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This thesis argues that there is a need to reappraise the significance of a jury in the 
adversarial criminal trial. A jury can no longer meet a prime criterion of its worth, which is 
that it brings to its decision making the collective common sense of the community from 
which it is drawn. In a new culturally diverse society, it is not representative enough to do so. 
Today’s jury does not comprise individuals from a single culture. It represents diverse 
cultures and sub-cultures, people from each of which will extract their own social meaning 
from courtroom discourse. This means there is a need for law to embrace a cross-disciplinary 
approach to adapting the discourse of adversarial law to contemporary society. It should 
recognize the need for courtroom advocacy to move beyond appraising the formal language 
competence of contributors. Standard accounts of language are inadequate to reveal the 
potential for discursive distortion of meaning. In fact, the language of courtroom discourse 
only promotes an illusion of transparent portrayal of facts, blinding the search for substantive 
truth in justice with the pragmatic allure of legal truth. Jury trial advocacy has in common 
with literary invention the power to press language into use to serve the preferred ends of the 
author. Each applies meaning to words according to context. Each brings to the narrative their 
own pre-understanding, or prejudices. Each constructs its narrative in contemplation of the 
minds it seeks to persuade and convince. But, courtroom advocates should not consider 
witnesses as manipulable characters in the narrative of the case; rather, they are contributors 
to its development. In this new diverse society, courtroom advocates should draw on lessons 
from language and literature to interpret, and understand the meaning of the narrative of law 
that they build in adversarial trials before jury. 
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The jury trial emphasis on language. Discursive manipulation can lead to distortion 
of meaning.  
There is a need to reappraise the value of a jury in the adversarial criminal trial. This is 
because it can no longer meet a prime criterion of its value, which is that it brings to its 
decision making the collective common sense of the community from which it is drawn. On 
the contrary, in the age of a new societal diversity, jury trial advocacy carries the potential for 
discursive distortion of meaning. This means there is a compelling need for law to embrace a 
cross-disciplinary approach to adapting the discourse of adversarial law to the new needs of 
society. It must recognize the need for courtroom advocacy to move beyond appraising the 
formal language competence of those contributors. 
Standard accounts of language are inadequate to reveal the potential for discursive distortion 
of meaning. Courtroom advocates should not consider witnesses as manipulable characters in 
the narrative of the case; rather, they are contributors to its development. Law must learn 
from sociolinguists, who concern themselves with the relationship of social entities with 
language use. The focus must move from competence in grammar, and syntax to 
performance. This means understanding the internalization of cultural rules that overlay rules 
of grammar and lexical choices. Thus, I argue that this new diversity of Australian society 
creates the need for courtroom advocates to draw on lessons from language and literature to 
interpret, and understand the meaning of the narrative of law that unfolds before them.  
The primary goal of the criminal trial ought to be to find truth in justice. This presumes that 
the jury will bring community common sense to its task to offset culturally derived 
differences in perceptions of justice and morality. I argue it is not representative enough to do 
so. Attempts to make it more representative are costly, and increases in representativeness are 
marginal. Moreover, I argue that the language of courtroom discourse promotes an illusion of 
transparent portrayal of facts, blinding the search for substantive truth in justice with the 





pragmatic allure of legal truth. Jury trial advocacy has in common with literary invention the 
power to press language into use to serve the preferred ends of the author. Each applies 
meaning to words according to context. Each brings to the narrative their own pre-
understanding, or prejudices. Each constructs its narrative in contemplation of the quality of 
the minds it seeks to persuade and convince. Therefore, as I now outline in overview, I argue 
that there is a need to move beyond a standard analysis of language if law is to understand the 
potential for distortion of meaning in courtroom discourse. 
An overview of how I argue my thesis 
The jury began in Britain in Anglo-Saxon times as the Crown’s communication conduit to its 
people. Only later did the Crown extend the jury function to finding facts in criminal trials. 
Conceptually in its development through successive stages up to the modern era, the jury 
prevailed, although its form and function changed. However, its successive changes always 
stemmed from the need of the Crown to sense the mind of the people. It was as champion of 
the Crown through its people rather than as champion of the rights of an accused that the jury 
evolved in the Middle Ages.  
The notion of the jury as conduit persists today. One of the perceived merits of the jury 
system is that by importing community values and common sense into the handing out of 
justice through the courts, it contributes to the legitimacy of the state. What this means is that 
the state, through its justice system, still champions the jury as conduit. It is a communication 
channel through which the state receives feedback from its people on whether bureaucratic 
notions of justice accord with community common sense.
1
 I examine this development in 
Chapter One. 
However, what the Crown in Anglo-Saxon Britain at the birth of the jury saw as common 
sense has little if anything in common with its modern-day restatement. Then, one could 
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more aptly equate it with common knowledge. For example, legal historian Theodore 
Plucknett points out that it was as ‘representative of the countryside rather than as a body of 
witnesses’ that the jury spoke.
 2
 If a felon wounded a person in one county, and the victim 
died in another, then the felon could not be tried ‘because a jury of the first county will know 
nothing of the death, and the jury of the second county will know nothing of the wounding.’
3
 
This meant that, rather than relying on facts presented through evidence in the court, jurors 
were expected to have their own knowledge of what had occurred.
4
 In other words, they 
brought to the court common knowledge of what had happened. Jurors were the indictors. I 
elaborate on the role of indictors in Chapter One. 
But, in its modern day restatement, the common sense that the court expects jurors to bring to 
their decision making expressly precludes prior knowledge of the issue in question. They 
must only discern facts from courtroom testimony. So, the premise that instils public 
confidence in the adversarial trial by jury is that because jurors hear from witnesses 
unmediated testimony, to which they apply community common sense, they discern facts, as 
they exist in the real world. Not as derived principally through legal argument. That is to say, 
the testimony they hear is unmediated. I believe that premise is flawed. As I discuss in the 
chapters to follow, counsel’s control of courtroom discourse means that transparent portrayal 
of facts to the jury is often illusory. And, that illusion is significant because it feeds the 
presumption of community common sense based, I argue, on another flawed premise. That is, 
that entrenched social values underlie community common sense. Furthermore, courtroom 
discourse is the tool counsel as advocates use to appeal to that perceived community common 
sense to persuade the jury to accept the advocate’s narrative of the case as true. But, as I 
explore in Chapter Five, a culturally diverse modern community does not contain such a 
common set of entrenched values. And, faulty perceptions of community values and common 
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sense can influence the structure of jury trial discourse. I also discuss the consequence of 
faulty perception of community values in Chapter Five.  
The adversarial trial as an oral event 
The adversarial trial is an oral event, which ought to aid the goal of unmediated testimony. It 
is in the orality of language, and in its use with others in genuine conversation—that is, in 
partnership with another, as distinct from mere participation with another—that we can 
explore and resolve omissions, distortions, false claims, and pretensions. But, the orality of 
the adversarial trial, does not give way to genuine conversation. It supresses it. In spite of 
this, the widespread view is that the jury hears witnesses present the facts first-hand, and, 
therefore, those are ‘raw facts’ because they are unmediated by such things as media 
excisions and selective emphases. Rules of evidence and criminal court rules of procedure 
purport to ensure that mediation of courtroom testimony does not occur. However, a power 
similar to that of media to distort, or mediate, underscores the procedures of adversarial trial 
discourse. It is just less evident. Opposing counsel, with the judge monitoring and 
constraining the discourse according to the rules of evidence, collaborate in an unwitting 
refutation of the legal truism that juries are best suited to finding the truth. 
Rarely does the court give the witness the unfettered option to tell their story in their own 
words, which is the common way one relates a story in interpersonal dialogue. Counsel will 
want there to be a narrative, but they are to be the authors of it. Witnesses are to feed the plot 
development, but under the direction—the discipline—of counsel as authors. Arguably, the 
skill of the courtroom advocate lies in their ability to comprehend a brief, mould it into the 
language of law, and organize courtroom discourse to persuade the jury to one or the other 
counsel’s competing narrative. Furthermore, because the adversarial trial with jury is an oral 
event, rules for witness testimony are founded on language. However, as I contend in Chapter 
Four, organization of courtroom discourse occurs beyond a level that standard accounts of 
language can account for.  





Obsessed with language, sometimes we cannot see the wood for the trees 
When I claim that jury trial procedure is obsessed with language, I do mean that literally. I 
submit that the power of language strongly influences those who determine rules of evidence. 
After all, language is law’s tool of trade, and from our very early days at school, we learn 
that, in language, grammar rules. Moreover, we learn that meaning resides in language. In 
Chapters Three and Four especially, I analyse this monolithic hypothesis of language to 
reveal its limitations in addressing the nature of courtroom discourse. I suggest that in our 
rule-focused journey through school, and in our indefatigable search for meaning in the 
language of law, we sometimes allow the trees to blind us to the wood. And, that metaphor 
points to the essence of my thesis that Standard, or monolithic, accounts of language and law 
are inadequate to reveal the potential for discursive distortion of meaning in criminal trial 
before jury.  
The evolution of the jury as Institution—the bastion of individual rights 
To explain the nature of the community, which vindicates the thrust of my thesis, I set the 
historical context by tracing the chequered development of the Anglo-Australian jury. It starts 
in the Middle Ages, and evolves through often-volatile steps into the notion of jury we have 
today.  
In an earlier paper, I discussed how, in successive eras, the state—the Crown in its early 
Anglo-Saxon form —had institutionalized the notion of the jury as the bastion of individual 
rights.
5
 I expressed the view that, in those successive eras, the jury was always a 
manifestation of the Crown’s self-assessed need to affirm its legitimacy. The institution of the 
jury achieved this by seeming to express the will of the people in the meting out of justice. 
Therefore, the Crown wanted its conduit to the people to be unmediated by third parties. That 
is why it was reluctant to allow lawyers to intercede in the feedback process. At first, it would 
not allow them to appear at all. When, later, it did allow them to appear in criminal trials, it 
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did so reluctantly and with constraints on their involvement. I explain the nature and 
consequences of this reluctance in Chapter One.  
Even the introduction of the jury in criminal trials in the first instance was exigent. It 
followed the cessation of the trial by ordeal, which the church had banned in 1215. Trial by 
ordeal was seen to reflect directly the will of God, and the intercession of the jury as a 
mediator of God’s will appealed neither to the Crown nor—counter-intuitively—to the 
accused, who did not wish to trust their fate to profane human beings. Nor were jurors happy. 
The reach and power of the Church was ubiquitous. It permeated peoples’ lives, reminding 
them that they must not usurp the will of God, and must not set themselves up as a secular 
replacement for God’s right alone to judge his creatures. Almost overnight, it seemed, the 
Crown, though, was asking them to do just that. In Chapter One, I reveal how, perversely, the 
Crown addressed this problem with the introduction of the principle of beyond reasonable 
doubt, not to protect individual rights, but to ensure more convictions.  
Within this history, I examine how the role of lawyers developed in criminal trials, 
specifically their capacity to mediate the transfer of raw facts from witnesses to jurors. 
Symbolically, the power of courtroom advocates to manipulate courtroom discourse still 
mirrors the state’s power in the Middle Ages to mediate God the creator’s purported 
admonition to his creatures not to judge. But, the state as self-anointed secular advocate 
displaced God’s invariant truth with the more pragmatic legal truth. Even after the 
Enlightenment and the humanist assurance that God is now dead, the symbolism of the God-
fearing era that spawned the jury remains, and serves the same useful purpose of securing the 
legitimacy of the state. That is, the state symbolically enlists the power of the people to 
ensure that subjectivity of secular judicial judgment does not supplant the transcendent truth 
in justice. And, the justice system has entrenched community common sense as the 
embodiment of that truth. In the process, though, through its rules of evidence and criminal 
court procedure, the justice system has invested in courtroom advocacy the authority to direct 
the meaning of discourse.  





In Chapter Two, I use an illustrative case study to examine how counsel
6
 organise courtroom 
discourse to direct the development of the narrative of the case down paths that best suit 
counsel’s desired outcome. Competing counsel each pitch their preferred narrative outcome 
to the jury in zealous advocacy of their client’s cause. Yet, even in the heat of their oral 
battle, they do come together in voir dire discussion of admissibility of testimony to ensure 
that control of development of the narrative of the case never passes to witnesses.  
Nevertheless, the focus of jury reform remains on making it more representative of a putative 
homogeneous community and the common sense with which it is imbued. The question, 
though, is whether common (or community) sense is a vestige of a past that a new reality has 
replaced.  
The nature of community 
We can define a community as a particular area or place considered together with its 
inhabitants.
7 
But, that is unsatisfactory, because an inhabitant is someone who lives in a 
particular place. Alternatively, we can define it as a group of people having a particular 
characteristic in common. But, that might merely tell us they live in the same place (they are 
inhabitants); it tells us almost nothing about shared community values. Geoffrey Walker is 
more specific. He claims a community is a part of society defined as ‘the customs and 
organization of an ordered community,’
8
 which reflect inherited values.
9
 Professor Geoffrey 
Hazard writes that those who live in a ‘single community’, which I interpret as one 
untrammelled by diversity, have a simpler moral life. Ideals, commitment, and expectations 
are common because they stem from the same inherited values.
10
 This is an ideal community, 
which listens to everyone’s voice. But, in the less than ideal universe from which the jury is 
                                                 
6
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chosen, not all voices have the opportunity to be heard. The effect is that the chosen jury is 
less than ideally representative.  
In his foreword to a study by Stephen Parker, Courts and the Public, Then Honourable Justice 
Neil J Buckley, President of the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA ), 
refers to Courts and ‘their public.’
11
 In his preface to the same publication, Parker, too, refers 
to the courts and ‘their publics,’ although the title of the study is ‘Courts and the public.’ The 
difference might seem a semantic quibble; just two ways of referring to the same community 
that the justice system serves. However, whomever else it does serve, the court is always a 
public servant. In that role, it is also a resource (principally) to other public servants; it is not 
only a vehicle in criminal law through which its primary moral obligation is to justice done 
and seen to be done. Even in its actions as an administrative resource though, it will still need 
to be representative of the community, but only broadly. However, when looking at the 
nature of a representative jury in a criminal trial, it is to the community composed of diverse 
publics to which we ought to attend. It is in this capacity that the jury came into being; it did 
not start out as a champion of the individual rights of the accused. But, to speak of the jury as 
representing diverse publics is to think of it as representative of a universal audience, which, 
however, can only ever be a construct of the rhetor,
12
 who, in the form of courtroom 
advocate, tries to persuade it to a preferred point of view. The reality is that the jury must 
always be a particular, not a universal, audience, as I will now explain. 
The universal audience is a concept, not an aggregation of real people. The arguer 
conceptualises it as a standard against which to judge what data a particular audience might 
accept as self-evidently true. Therefore, the better way to ensure the jury does deliver 
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community values and common sense in its decisions is to improve the ways in which 
advocates and judges present testimony to it. I argue that this means introducing theories of 
the social sciences, and literature to augment legal theories to analyse courtroom discourse at 
a level above language. It is only through such a cross-discipline approach to analysis that 
one can reveal the opportunity for distortion of meaning in courtroom discourse. To explain 
the nature of courtroom discourse using only competing theories of law and standard 
accounts of language is to leave too much to practitioner intuition. I traverse this territory in 
Chapter Six, in which I consider the value of legal and social theory in moving beyond a 
monolithic hypothesis of language into discourse, which is beyond language. 
Courtroom advocates in criminal trials before jury can learn from legal and social theory 
In both New Zealand and Australia, law commissions have talked about the important 
legitimating role of juries without defining what they understand the term to mean. We need 
to know what kind of legitimacy describes the relationship of the justice system and the 
community if we are to understand how a jury contributes to it. If jury-as-symbol is all that 
the justice system needs for it to be legitimate, it already has that; it can leave well enough 
alone. If it wants substantive truth in legitimacy, it ought not to waste time and money on 
marginally improving representation, but look to the workings of the jury decision-making 
process. This would require that it draw on other disciplines in support of law. On the other 
hand, if it wants legitimacy in the form of ‘dehumanized’, rational decision-making, it does 
not need a representative jury. Because, only in dehumanisation can it ignore ‘love, hatred, 
and all purely irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation.’
13
 But, those are 
the things that theorists such as Bruner
14
suggest differentiate decision making by laypersons 
from decisions made by specialists. Those are the elements that stimulate community 
common sense.  
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However, former New Zealand High Court judge, E.W Thomas maintains that not everyone 
agrees on the need for theory to intrude into judicial practice. He cites Andrew Halpin’s 
identification of various strands of practitioner’s scepticism towards theory, 
15
and suggests 
that ‘they are encountered often enough in legal practice. Scepticism is first apparent in the 
belief that the law has no need of theory. Legal practice is regarded as sufficiently rich to 
make theory redundant.’
16
 Philip Leith and Peter Ingram acknowledge the importance of 
theory, with a caution. Jurisprudence can aid the legal process only ‘if it can be brought out 
of its back room and away from its limited perspectives: by accepting that a legal theory is 
little without a social theory.’
17
 
What is a theory of law? Is it a theory of natural law? Legal positivism? Legal realism? Is it 
the relative newcomer, Critical Legal Studies? I can do no more than broadly survey them, 
which I do in Chapter Six. However, one needs to understand how they compete for 
relevance to answer the question, should law embrace legal and social theory as a way to 
avoid bureaucratic dehumanization. I discuss Thomas’s view that scepticism of theory is 
misplaced and dangerous. ‘Intuition and unquestioned assumptions replace a personal theory 
of law or a conception of the judicial role. If the judge does have a personal theory, it may be 
largely unarticulated, or incomplete, or even unsound, or it may be no more than a felt 
approach reflecting a vaguely understood legal theory.’
18
 Does the apparent judicial 
ambivalence to theory feed the fear that, in criminal trials before judge alone lies the potential 
for arbitrary judgments? Since the secularisation of law, God is no longer the feared arbitrator 
of the morality of the judge’s decision in a criminal trial. To state it plainly, judges need no 
longer seek to spread the risk of incurring God’s wrath by seeking safety in numbers through 
the jury. Nevertheless, as the Crown did in the Middle Ages, the justice system still prefers to 
entrust the task of fact finding to the common sense of a jury, even though cost increasingly 
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decrees that it does otherwise. Therefore, I suggest the need to reconsider the principles of 
narrative construction in courtroom discourse by addressing the following issues.  
First, the adversary criminal trial courtroom is what I will call, a meaning filtration system. 
Those who organize and direct it are the diverse officers of the court who play a part in 
confirming or confounding the institutionalized
19
 belief that juries are best suited to finding 
the truth because they have access to raw, unmediated facts.
 20
 This raises the question 
whether the discourse counsel employ in the courtroom is a form of neutral mediation. Or 
does it create potential for systemic distortion of linguistic meaning? 
Second, the question and answer exchange of witness examination—what Brenda Danet 
describes as the adjacency pair social interaction, governed by the chain maxim (question and 
answer exchange)—is preoccupied with rules. The application of language in the legal 
setting, reveals, she contends, ‘a preoccupation with language rather than the relation 
between language and the world.
21
 So, does courtroom advocacy consider witnesses as 
manipulable characters in the narrative of the case; or as contributors to its development? 
Third, to comprehend the language competence and performance of witnesses one must also 
recognize that the jury does not comprise individuals from a single culture. It represents 
diverse cultures and sub-cultures, each of whom will extract their own social meaning from 
the courtroom discourse. 
Fourth, for the jury to serve the reality of truth in justice, and to be more than merely a 
symbol of it, requires that we distinguish between ordinary conversations, and the rules of 
engagement in an adversarial courtroom. Ordinary conversation is a willing exchange 
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between partners in the conversation with the aim of reaching a common understanding.
22
 
The rules of engagement in courtroom discourse pit one agonist against another. It compels 
the use of language strategically and tactically rather than cooperatively. This raises the 
question whether the justice system needs to move beyond appraising the formal language 
competence of witnesses. In this, can it learn from sociolinguists, who concern themselves 
with the relationship of social entities and language use?  
Fifth, there has been significant research into how to improve the jury selection process to 
reflect the diverse community it represents.
23
 However, because of the range of cultures and 
sub-cultures that this diversity embraces, improvements can at best be marginal. Selection 
parameters alone make the task unwieldy. Furthermore, the cost for a mere marginal gain is 
hard to justify.  
Therefore, 
Sixth, is the better way to ensure the jury deliver community values and common sense, to 
recast the principle of narrative construction of courtroom discourse? And,   
Seventh, the overarching question. In the age of a new social consciousness, does Australia 
still need the jury? 
These questions underscore my discussion in which I traverse the Anglo-Australian evolution 
of the institution of trial by jury from its origins to the age of a new social consciousness.  
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Chapter structure  
Chapter One: The origin and evolution of the jury 
I address the question, how and why did we acquire a jury system. How did it originate? How 
did it evolve through successive eras from the Middle Ages up to, and into, the modern era? 
Why did the jury trial gain the status of Institution?
 24
 I organize the discussion in three parts. 
First, I analyse the concept of the jury-as-institution. This is primarily a conceptual 
discussion, conducted in awareness of Law and Literature foundation member James Boyd 
White’s warning that to accept “concept” as an unassailable truth in which to ground an 
argument in law is to risk asserting a conclusion grounded in nothing more than a subjective 
idea falsely promoted into perceived irrefutability.
 25
 Even so, as Michael Chesterman asserts, 
the High Court of Australia uses its judgments to reassert the ‘traditional values and features 
of the jury trial.’
26
 In this analysis, I address the question, why is the idea of jury as institution 
so pervasive? 
Second, I provide an overview of the origins and evolution of the jury. Thomas Green holds 
that the jury arose as an act of ‘administrative expediency, after the Church banned trial by 
ordeal [in 1215].’
27
 W.S. Holdsworth reveals that, because the Crown was reluctant to 
relinquish control of the jury, it was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century that it 
allowed prisoners to call witnesses.
 28
  Moreover, even the now hallowed ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ did not begin as the accused’s safeguard against an ill-considered verdict of guilty.  
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So, third, I examine the systemic nature of the jury trial and contend that, the jury is still 
valued in Australia because of its institutionalized symbolism as guardian of individual 
rights, in spite of the secularisation of law in the modern era. I explain this increasing 
secularisation since the Enlightenment by examining the concept of natural law, stemming 
from its Christian roots, and its clash with a legal positivist claim to a more enlightened view 
of law without God. For instance, recourse to God is now an option in the courtroom—
witnesses may swear on the bible, or avoid religious association by taking an oath of 
affirmation. 
Against this background, I discuss whether courtroom and procedural symbolism still inhibits 
judges and lawyers from acknowledging the reality of a new social consciousness and from 
recognising the need to shape courtroom discourse to deal with it. Chapter One, therefore, 
provides the context for the analysis that follows. 
Chapter Two: How advocates control courtroom discourse: an illustrative case 
study 
In Chapter Two, I use a case study of an actual recent criminal trial before jury to show how 
the rules of evidence and the assessment of the probative worth of testimony facilitate a 
compromise between contextual and invariant truth. I show that, in my case study, the 
lawyers have reached an understanding, not of meaning, but of rules. Moreover, often 
counsel and judge set these rules in the voir dire. I discuss the significance of this process, 
which excludes key partakers in the procedure of finding the facts in witness testimony—the 
jurors. Furthermore, in setting the rules—albeit with adherence to rules of evidence and 
criminal trial procedure—counsel also tacitly agree who will control what happens in open 
court. That is, they decree that development of the narrative of the case must not pass to 
witnesses, as this illustrative case study shows. 





My case study is illustrative, not prescriptive. Its value lies in stimulating the idea that it does 
promote contemplation of why a witness might want to construct their own narrative, and 
why counsel might wish to prevent them.  
Chapter Three: Why standard accounts of language and law are inadequate to 
assess the nature of courtroom discourse 
Roman Jakobson claims that if we are to get to the essence of the organization of discourse, 
we must move beyond language. He probes the realm of linguistics to expound a need to 
revise the notion of “the monolithic hypothesis of language.”
29 
A monolithic approach would 
suggest that writing and reading are manifestations of language used in speaking and 
listening. I explore the reason why this is not an adequate way to analyse the oral 
performance that is courtroom discourse. I draw on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s assertion that 
language is a game in which it is only possible to play if one knows the rules.
 30
 But, these 
rules go beyond the inert rules of grammar. And, as Andrew Halpin explains, when a word is 
open to diverse meanings, ‘we may fail to grasp what rules are appropriate to govern the 
proper uses of a particular word’ in different applications of it.
 31
 
Chapter Four: Creating the illusion of transparent portrayal of facts. The strategic 
and manipulative use of discourse 
The key point I make in this chapter is that the standard accounts of language do not explain 
adequately the nature of courtroom discourse in criminal trials before a jury. One cannot 
understand how discourse truly represents the worldview of protagonists in any trial by 
analysing it from the formalist viewpoint of the grammarian. However, the rules of evidence 
almost ensure this outcome. They discourage consideration of the social relations of language 
with the world it represents. Such consideration requires that one acknowledge the inherent 
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instability of the processes that diverse receivers bring to their determination of the meaning 
of the text. Discourse cannot truly represent the worldview of protagonists in any trial if one 
analyses it from the formalist viewpoint of the grammarian. The court demands of discursive 
organization in criminal trials that witness testimony reveals the what, when, and how of any 
action, and that it avoids apparent speculation on the why. Yet, when we extend search for 
the truth into the “why,” rather than stop at the “what, when, and how,” we then understand 
that a person exists in performance. So, in testimony we need the person as entity with a 
psychical attribute that gives them a transcendent presence only in performance of intentional 
acts. Only then can we have a substantive truth. Only then can we bring a common sense to 
bear. 
Chapter Five: How wrong perceptions of common sense and community values can 
influence organization of jury trial discourse 
Chapter Five is pivotal. In it, I explore the nature of the specific audience—the jury—which 
counsel attempt to persuade to accept their respective propositions. That is to say, the justice 
system has drawn the jury from the statistical universe, which is a particular audience. It is 
not a universal audience. A universal audience is the ideal construct of the rhetor. In the 
context of the jury, one is talking of a particular audience, with its values and prejudices, 
which jurors supposedly represent. Gadamer asserts that prejudice is not an impediment to 
reaching an understanding. On the contrary, two people, who start from their own prejudiced 
viewpoints, but who converse cooperatively, will arrive at an understanding that informs both 
participants.’
32
 However, counsel do not play the parts that Gadamer assigns to those who 
converse in partnership. Each plays to win over the jury to accept their argument. Also, for a 
person—our juror—to rise to the level of the universal, they must sacrifice their particularity. 
This means ascent to the universality of substantive truth. To imagine (for that is all the 
rhetor can do) a universal audience common to diverse communities—one that reflects their 
agreements on values and standards—is difficult.  
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Jürgen Habermas asks ‘How can we reconcile the assumption that there is a world existing 
independently of our descriptions of it and that is the same for all observers with the 
linguistic insight that we have no direct, linguistically unmediated access to “brute” 
reality?’
33
 He raises another concern. He notes that analysis of linguistic utterances largely 
has neglected questions ‘pertaining to theories of communication, action, morality, and the 
law’.
34
 He cites an exception, however, quoting Michael Dummet. 
Language, it is natural to say, has two principle functions: that of an instrument of communication, and 
that of a vehicle of thought. We are therefore impelled to ask which of the two is primary. Is it because 
language is an instrument of communication that it can also serve as a vehicle of thought? Or is it, 
conversely, because it is a vehicle of thought, and can therefore express thoughts, that it can be used by 
one person to communicate his thoughts to others?
35
 
The answers are important generally to comprehend how one might best use the power and 
purpose of language to reach an understanding with another, or to compel or coerce. What is 
more, the organization of courtroom discourse aims to persuade rather than to convince. It is 
a theatre of operation in which the abstract principles of argumentation confront the exigency 
of a real situation. 
But, if the state values the symbolic presence of the jury as a legitimating device, then 
courtroom advocates increasingly will need to tailor their courtroom discourse to an audience 
that can never be truly universal. Rather, they will be attempting to persuade a particular 
audience of disparate prejudices and predispositions. It is an audience with a need for stories 
that are not tightly constrained by rules that aim to move evidence from story into a presumed 
value-free rational core. The community common sense, which the jury brings to fact-
finding, expresses itself best in storytelling, and, the collective memory of the group to which 
the storyteller belongs influences the nature of community common sense. It is more likely to 
be consistent in a group of common origin.  
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Without knowing how the jury deals with the mediated oral cut and thrust of the adversarial 
trial, it seems imprudent to laud jury secrecy as protecting the purity of the jury verdict and as 
representing common-sense morality. 
Chapter Six: What courtroom advocates can learn from embracing legal and 
literary theory 
Throughout my discussion, I affirm the theme that to understand better the nature of common 
sense and its relationship to community values, we need a cross-discipline approach to theory 
to augment theories of law. Historically, Berman says, ‘a social theory of law’ was concerned 
with ‘the extent to which the Western legal tradition has always been dependent on…belief in 
the existence of a body of law beyond the law of the highest political authority.’
36
 It was once 
called divine law, then natural law, and, more recently, human rights.
37
 However, there is a 
view within the judiciary that Law’s own experience so enriches legal practice that it has no 
need for theory. I challenge that view. It leads to searching for solutions to problems in 
pragmatism, which might dispel a problem, but not necessarily resolve it. 
The pragmatic driver of courtroom advocacy is persuasion to adhere to counsel’s preferred 
narrative of the case. And the preferred narrative of the case is that which steers clear of 
perceived ambiguities of substantive truth—the output of the consciousness of witnesses—in 
favour of the rational certainty of legal truth, which is the output of rules of evidence. 
Substantive truth bows to legal truth, in pursuit of which courtroom discourse is organized. 
Legal truth implicitly founds on the premise of equality, in that the rational certainty of legal 
truth treats all parties alike; they are legal persons ‘free and equal subjects of the law’s 
address’, with an equal capacity for free will.
38
 The pertinent question, though, is whether this 
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means merely that they are free in the sense that this equality strips them of all their 
idiosyncratic characteristics. 
Though tacit, there is an underlying theme in the views I have cited here. That is, the need for 
simplicity in reciting the narrative of the case. In earlier chapters, I have discussed broadly 
the importance of social theories as supplement to legal theory in the organisation of 
courtroom discourse. A fuller discussion is beyond the scope of my thesis. What is more, the 
overarching theme of my study is the potential for discursive manipulation of meaning in a 
trial before a jury. Furthermore, I have stressed that a standard model of language is not 
adequate to illuminate meaning in courtroom discourse. Therefore, in this chapter, I still 
probe beyond the constraining paradigm of the sufficient richness of legal practice and 
venture into the vexed province of law and literature. I argue that courtroom advocates can 
learn from literature why there is a need to organize courtroom discourse to account for the 
differing social realities across cultures. In short, why in adversarial trials before juries there 
is a need for stories. 
Chapter Seven: Comprehending a new social consciousness: does Australia still need 
the jury? 
When I reviewed my analysis of my case study, I realised that I kept coming back  to 
Witness’s answer to the question why he crossed the road toward, what screams had led him 
to presume, was the site of a person in danger. It seemed to be an unproblematic question. On 
the face of it, it was just setting the context for the jury, explaining how the witness found 
himself at the centre of an assault. He was not part of its development, just an accidental late 
arrival to it. But, at trial, the prosecutor—challenged by a defence counsel objection because 
of what was agreed in the voir dire—was telling the witness “what this court is interested in 
is what you saw and what you heard.” The court did not want to know what he was thinking. 
It was not until later that I found that the question, which at first had seemed nothing more 
than a device to establish the context for what would follow, was loaded with discursive 
weight.  





I was uncovering something beyond my initial objective, which was to reveal the potential 
for distortion of meaning in courtroom discourse. For that, my focus was discourse as a 
stimulus-response procedure. But, what constitutes the community common sense that the 
jury system prizes is much more than a mechanistic stimulus response action of the brain. 
Kant had made the point in his Critique of Pure Reason  
The body would thus be, not the cause of our thinking, but merely a condition restrictive thereof, and 




We cannot interrogate collective consciousness—the wellspring of putative community 
common sense—using a stimulus-response, physiological approach. Yet the rules of evidence 
as they apply to courtroom testimony seem premised on a principle that providing so-called 
raw testimony to the jury requires courtroom discourse to do just that. But, community 
common sense resides in collective consciousness; and, what is more, today’s jury does not 
comprise individuals from a single culture. It represents diverse cultures and sub-cultures, 
each of whom will extract their own social meaning from courtroom discourse. And, that 
raises the question, has the jury as a putative link in the cohering bonds of the community lost 
its relevance? In Chapter Seven, I argue this is where we must focus if we are to answer an 
implicit underlying question, does modern society still need the jury? 
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Chapter One: The origin and evolution of the jury. Why 
Australia still wants it.     
Introduction 
In this chapter, I set the context for the analysis to follow. I structure this chapter in three 
related parts. First, I discuss the concept of the jury as institution. This discussion is largely 
conceptual, although I acknowledge James Boyd White’s admonition to beware of the 
seductive allure of ‘concept and its cognates.’
40
 To accept concept as an unassailable truth in 
which to ground an argument in law is to risk asserting a conclusion grounded in nothing 
more than a subjective idea falsely promoted into a perceived irrefutability of concept. But, to 
promote a subjective idea into an intersubjective shared idea is a reach too far. For example, 
if I talk about the concept of freedom, I may think it means one’s personal or civic liberty. 
William James equates it with sensation, in that there is ‘no feeling of sensible constraint.’
41
 
Janis Joplin sings ‘Freedom’s just another word for nothing else to lose.’
42
 Each of these 
conceptions of freedom potentially has a meaning that differs from other meanings. 
Personal or civic freedom carries the idea of a positive liberty, that is, the power to influence 
one’s own future. Freedom of sensible constraint may mean nothing more than being able to 
move without the constraint of four walls or physical shackles. Both explanations carry 
ambivalences that remain unresolved without further qualification. Nevertheless, vague hope 
resides in each. On the other hand, Joplin sings in Kris Kristofferson’s Me And Bobby 
McGee: ‘Freedom's just another word for nothin' left to lose And nothin' ain't worth nothin' 
but it's free ...’. I might interpret those lyrics as an expression of denial from a despairing 
heart. Someone else might counter that they at least have the virtue of absoluteness even 
though that absoluteness manifests itself in hopelessness. Saint de Exupery writes of freedom, 
perversely, as a kind of contentment. ‘Yet he who is blind to this havoc of his life grieves not 
for his bygone plenitude, but is contented with his new-won freedom, which is the freedom of 
having ceased to exist.’
43
 How one relates to language determines its consequences. Yet, to 
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think conceptually of the jury-as-institution has the effect of transforming it into what I will 
describe as a symbolic reality. We need to understand why, as I discuss below.  
Second, then, in this chapter, I delve below the surface symbolism to reveal better the 
actuality of the origins and evolution of the jury system. I provide an overview of the 
evolution of the jury from its administrative beginnings in Anglo-Saxon Middle Ages through 
to the modern era. Its growth is inconsistent. Some of its early history is speculative. 
However, what will appear as a constant is a picture of a time when God—or His secular 
agent on earth, the Church—weighed heavily on the consciences of those the Crown called 
upon to judge their fellow man or woman. So, the power of God or the church had much to 
do with the way the jury evolved. Moreover, it had much to do with the inconsistent 
development of the jury as an element of the criminal trial, as I will explain. 
This brings my discussion to the third, synthesising, part in which I examine the systemic 
nature of the jury in criminal trials in the modern era. We will see that it is still valued in 
Australia because of its institutionalized symbolism as guardian of individual rights, but now 
with recourse to God reduced to an option.
44
 Therefore, within this section, I discuss the 
concept of natural law, stemming from its Christian roots, and its ultimate clash with a legal 
positivist claim to a more enlightened view of law without God. However, in spite of the shift 
to the teaching of law as secular, symbolism inhibits judge and lawyer from acknowledging 
the new reality of community values, and recognising the need to shape courtroom discourse 
to deal with it. When we can lay bare this reality, we are better able to understand courtroom 
discourse as more than the organization of a ‘mere system of rules,’ as Jeanne Gaakeer has 
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First, though, in the next section, I explore the perception of the jury as an institution that 
embodies the community values, expressed as community common sense. 
The jury as Institution 
The manner in which section 80 of the Australian Constitution influences perception beyond 
its literal scope illustrates the force of institutionalization. For instance, there is a widespread 
view in the community that the Constitution guarantees all citizens trial before jury for 
indictable offences. This is despite the fact that section 80 refers only to offences against the 
laws of the Commonwealth, and that the requirement for a trial before jury in those 
circumstances contains nothing about a jury of the peers of the defendant.
46
 What is more, 
when first formulating their ‘rules’ for the conduct of jury trials, the Australian states were 
pointed in their exclusions of some citizens as peers. For example, The Juries Act (1898) WA 
did not provide for women to serve on juries, and Parliament did not even discuss the 
matter.
47
 Moreover, not all men were equal when it came to qualification to serve on the jury. 
According to section Five, 
Every man (except as hereinafter excepted) between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years residing 
within the said Colony, and who shall have within the Colony, either in his own name or in trust for him, 
real estate of the value of fifty pounds sterling, clear of all incumbrances [sic], or a clear personal estate 
of the value of one hundred and fifty pounds sterling or upwards, shall be qualified and liable to serve as 
a common juror in all civil and criminal proceedings and on any inquisition in the said Colony within a 
radius of thirty-six miles from his residence.
48
 
However, the early history of Australia tells us that just because the legislature decrees it to 
be so does not mean that broad consensus of who are one’s peers follows. Chesterman writes 
that, in a colony comprising both free settlers and emancipists, the idea of all colonists as 
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peers of one another came under strain.
49
 Neither group could trust the other group to 
approach their decision making free of bias. The free settlers argued ‘that Emancipists would 
be far too willing to acquit and, moreover, that they themselves should not suffer the 
indignity of trial before jurors who were still tainted by their criminal records, even though 
they might now be law-abiding people who were able to satisfy a property qualification.’
50
  
Chesterman maintains that, in spite of section 80, which applies only to trials of any offences 
against Commonwealth laws, the High Court is committed to using its judgments to reassert 
the ‘traditional values and features of the jury trial.’
51
 Its judgments serve as ‘strong 
reminders of the reasons why jury trial travelled from England to Australia in the first 
place.’
52
 Be that as it may, history does not support a view of the jury having carried through 
successive periods of development moral values that transcended the exigent needs of the 
eras through which it passed. I suggest that the judgments more strongly reflect the power of 
an institutionalized myth, using that word in the sense of a traditional story told and often 
memorialized, to explain or enshrine cultural practices.  
The institutionalization of the jury in the common law has served the state
53
 well. As a 
legitimating device, in fact, it reflects the power of ‘the institution.’ This is why, at every 
stage of the jury’s history, through the changing justifications for it, the most compelling 
answer to the question, why do we need a jury is symbiosis. That is to say, interdependence. 
If the community has confidence that a jury represents it adequately, it is content that it has a 
voice in the maintenance of social order. If the state—through its agent, the justice system—
has the confidence of the community, it can reinforce the legitimacy of its right to govern. 
Yet, what the institution is, and what it ought to be is easily confused. 
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 In this and subsequent uses of “state,” meaning polity broadly, I will not capitalise it. 





The ambiguity of Institution 
The word ‘institution’ (in its morphological variations), recurs throughout my thesis. Writers 
I cite generally do not define it. For example, in the High Court case of R v Snow, Griffith CJ 
is adamant that the trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth 
shall be by jury. It represents a ‘fundamental law of the Commonwealth, which ‘ought prima 
facie to be construed as an adoption of the institution of “trial by jury” with all that was 
connoted by that phrase in constitutional law and in the common law of England.’
54
 He does 
not define “institution.” In 1993, in Cheatle,
55
  the High Court refers to the ‘institution of trial 
by jury,’ ‘institution of criminal trial by jury’ or to the diminution ‘the institution’ 21 times, 
without defining what it means by the word institution.  
Writers who do actually define the word give “institution” various meanings. Randall Calvert 
contends,  
This seems especially to have been true in political science, where an institution is variously a set of 
rules of the game that regulate lower-level political activities; a central and widespread species of 
interest groups; a highly formalized and elaborated type of organization; a method of preference 
aggregation; and a set of norms, habits, rules of thumb, and other precepts for decision making and 
behavioural choices with which a political group is endowed. 
Neil MacCormick
56
 expresses these aspects of “Institution” by analogy rather than by explicit 
definition.
57
 In particular, he examines the difference between informal norms and ‘explicit or 
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implicit rules that may be introduced and established, or developed and recognized, by 
persons holding some position of authority.’
58
 In other words, they become institutionalized 
norms. We sometimes call informal norms “informal social conventions.” However, 
convention differs from institution, which MacCormick’s example of queuing clarifies. 
Where there is a queue, he asserts, ‘you ought to take your turn in it, and people do so 
because in their opinion that is what one ought to do’ in that situation. People do not need a 
‘canonically formulated or formulable rule’
59
 about queuing. Moreover, if one were to offer 
such a rule, chances are it would provoke discussion about whether it was a good rule. 
Without it, generally people know what to do. And, if they do not, there are plenty of people 
standing in line who will tell them. That then is a norm. ‘This very orderliness seems 
explicable by reference to an implicit queuing norm whose articulate understanding would be 
a matter of interpretive debate among those who acknowledge the practice as an essentially 
shared or common one and try to “play fair” within it, adequately satisfying each other’s 
mutual expectations.’
60
 We have now entered the esoteric realm of ‘interpretive concepts.’
61
 
However, even if we dress it up with a fancy name, it still means the same thing. That is, an 
innate need for orderliness, prompts a give-and-take attitude to the process. 
MacCormick reminds us, though, that queuing is not always an informal social convention. In 
another situation, someone in authority might have declared that we are required to queue—
whether we like it or not.
62
 Think of banks, airport check-in counters. People have to 
orientate themselves to the queuing, but it is no longer just social convention. Queuing has 
become a quasi ‘rule’. But, not a real rule.  
Unlike informal norms or conventions, explicitly made rules have an expressly promulgated text. 
Interpretation of norms in the form of explicit rules necessarily involves attending to the very words 
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used by the rule-maker, and reflecting on the underlying point of the words only where the words seem 




The significant point is the difference between explicit and implicit rules. MacCormick cites 
as a ‘classic example’ of an implicit rule, the doctrine of precedent. The ‘elusive “ratio 
decidendi” of a case is the implicit rule laid down by the court whose decision in a particular 
case constitutes a precedent that is applicable generally.’
64
 The rule is effectual to the extent 
that ‘institutional’ relations exist between the judges and courts. It also needs an institutional 
attitude to ‘constancy of decisions’ on different occasions over time. To this, MacCormick 
adds ‘the bare idea of universalizability,’
65
 by which he means widespread or common 
acceptance. In other words, universalizability suggests constancy in that all people, in a given 
circumstance, would tend to act or react in a similar way. For our purpose in talking about the 
jury, that means a common sense of what is right, either morally or as communal duty. 
MacCormick argues that the world of human beings includes both ‘sheer physical facts’ and 
‘institutional facts,’ which are facts that depend on some normative framework that embraces 
intersubjective agreement on how one interprets things, events, and behaviour. Institutional 
facts are ‘omnipresent and inherent elements of social reality.’
66
 In law, such elements will 
include contract, property, marriage, and so forth. It will also embrace institutionalism of law, 
through such agencies as the courts, legislature, police force, and so on. Unless we 
understand what the referent stands for, and how normative order acquires its status, the 
phrase ‘institutionalism of law’ floats aimlessly in a sea of abstraction. He describes 
normative order against a background of reciprocity. So that even in informal settings, we 
will try to interact with others in a way that shows we share an understanding of what is right 
and wrong conduct, as I have discussed earlier, illustrating with MacCormick’s example of 
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queuing. That is, an innate need for orderliness prompts a give-and-take attitude to the 
process. 
In a largely homogeneous society, in which a jury is more likely to comprise peers of the 
accused from the monocultural society of which they are all members, reciprocity—the 
process of give and take—is likely to have some effect on jury deliberations. In a 
multicultural society, I submit, this is less true, as I discuss below.
67
 I return to this topic in 
Chapter Five, in which I examine jury trial discourse and assumptions about common sense 
and common community values, which the justice system claims inform jury decision 
making. But do common sense and common community values inform those decisions? 
Because juror deliberations are secret, all we can claim is that calling upon so-called 
normative statements to justify acts or omissions might instead be invoking a descriptive 
epistemology. This means invoking facts not values. Normative jurisprudence, for example, 
includes discussion of the role of morality in law; the role of conscience in response to 
unduly repressive or repugnant law; and the approach judges ought to adopt in deciding hard 
cases, in other words, how people ought to think, generally expressed as values. Descriptive 




Distinguishing between fact and value in real life can lead to ambiguity of meaning. One way 
of avoiding the difficulty is to apply the ‘principle of humanity.’
69
 This means that ‘when 
interpreting another speaker we must assume that his or her beliefs and desires are connected 
to each other and to reality in some way, and attribute to him or her the propositional attitudes 
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one supposes one would have oneself in those circumstances.’
70
 The consequence of applying 
this principle is an assumption that people think what they ought to think. The transformation 
from “is” to “ought” is smoothly seductive. “Is,” which connotes the community standard, 
becomes “ought,” an attributed community value, and, the “ought” becomes a deontic norm, 
creating both permissions and obligations, from which the state determines the substantive 
content of law.  
I submit that the institutionalized conception of the jury as capturing community values 
epitomizes MacCormick’s analysis. For instance, in each Australian jurisdiction, trials before 
a jury follow rules, which the jurisdiction authority has decreed. The Authority formulates its 
rules about the jury on an assumption that people think what they ought to think as a member 
of the community to which they belong. By this, I mean they are part of a community, which 




Geoffrey Walker explains ordered community as reflecting inherited values.
72
 This ordered 
community has much in common with what Geoffrey Hazard calls a ‘single community.’
73
 
Those who live in such a community, he claims, have a simpler moral life, because ideals, 
commitment, and expectations are common; they stem from the same inherited values. The 
jury system still relies for its legitimacy on this assumption. However, the nature of the 
inheritance is not clear-cut. Nor, as we see in the next section, was its development consistent 
over the ages. 
The inconsistent evolution of the criminal trial jury and the power of God 
Legal historian, Theodore Plucknett records that as late as 1100 the law in Anglo-Saxon 
Britain was substantially local. Local sheriffs administered it according to ancient customs, 
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which were local, not uniform across the country. There was, Plucknett explains ‘very little 
that could be called “common law.”’
74
 Today, however, the “common law” wears the mantle 
of the mother of human rights, even up to the High Court of Australia.
75
  
In a contrary view, Arthur R Hogue asserts emphatically that medieval common law ‘was not 
local or particular. We should distinguish it from whatever smacks of a speciality.’
76
 He 
claims that misunderstanding medieval common law stems from ‘insistence’ on subjecting 
mediaeval materials to modern definitions. 
For example, modern usage tends to distinguish common law from “written law,” or statutory 
legislation. Again, the modern lawyer, as well as the layman, may think of the common law as a body 
of principles embodied in or derived from precedents—the decisions of certain courts in England and 
other common law countries. To add to the misunderstanding of medieval common law there is the 
occasional modern effort at defining common law as a body of rules based on custom alone.’ 
77
 
There are still others, as Joseph Raz discusses, who see the legitimacy of law residing in the 
recognition, and justification, of authority, with its commensurate duty to obey.
78
 In this 
situation, he suggests, there is no need to seek out any kind of normative power. That is 
defining how something ought to be done from a value perspective.  
David Dyzenhaus
79
  acknowledges that there are those who will argue that any claim to the 
existence of a normative conception of the rule of law is just a figment of judicial 
imagination.
80
 But, he goes so far as to propose the notion of an unwritten common law 
constitution sufficient to support a judge’s duty to assert the rule of law over legislative or 
executive override even when the state has no written constitution and the citizens have no 
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bill of rights safeguard. The consequence of such an unwritten law could be that the 
‘aspirational’ common law conception leads to the idea of competing supremacies of the 
judiciary and the legislature; in other words, activist judges.
81
 In his hypothesis, the rule of 
law overrides rule by law to trump unjust legislation. However, in 1998, then Chief Justice of 
Western Australia, David Malcolm, claimed that the process of judges and courts developing 
law has been going on for a very long time. He contends that the common law, developed and 
modified by judges over the centuries, is as much a part of our laws as an Act of Parliament, 
although he acknowledges that parliament is supreme.
82
   
In the face of such conjecture, we need to explore further the evolution of the jury. In the next 
section, I delve below the surface symbolism of jury system legitimacy to discuss the origins 
and evolution of the jury system since the Middle Ages. I provide an overview of the 




How common are the community’s inherited values? 
Plucknett argues that the jury was not initially concerned with judicial proceedings. ‘Like so 
many institutions, [the jury] was an administrative device, which only later became confined 
to courts of law.’
84
 Plucknett uses “institution” here to refer to an organization or association, 
not to tradition or custom to which Griffith CJ tended in his use of the word.
85
 On the 
contrary, Plucknett explicitly warns against idealizing the origins of the jury for, what he 
calls, ‘patriotic reasons.’
86
 His detached use of the word as a historian, contrasts with the 
more dedicated use by commentators on the law today, and illustrates why attempts to 
modify the jury system often are more tentative than bold. He also argues against a tendency, 
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‘in popular thought’ to see the jury as having arisen in Anglo-Saxon times as a ‘safeguard of 
political liberty.’
87
 Suffice it to say that much murky water flowed under the bridge between 
the supposed Anglo-Saxon origins of the jury and its more human rights manifestation in the 
modern era.  
Competition for supremacy between Crown and Church 
Plucknett asserts that the story of how the jury system evolved is complicated ‘because 
several different lines of development were being pursued simultaneously.’
88
 Nevertheless, 
he does explain that competition for supremacy between the Crown and the Church gave 
impetus to the birth of common law. King Henry II was determined to impose his own ‘lay 
law,’ and Archbishop Becket was equally unwavering in demanding to apply ‘rigorously’ the 
Church’s ‘large mass of common law’, breaches of which should be tried only in Church 
courts.
89









it with ‘native feudalism’ notably the land laws. ‘Because no distinction was as yet possible 
between legislation (in the technical, narrow sense) and judicial actions, any rule which was 
considered binding, derived its force—in the contemporary feudal environs—from the 
(explicit or implicit) consent of the barons and the king in his feudal capacity.’
92
 It was 
essentially law to administer the rights of property ownership; contract; debt accompanied by 
an oath, which had attracted ‘spiritual censures for breach of faith; and the conflicting civil 
jurisdiction over debts.’
93
  The jury, thus, spoke for the countryside. 
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The jury as community representative 
Whether the jury was merely a ‘newer sort of ordeal,’ as Plucknett claims was the case in the 
thirteenth century
94
; or, in a later perception, a safeguard against arbitrary punishment, it was 
at first as community representative that it undertook its task. Masschaele describes juries 
between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries in England, as ‘articulation points between 
institutions and individuals, and as the place for interaction between central government and 
local society.’
95
 He goes so far as to assert that one cannot understand the relationship 
between state and its people in medieval England ‘without full consideration of jury service 
and the nature of people’s engagement in it.’
96
  
It is clear then, the jury spoke as representative of the countryside, not as representative of ‘a 
body of witnesses.’
97
 This meant that, rather than relying on facts presented through evidence 
in the courtroom, the court expected jurors to have their own knowledge of what had 
occurred.
98
 Where the jurors were uncertain, the justices would help them decide, in the 
following form: ‘If the jurors are altogether ignorant of the fact and know nothing concerning 
the truth, let there be associated with them others who do know the truth. But if even thus the 
truth cannot be known, then it will be requisite to speak from belief or conscience at least.’
99
  
This would change as circumstances changed. Nevertheless, although the evolution of the 
jury was inconsistent, the power of God, or perhaps more pointedly, the power of the Church 
was constant. 100 
The power of God and the passing of trial by ordeal  
In medieval times, God, or the Church, heavily influenced those who were involved in the 
justice system—either as administrator, or as a defendant. Laurie Kadoch writes that, in civil 
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matters, for example, the plaintiff would plead their claim, and the defendant would simply 
formally deny the claim point by point. ‘Because it was God who was judging between the 
parties, there was no need for the defendant to make any other kind of defence. God would 
not be misled in the way that a jury later could be by factual situations supporting the 
plaintiff’s claim, but which actually exonerated the defendant’ (Footnotes omitted)
101
. That 
was all there was to it. The parties could then choose to have their evidence put to proof by 
compurgation, ordeal, or battle. Compurgation
102
 reflects the constitution of the Fourth 
Lateran Council in which the Council declares its authority to correct offences and reform 
morals; to determine how and in what way a prelate ought to proceed to inquire into and 
punish the offences of his subjects; how appeals ought to proceed; and the sanctions that are 
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Briefly, compurgation was a swearing on oath by the defendant and their ‘companions’ to the 
truth of the defendant’s evidence. It was a character test. More so than is the case today, 
evidence given on oath carried the powerful divine stimulus to tell the truth because the 
alternative was to feel the wrath of God, which manifested itself in eternal damnation. 
Therefore, a person with a doubtful reputation for integrity would have trouble finding 
compurgators, because they had no wish to share the accused’s fate in hell.
104
 
Trial by battle also relied on the infinite wisdom of God. ‘The battle was conducted under 
oath. Each party swore to the truth of their position. However, their success depended on 
their skill in battle and not the number of co-swearers. Barbarian tribes had relied upon this 
method, and Christianity adopted it readily. It rested on the belief that God would provide 
victory on the side of right.’
105
 
Trial by water, which relied on a trussed defendant floating or sinking in a tub of water, also 
depended on the power of God, until the Church decreed that the whole process was barbaric, 
and banned priests from taking part. When, in 1215,
 106
 the Church finally proscribed priests’ 
participation in the trial by ordeal, it might not have been so much because of its barbaric 
nature but merely that, in a God-fearing environment, trifling with His mandate to exact 
vengeance might carry an element of risk. It were as if the Church, which had taken it upon 
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itself to exercise the wrath of God in consigning evildoers to eternal damnation, had now 
suddenly wakened to a realization that when God says ‘vengeance is mine’, He means 
exactly that. Whether the benignity was a divine inspiration to help one’s fellow man is moot. 
Whatever the motivation, justices, (and jurors) began to fear that if, in usurping God’s right to 
vengeance, they were unjustly to consign an innocent person to death, they might find 
themselves sharing eternal damnation with a whole lot of past clients.
107
 
A more sceptical view was that men, who generally had lower body fat than women did, were 
too prone to sink, thereby ‘proving’ their innocence.
108
 In other words, physics more so than 
divinity was influencing the decisions that flowed from sending men to the water.
 109
 The 
inference is that the process was thwarting the divine will of God. Thomas Green, too, 
suggests that, ‘even if belief in the divine nature of proof by ordeal had begun to wane long 
before the decree of 1215 brought its use to an abrupt end, tradition may have sustained its 
use late in the twelfth and early thirteenth century—tradition and the lack of a divinely 
endowed alternative.’
110
 In fact, so strong was the belief in the power of God that, even after 
the 1215 decree and the resort to the jury, ‘recourse to the verdict of men sworn to say the 
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truth could not be had without the suspect’s consent.’
111
 If the people were God-fearing, it 
would owe much to the presence of the Church. 
Trial by jury: another act of administrative expediency 
So, with the 1215 banning of the ordeal—and, perhaps, with an eye on the hereafter, or on the 
Church at least
112
—the court, as agent of the Crown, had sought to shift responsibility by 
asking the accused for consent to trial by jury. If the accused refused to plead and ‘put 
himself upon the country’, the court had only discretion to adopt, what Plucknett calls, ‘one 
or other of several high-handed courses’.
113
 Sometimes ‘…it would cast the responsibility on 
a larger jury of twenty-four knights; alternatively, it might allow the prisoner to abjure the 
realm, even for homicide, while for lesser charges a prisoner could purchase (for 20s) the 
privilege of merely finding sureties.’
114
 It is clear, that trial by jury arose as an act of 
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‘administrative expediency,’ as Plucknett and Green agree.
115
 Henry III’s government had to 
resolve the difficulty created by the Church’s ban on the only method of trying criminals—
trial by ordeal. Therefore, in 1219 he issued a writ to the Justices in Eyre
116
 to employ a 
temporary instruction by order of the King. 
“The King to his beloved and faithful…Justices itinerant…greeting: 
Because it was in doubt and not definitely settled before the beginning of your eyre, with what trial those are 
to be judged who are accused of robbery, murder, arson, and similar crimes, since the trial by fire and water 
(the ordeal) has been prohibited by the Roman Church, it has been provided by our Council that, at present, 
in this eyre of yours, it shall be done thus with those accused of excesses of this kind; to wit, that those who 
are accused of the aforesaid greater crimes, and of whom suspicion is held that they are guilty of that 
whereof they are accused, of whom also, in case they were permitted to abjure the realm, there would still be 
suspicion that afterwards they would do evil, they shall be kept in our prison and safeguarded, yet so that 
they do not incur danger of life or limb on our account. But those who are accused of medium crimes, and to 
whom would be assigned the ordeal of fire or water if it had not been prohibited, and of whom, if they 
should abjure the realm there would be no suspicion of their doing evil afterwards, they may abjure our 
realm. But those who are accused of lesser crimes, and of whom there would be no suspicion of evil, let 
them find safe and sure pledge of fidelity and of keeping our peace, and then they may be released in our 
land… We have left to your discretion the observance of the aforesaid order…according to your own 
discretion and conscience.”117  
This environment of doubt about the efficacy of divine judgment, gave rise to the symbiotic 
relationship between government and the community, for which the jury was the medium. It 
also gives the first inkling of doubt about the number of members at which (and the 
circumstances in which) a jury becomes adequately representative. But, according to 
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Holdsworth, the Crown only gradually relinquished its power to control the jury. In fact, not 
until the beginning of the eighteenth century did prisoners have the right to call witnesses.
118
 
Too much discretion was too much of a good thing
119
. In the thirteenth century and into the 
early fourteenth century, the judges were ‘very free to follow what procedure seemed best to 
them in the circumstances.’
120
 Whether or not what ‘seemed best to them’ means ‘what suited 
them’ is unclear. However, Holdsworth goes on to say that ‘gradually the practice shaped 
itself under two opposing considerations,’ the interest of the prisoner and the best outcome 
for the Crown. By juxtaposing these interests in opposition, Holdsworth invites the inference 
that the Crown surrendered influence over the jury reluctantly and slowly.  
What is a best outcome more often than not depends on the predisposition of the decision 
maker. For the Crown, it was securing convictions. Therefore, the jury, which comprised 
members of the presentment jury, was preferred. The history of the origins of the presentment 
jury is not uniformly agreed. But, what is of interest, and generally agreed, is that the 
presentment jury was required to swear to the court on oath about matters of which they were 
aware from their own knowledge. They were also to swear that they would not accuse any 
innocent man or shield any guilty one.
 121
 That, of course, is the significant point of difference 
between then, and the modern day requirement that jurors are to have no knowledge of—or 
are to disregard—relevant matters other than what comes to them through in-court testimony. 
In the 12
th
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 Century quote from Shakespeare’s “As you like it.” (Rosalind: Act 4 Scene 1) captures from 
literature the pertinent point that too much judicial discretion lead to harm. It presages also my discussion in 
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Holdsworth quotes Judge Parning in 1340: “if indictors be not there it is not well for the 
King.”
123
 What seems to have been worrying Judge Parning was that were the jury not to 
include indictors, there was no one to punish should the jury acquit.
124
 However, the interests 
of the prisoner was to get a boost with the 1351-52 enactment that provided that ‘no indictor 
should be put on an inquest upon the deliverance of one indicted for trespass or felony, if he 
were challenged for this cause by the accused.’
125
 Still, the process of freeing itself from the 
grand jury or jury of presentment was slow. The Crown selected the jury; prisoners were not 
allowed to call witnesses for a long time after the 1351-52 enactment, and, when they were, it 
was not until the eighteenth century that those witnesses could be sworn. Even then, they 
were not able to enlist the aid of counsel; this happened much later. Hence, the inconsistent 
development of the jury as the Crown sought innovative ways to compensate for the Church’s 
ruling in 1215. 
In the meantime, there was another pressing problem. With the evolution of the trial and jury 
system, the question arose of the right of the jury in a God-fearing community (literally) to 
pass judgement on another. Jurors, who daily lived with the threat that if they sinned they 
would suffer eternal damnation, feared that if they got it wrong and condemned an innocent 
person to death, God would have revenge. It might seem surprising in today’s more secular 
environment, but it was a real fear then. The power of the Church in medieval England to 
instil the fear of God was substantial. This explains the Crown’s reluctance to relinquish its 
power over the jury. It could not allow the jurors’ fear of God’s vengeance to usurp the 
Crown’s need for its own secular vengeance against malefactors. Again, the Crown called up 
an innovative remedy. 
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Guilty beyond reasonable doubt to the rescue 
All their lives, the Church had admonished citizens to judge not, lest they be judged and now 
the state was asking them to usurp the will of God. According to legal historian, James 
Whitman, the Crown countered the disquiet with a perverse secular admonition to jurors to 
render their judgments subject to satisfaction only beyond reasonable doubt. Perverse, 
because the admonition carries with it the implied imprimatur of God that He did not expect 
them always to be right, and He was not going to judge them harshly if they sometimes found 
an innocent prisoner guilty. Whitman suggests, ‘For Christians living in an age of fear and 
trembling, any “doubtful” act was full of danger.’126 Therefore, jurors did not want to 
convict, even when the evidence of guilt seemed overwhelming. To overcome this timidity, 
the Crown became midwife to the birth of what society has enshrined as a golden rule of 
law—satisfaction of guilt “beyond reasonable doubt.” However, unlike later when Blackstone 
uttered his famous dictum that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one 
innocent suffer,”127 the aim at its formation was to get more guilty verdicts by assuring jurors 
that God did not expect them always to be absolutely certain. It was a “rule bound up with the 
fate of those who sat in judgment.”
128
 Judges dreaded their responsibility so much that they 
avoided entering verdicts if possible, or else sought to diminish their personal responsibility 
by embracing the old aphorism of safety in numbers, that is, through the unanimous decision 
of the jury. Beyond reasonable doubt allowed a bit of latitude in construing the New 
Testament admonition “judge not lest ye be judged.”  
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This concession from God was necessary, because the Crown discovered that jurors were 
more worried about God than they were about the Crown. Therefore, they were allowing too 
many criminals to walk free. However, in spite of this history, the justice system has 
engrained the principle of beyond reasonable doubt as a tradition stemming from notions of 
individual rights. Clearly, though, it had more to do with affirming the state’s legitimacy than 
with the sacrosanctity of individual human rights. 
It is arguable therefore, that what has been mythologized—or institutionalized by the justice 
system—is the form of the “ancient institution” of jury, not the function. In other words, as 
Naomi Hurnard suggests, in enshrining the myth of the jury as the golden light of democracy, 
a safeguard of liberty, we have overlooked the reality that the petty jury arose through 
expediency, and generated ‘innovation’ to deal with it.
129
 This raises the question why the 
jury evolved as it did up to the present where now there is a propensity in the law academy 
(generically) to look at the social history of law in a way that consigns God to a footnote on 
superstition. The answer lies in the history of the secularisation of law, which one can derive 
through a reading of the battle between natural lawyers and the legal positivists, as I explain 
in the next section. 
The systemic jury system and the secularization of the social history 
of law 
In contemporary law, Michael Schutt
130
 contends, we are ‘largely ignorant of the historic 
Christian resources on law and government. ‘When we are cut off—or cut ourselves off—
from our own intellectual roots and Christian foundational thinking about the nature and 
purpose of law, we force ourselves to build on other foundations or become susceptible to 
false narratives of what law is and who we are.’ He quotes CS Lewis: 
Every age has its own outlook. It is specially good at seeing certain truths and specially liable to make 
certain mistakes. We all, therefore, need the books that will correct the characteristic mistakes of our 
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own period. The only solution to our own prejudice is to keep the clean breeze of the centuries blowing 
through our minds, and this can be done only by reading old books.
131
 
Without those old books, that is, without history, the theories of the legal positivists were 
always more likely to influence a contemporary social theory of law than were the natural 
lawyers reading from the historical source of Coke, Blackstone, or Aquinas.  
Natural law and a belief in law beyond the law that politicians make 
Natural lawyers will argue that a social history of law is concerned with the extent to which 
the common law tradition began with a belief in a law beyond law that politicians make. 
Today we might call it human rights. At the birth of its social history, Law recognised it as 
divine law, and later, as natural law. Natural law cannot condone an action that subjugates 
divine moral truth and certainty to a secular humanism. On the other hand, legal positivism 
will have no truck with morality because it deprives law of one of its essential attributes, 
certainty.  
In Anglo-Australian law, Thomas Aquinas is the acknowledged source of the doctrine of 
classical natural law. Its ultimate source, he asserts, lies in God and in God lies the source of 
all truth, because God created the universe from nothing. Although Aquinas was positing 
God from a Christian standpoint, Andrew Phang makes the point that the concept of God may 
apply with equal force to any ‘mainstream’ religion that builds its faith on the concept of a 
god.
132
 This is a useful argument if one is seeking consensus about the application of the 
doctrine in a pluralist society. From a Thomist point of view, however, it is a self-serving 
argument with a utilitarian bent, that is, willingness to concede a multiplicity of gods as a 
trade-off for buying the doctrine.  
Aquinas would assert that, if we are sincere in embracing morality as an objective truth, we 
have to acknowledge only one God and his only authoritative representative on Earth, Jesus 
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Christ. Bending one’s Christian faith to embrace pluralism involves a relativistic concession 
that denies the very faith one professes to hold. It is also a logically inconsistent argument 
that, by its very presentation, reduces morality and truth to the subjectivity and indeterminacy 
it was supposed to obviate. Unlike some religions that conceive of God as merely immanent 
(that is, existing in and extending into all parts of the universe), Aquinas talks of God as 
embracing both the transcendent and immanent. This is an important distinction in validating 
the continuing relevance of Christian jurisprudence. For Aquinas, the source of all truth lies 
in God’s transcendence, and through which he reconciles faith and reason.
 133
 
Although Aquinas posits the natural goodness of humans, he nevertheless acknowledges that 
some are likely to submit to vice, depravity, and intransigence in adhering to the wisdom 
expressed in God’s words. To ensure that these backsliders do not upset the peace of mind 
and tranquillity, society may have to resort to the use of force and fear to bring these 
intransigents willingly to accept the ways of the virtuous.
 134 
In the formative years of 
common law, men such as Blackstone and Coke did consider those criteria incontestable. 
They ‘built on the foundations of Magna Carta and the theological footing of Thomas 
Aquinas’
135
and his four types of law: eternal law (which Coke called ‘lex aeterna’, and 
Blackstone labelled ‘the law of nature’), natural law, human law, and divine law. Probably 
the most succinct statement of Coke’s position is in his ‘obiter dictum’ in Calvin’s case,
 136
 
which Schutt summarises: 
1. That ligeance or obedience to the Sovereign is due by the law of nature; 
2. That the law of nature is part of the laws of England; 
3. That the law of nature  was before any judicial or municipal law in the world; 
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4. That the law of nature is immutable, and cannot be changed.137  
Although formally a dispute over land titles, Calvin’s case ‘turned on the problem of whether 
allegiance was owing more to the king or to the laws.’
138
 Allegiance, or Ligeance, was the 
duty of loyalty and obedience that, immediately upon their birth, all persons born within the 
sovereign’s realm owed to the sovereign. They could not relieve themselves of that burden by 
their own actions. 
Coke held that ‘ligeance and obedience of the subject to the sovereign [was] due by the law 
of nature’ and ‘protection and government [were] due by the law of nature.’ In his 
introduction to ‘Treatise on Law’ by Thomas Aquinas, Professor Ralph McInerney states, 
‘Natural law has eternal law as its measure. Human law has natural law as its measure. In 
short, there is an unwritten law that stands in judgment on human ordinances.’
139
 
Positivist law and God’s irrelevance 
Unlike the inviolability of truth as the natural lawyer perceives it, HLA Hart perceives rules 
that are susceptible to ‘rules of change.’ He explains, 
[t]he simplest form of such a rule is that which empowers an individual or body of persons to introduce 
new primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or of some class within it, and to eliminate 
old rules... . [I]t is in terms of such a rule, and not in terms of orders backed by threats, that the ideas of 
legislative enactment and repeal are to be understood.
140
 
‘Primary rules’ impose on human beings a duty ‘to do, or abstain from, certain actions, 
whether they wish to or not.’ But, because such rules tend to be static, no person or body has 
the capacity to bring about changes to them to accommodate changing circumstances. In 
other words, he claims, they have the attributes of nothing more than customarily accepted 
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standards, with no more certainty than rules of etiquette.
141
 In a simple social setting, such 
uncertainty might be manageable. A more complex society needs something more. Hart’s 
‘secondary rules’ provide the mechanism through which the duties and obligations of human 
beings may be changed by providing that ‘human beings may by doing or saying certain 
things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various 
ways determine their incidence or control their operations.’
142
 His views on duties and 
obligations challenge the natural lawyer’s lodestar of a divine or natural law. It is a more 
prosaic view of human life. Mere survival is the end goal. That, he asserts, is the fundamental 
truth. 
Although Natural Law claims an inviolable truth and certainty,
143
 to which, its opponents 
argue, it is not entitled, Positivist Law also claims to know the truth. However, it is a truth 
that decrees that God is irrelevant. Natural-law theorist, John Finnis, finds his answer to the 
question, what is truth, in moral absolutism embedded in a notion of God.
144
 His Christian 
belief favours a non-instrumental reason for action—undertaken because it is humanly 
valuable.
145
 But, Rousseau came to the same conclusion of humanly valuable actions without 
invoking a notion of God. His conception of a social contract and society’s ‘articles of 
association’, require ‘the total alienation by each associate of himself and all his rights to the 
whole community.’
146
 Perhaps, as Jeremy Waldron claims, ‘this is why Kant saw Positive 
Law as the only logical answer to the dilemma of whether one can posit truth and certainty in 
Christian understanding.’ Waldron sums up. ‘The irony of law and politics is that this 
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symmetry of self-righteousness is not matched by any convergence of substance—each of 
two opponents may believe he is right.’
147
 So, whilst two agonists battled for the crown of 
certitude, a pragmatic interloper outflanked them, as I explain in the next section. 
The triumph of instrumentalism 
With the secularization of the social history in the teaching of law, the gap has been filled by 
instrumentalism (and its corollary, pragmatism) as reflects the environment in which law 
today works. Whatever the merits of the competing claims, Instrumentalism has triumphed 
over religion in university and in the practice of law. The Law academy—generically 
described—has secularized the social history of law and fundamental human rights into the 
orbit of pragmatism, which renders God irrelevant.  
Thus, veneration of the history of the jury, in which the transcendent godliness of the jury 
was never in doubt, might substantiate the Barthesian myth (For example, in Australia, the 
Anzac Myth as our culture’s way of thinking about something, as I discuss later) but 
ignore the reality. To lift a form of jury trial and the behaviour of jurors, from its contextual 
history and submit it to evaluation against modern values and standards is suspect. 
Nevertheless, although the state embraces the reality of a society without the need of an 
omniscient God, it is reluctant to dispel the myth that the reliance on God initiated. It is not 
yet prepared to take the step that James Whitman and John Langbein, for instance, champion; 
that it is time for radical change to the ‘strange, tradition-ridden system of American jury 
trial.’
148
 Sterling Professor of Law and Legal History at Yale Law School, John Langbein 
elaborates: 
Our criminal justice system has become ever more dependent on processing cases of serious crime 
through the non-trial procedure of plea bargaining. Unable to adjudicate, we now engage in 
condemnation without adjudication. Because our constitutions guarantee adjudication, we threaten the 
criminal defendant with a markedly greater sanction if he insists on adjudication and is convicted. This 
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sentencing differential, directed towards inducing the defendant to waive his right to trial, makes plea 
bargaining work. It also makes plea-bargaining intrinsically coercive.
149
 
Albert Aschuler has a different point of view. He muses that perhaps non-American readers 




A similar reluctance to take the step suggested by Langbein and his Yale colleague, Whitman 
is evident in the wording of the Criminal Procedures Act 2004 (WA). Although the Act 
acknowledges the reality of trial by judge alone in designated circumstances, it 
accommodates the reality tentatively. It seems not yet ready to cut the umbilical cord tying 
the state to the institutionalized symbol of the jury as the preferred route to truth in justice. 
Just as the Crown in the thirteenth century only fearfully separated the jury from the trial by 
ordeal, which seemed more certainly to exercise the will of God.  
For example, the Act is clear that, when running a trial for an indictable offence with judge 
alone, the Judge must adhere as closely as possible to the procedures that govern trial before 
a jury. Section 118(1) provides that if an accused is committed on a charge to a superior court 
or indicted in a superior court on a charge, the prosecutor or the accused may apply to the 
court for an order that the trial of the charge be by a judge alone without a jury. Section 
119(1) requires that, in a trial by a judge alone, the judge must apply, so far as is practicable, 
the same principles of law and procedure as would be applied in a trial before a jury. Section 
119(3) requires that, 
  If any written or other law —  
  (a) requires information or a warning or instruction to be given to the jury in certain 
circumstances; or 
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  (b) prohibits a warning from being given to a jury in certain circumstances, 
the judge in a trial by a judge alone must take the requirement or prohibition into account if those 
circumstances arise in the course of the trial.  
Especially relevant to my thesis is section 118(6): 
Without limiting subsection (4), [the court’s discretion to make the order for trial by judge alone] the 
court may refuse to make the order if it considers the trial will involve a factual issue that requires the 
application of objective community standards such as an issue of reasonableness, negligence, 
indecency, obscenity or dangerousness. 
Although section 118(6) frames its provision to grant the court discretion in the matter, not as 
a direction to it to refuse the order, it also carries a strong admonition that the jury is better 
able to bring community common sense to bear than is a judge alone. First, s118(6) implies 
that, as Keith DeRose writes,  a ‘fact’ is not an absolute, it is contextual; what one might 
consider true in one context might not be true in another.
 151
  
De Rose addresses the way in which speakers use knowledge-attributing and knowledge-
denying sentences in ordinary, that is, non-philosophical talk. He differentiates between ‘low-
standards’ and ‘high standards’ contexts. He argues that in low-standards cases, speakers will 
claim knowledge based on evidence that they would not consider adequate in high-standard 
cases. A low-standard case is one in which the stakes are not high. A contextualist will argue 
that the positive attribution of knowledge in LOW is true, and the denial of knowledge in 
HIGH is true. An invariantist will argue that there is a single set of standards for what is a 
true fact (In the context of this discussion, the tautology—true fact—is deliberate). The 
contextualist argues that the “epistemic standards” can vary according to the speaker’s 
context. The invariantist denies that those standards can vary, not that the standards should 
not vary, but that they cannot vary. I discuss the importance of the distinction in Chapter 
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Five, in which I discuss Jerome Bruner’s proposition that there is a difference between 
paradigmatic, or logico-scientific argument, and narrative accounts of an event.
152
 
Second, ss118 (6) implies that community standards and community values are the same. 
That is not always true; it is especially not true when moral panic is abroad. I will argue, in 
Chapter Five, that when moral panic strikes, and fear of threats to personal security runs 
rampant, social values can give way to community prejudices—often disguised as standards. 
Understanding this social phenomenon brings about the realisation that in times of moral 
panic and in times when, misled by the belief that community values are at stake, we are in 
fact defending community standards—or perhaps, prejudices. In other words, social values 
are deep seated; collective memory conditions them. Standards are more likely to be 
pragmatic, and contingent. So one can see that Contextualism is pertinent when applying 
s118 (6) to the issues of community values and community standards. In this subsection, the 
list of issues to which objective community standards might apply is not exhaustive. Indeed, 
“dangerousness” is a catch-all word. What it means will depend on context; it might also 
depend on the ideology of the user. In Australia, the Federal Court case of Eatock v Bolt
153
 
provoked controversy, not because the respondents (Andrew Bolt, and the Herald and 
Weekly Times) felt the wrath of the Court for injudiciously defaming the applicant (Eatock), 
but because of disquiet at the manner in which the judge rationalized the decision.
 154
 There is 
no need to question the moral justice—as distinct from legal justice—of the decision to 
ponder nevertheless the extent to which manipulation of language played a part in the 
outcome. I return to this topic in Chapter Four. 
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Interest in the nature of truth according to context is not new. Nor is change of meaning to 
reflect common use pernicious; that is how language evolves. However, it can be a threat to 
truth in justice when, in seeming to use language according to its ordinary meaning to 
communicate facts, the judiciary appears to substitute the metaphor for reality.
155
 But, the 
irony of the provision in s118(6) is that the court, which decides whether or not to grant the 
order to allow trial before judge alone, would usually be a court over which a single judge 
presides. 
Moving beyond the discipline of law to challenge the institution of the jury system 
Moving outside the discipline of law to seek theories to aid in the administration of justice, 
might seem to challenge the institutional status of the justice system. That attitude ought not 
to prevail in a culturally diverse society. This applies particularly to the jury, which gave rise 
to a symbiotic relationship between government and the community for which it was the link.  
Symbiosis and symbolism 
The history of the jury identifies varying triggers for change at each stage of its evolution. 
Nevertheless, at each stage, the importance of a symbiotic relationship is a constant. If the 
community has confidence that a jury represents it adequately, it is content that it has a voice 
in the maintenance of social order. If the state—through its agent, the justice system—has the 
confidence of the community, its legitimacy to govern is further enhanced. So, to symbiosis 
we add symbolism. Joseph Gusfield
156
 calls it ‘symbolic quiescence,’ which comprises ‘acts 
[that] provide the spectator with reassurance that his or her values are respected and that his 
or her goals are being pursued.’
157
 I have said that the justice system has institutionalized the 
form of the “ancient institution” of jury, not the function. I contend that, because of the 
diversity of cultures and sub-cultures of a modern community, its value is largely symbolic. 
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If the majority gains assurance that the jury gives it a voice in the halls of justice, and if the 
justice system, in the service of the state, confirms its legitimacy through the jury, symbolism 
has done its work. It perpetuates the tradition of independence, and impartiality. And, it 
purports to preserve the notion of community common sense. This is why recent studies of 
the role of the jury focus on improving its representativeness.
158
 In the new social reality, I 
suggest, it can no longer substantiate a claim to community common sense. To suggest that it 
can, is to accept a premise that the community embraces undifferentiated standards, which 
the common sense reflects. However, that premise is not sound in a culturally diverse society. 
The judicial process and the jury in particular, operate in a new social reality. I submit that a 
theory of law without an accompanying social theory cannot account for the consequences of 
this new reality. 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter, by describing the justice system’s perception of the jury as the bastion of 
democracy, which gives effect to the community conscience in deciding criminal trials. I 
have argued that in institutionalizing this perception, Law and its legislators are operating on 
an assumption that the common law, in which the modern iteration of the jury is grounded, 
was the birthplace of human rights. A brief review of the history of origins and evolution of 
the jury does not support this assumption. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of the origin 
of the jury in common law has served the state well as a legitimating device. This was the 
Crown’s motivation for introducing the jury in Anglo-Saxon times before common law. Its 
function in the criminal trial followed later. 
I have traced the evolution of the jury historically to reveal a picture of a time when God—or 
His self-proclaimed agent on earth, the Church—would play on the consciences of those who 
the Crown called upon to judge their neighbour. I have explained that the power of God or 
the church had much to do with the way the jury evolved. I have shown that despite the 
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absence of the power of God, which permeated the decision-making of the jury of Middle 
Ages, the state is reluctant to dispense with the institutionalized jury. This is because the 
symbolism of the jury retains the power to maintain public confidence in the state, just as it 
did in its Anglo-Saxon beginnings in the Middle Ages.  
In the minds of the people, the institutionalized symbol of the jury is still the preferred route 
to truth in justice. Given this preference, our focus should be on the nature and organization 
of courtroom discourse. I suggest that, in the criminal trial, the standard accounts of language 
and law are not adequate for this task. This will be my focus in the chapters to follow, 
beginning in Chapter Two with a case study of courtroom discourse in action.  
  





CHAPTER TWO: How advocates control courtroom discourse: 
an illustrative case study.    
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I use a case study to challenge a misconception that, because the jury hears 
witnesses’ testimony first hand, it is hearing raw facts. The widely-held claim is that they are 
raw facts because lawyers have not transformed the testimony into a legal argument; or, as 
Gaakeer writes, translated the stories of clients, or parties to a lawsuit into the language of 
law.
159
 Nor at that time have media yet had the chance to decide what part of the evidence 
and arguments of the trial are of interest to the public.
160 
This explains why the focus of the 
justice system is on a perceived need to inoculate the jury against media distortion of the 
reality, both before and during the trial.
161
 Do that, the argument goes, and the jury hears 
unmediated facts. But, I argue that the same power to distort, or mediate, is inherent in the 
adversarial courtroom discourse in a criminal trial before jury. It is also less evident than is 
media manipulation and, therefore, it works its changes more subtly.  
Furthermore, although notionally the same power is present in a trial before a judge sitting 
alone, the propensity for damage to person is greater in a trial before a jury. I will have 
something to say about the power of pre-supposition to affect the judge alone later. I will 
suggest that the influence of the jury system is so pervasive that it even influences the judge’s 
approach when, in an indictable offence, the justice system gives the accused the option of 
trial before judge alone. But, principally in this chapter, I use the case study utterances to 
focus on how counsel argue to persuade—not necessarily to convince—in a trial before jury.  
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Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have studied the discursive techniques that allow one to 
persuade a receptive mind to accept the proposition one offers for judgment. Their point, 
which is pertinent for the lawyer as courtroom advocate, is that they do not insist on the ‘the 
mind’s adherence’ to a thesis that is self-evident. Rather, the need is to induce the mind’s 
acceptance of theses offered for agreement. That is they structure an utterance so that it seems 
so logical as to be irrefutable. It is, as I explain later, quasi logical. If all one has to do is to 
persuade, one can put on hold the ultimate need to examine how, and to what extent, 
argumentation interferes with substantive truth.
162
  
The value of my case study is that it allows me to use actual courtroom discourse, not as 
substantive support for argument, but as a tool to aid interrogation of the principles, which 
underpin Counsel’s control of witness testimony. In short, counsel do this through the 
organization of courtroom discourse. My analysis reveals characteristics of argumentation, 
starting from the premise that in an adversarial trial before jury, counsel aim to persuade, not 
to convince. The transcripts of both the trial before the jury, and the voir dire hearing, in 
which the jury is absent, show how courtroom discourse is the antithesis of conversation, 
which Gadamer contends  creates the channel to reaching an understanding. He suggests, 
‘Men generally understand each other directly, ie they are in dialogue until they reach 
agreement. Understanding, then, is always understanding about something. Understanding 
each other means understanding each other on a topic or the like.’
163
 
In the voir dire, Counsel might reach agreement about what questions, seeking what answers, 
are proper within the rules of the game, in which they are participants. However, we cannot 
call them partners in this conversation. On the contrary, almost invariably, the voir dire will 
end when the judge decides in favour of one point of view over another. This runs counter to 
Gadamer’s claim that to reach an understanding requires a three-way relationship. He argues 
that it is not a zero sum game in which one participant in disputatious discourse wins, and the 
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other loses. Rather, it means one person coming to an understanding with another about 
something that they both, therefore, now understand. Moreover, he points out that we learn 
from language that ‘the topic is not some random self-contained object of discussion, 
independently of which the process of mutual understanding proceeds, but rather is the path 
and goal of mutual understanding itself.’
 164
 But, this is not the nature of the adversarial jury 
trial. The voir dire has merely elicited understanding of the rules of the game, not agreement 
on the topic. Once the voir dire conversation is over, and the protagonists return to open 
court, the adversarial trial continues before the jury as very much a zero sum game. The goal 
is to persuade the jury to accept one of two competing viewpoints, albeit now mediated to 
accord with the rules of the game.   
A criminal trial case study: Storytelling and why counsel want to 
control it  
Although ‘storytelling’ might be the most ‘effective tool of persuasion’ at trial,
165
  in my case 
study, we see how Counsel
166
 and judges organize courtroom discourse to ensure the locus of 
control of the narrative of the case does not shift to witnesses. The facts that reach the jury 
are no longer “raw,” as my case study shows. And, as is clear, the jury becomes an audience 
that one needs to persuade—not convince through a conversation partnership—to the 
preferred thesis of counsel in competition. 
The advent of this case was timely, coming in the early stages of my laying the groundwork 
for my thesis. It arose, first, out of my chance encounter at the crime as it unfolded, and 
second, as a witness giving testimony. I do not present it as a case from which to deduce 
general principles. I do present it as illustrative of courtroom discourse in criminal trial before 
a jury. The added benefit arises from my being able to analyse my own self-deliberations as I 
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prepared for the hearing. In addition, I can discuss—albeit subjectively—the way in which I 
presented my testimony. Did I believe I gave the jury unmediated raw facts? Or, did I feel 
that the question and answer process inhibited my ability to tell a story of what happened? To 
what extent did my responses to probing questions reflect a desire to preserve my self-image? 
In other words, did I rationalize my actions of that day to persuade the jury of my credibility? 
How did my response, with which I aimed to persuade, differ from my self-deliberations that 
I used to convince myself of the integrity of my recollections of events?  
I concede that even my undertaking to analyse my thoughts as witness invites scepticism. I 
am about to explain what was going on in my mind at three stages of the introspective 
journey—from the event, through contemplation in the quiet of my home, to explication in 
the numinous space of a courtroom. Should the reader expect that even in the fourth iteration 
of this text I would rationalize? There is no reason why they should not. I will use examples 
in my case study to show that an act, which seemed instinctive in a moment of emergency, 
might take on a different character in self-deliberation after the emergency has passed. Inga 
Markovits suggests, for instance that ‘[a]s individuals, we have no power over our 
recollections: we forget what we would like to remember, remember what we would like to 
forget.’
167
 Thus, the value of this case study is illustrative. It is not of itself prescriptive. 
My case study is a bridge to Chapter Five (through Chapters Three and Four of course), in 
which I discuss why one must regard the jury as a particular audience, and how it differs from 
a universal audience. It reveals the forces at work in the communication process, with which 
the speaker to that audience must deal if they are to adapt to the difference. Therefore, 
although the case is illustrative, not prescriptive, it does promote consideration of why a 
witness might want to construct their own narrative, and why counsel are at pains to stop 
them.  
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Setting the scene 
I was a witness to an  assault—into which I reluctantly inserted myself—which led to one of 
five charges the state laid against a man for inflicting bodily harm on his spouse. Also 
relevant, as become clears in my discussion of discourse organization, the accused was a 
high-profile leader of a motorcycle gang.
168
 He had recently completed a two-year jail 
sentence for a much-publicized assault on a crowd controller (“bouncer” in the vernacular) in 
a well-known nightclub. Television news services had aired the assault, captured on amateur 
video, many times. Therefore, propensity, and relationship, evidence was to loom large in the 
mind of counsel for the defence, having regard to section 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 
(WA).  
In proofing before the trial began, prosecuting counsel had asked me to recount the incident I 
had witnessed, and my attempts to intercede on behalf of the alleged victim. He did not lead 
me through my testimony with a series of questions, he simply asked, ‘tell me what 
happened’. He was happy with my story, because, as I discovered, it fit nicely into the plot 
development of the narrative he was constructing. Satisfied that my account would hold up 
under questioning, and content that it would contribute to the compelling narrative he hoped 
to present to the jury, he pronounced me a credible witness.  
In the event, however, the jury did not hear the unexpurgated story I had planned to tell.  
The power of the Adjacency Pair to direct the narrative course 
The testimony I was to give in court reaffirmed the written police statement I had provided 
after the incident. I had described the screams I had heard coming from the house, which I 
knew to be the home of a well-known motorcycle gang member and his spouse. The screams 
were such that, in spite of the fact that I had no wish to expose myself to possible threats from 
this man, I believed I had a citizen’s duty to investigate whether a life was in danger. 
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In fact, of course, my mind did not process the event in this way immediately. Rather, my 
ensuing actions were instinctive, but perhaps reflected the values I had absorbed from a 
culture and time in which I had grown up. Alisdair Macintyre says we humans are an 
amalgam of our past social and cultural fragments.
169
 The question is whether we bring the 
expectations that stem from our cultural way of being to any new experience. I develop this 
idea further in Chapter Five in which I discuss courtroom discourse and false assumptions 
about common sense and common community values. I introduce it here only to give 
context to Witness
170
 testimony on his actions when he heard screams from a woman 
apparently in distress. A dispassionate, reasoned consideration at the time would more than 
likely have led to a different, decision. Witness’ action was instinctive when it happened.  
However, at the point of recounting the action in court, he had processed it in his mind and 
convinced himself that the action was justified. In other words, he had anticipated possible 
attacks on his credibility from defence counsel, and needed to convince himself that he had 
acted credibly. He was not a busybody intruding into a mere domestic dispute out of nothing 
more than curiosity. The significant point that comes from this is that witnesses might also 
have mediated their testimony. Testimony might not always be a dispassionate informant’s 
account of an event as history.  
At the trial, counsel for the prosecution (“Prosecutor”) began his direct examination 
deferentially: 
Prosecutor: Now, Mr Fisher, we're going to ask you some - you're going to be 
asked some questions about an incident that occurred in 2011. 
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You understand, in a general sense, what this - these questions 
are all about, do you? 
Witness: Yes, I do. 
Prosecutor: Can I ask you - well, I'll call it the incident. Just talk us through 
what you remember about the events that you subsequently spoke 
to police about? 
Up to now, Prosecutor in my case study has deferred to Witness in the less formal, 
conversational, mode of the pre-trial witness proofing. Proofing had taken place in 
Prosecutor’s office whilst sipping coffee, setting a conversational mood, rather than an 
interrogative one. In that congenial atmosphere, Witness, an experienced former broadcaster, 
told his ‘story’ succinctly, and to the satisfaction of counsel, who had then reviewed the 
testimony to cover any point on which he was unclear, or which he thought might need 
elaboration. In court, Witness took Prosecutor’s, ‘Just talk us through, as an invitation to do 
the same thing. In the event, as the transcript reveals, counsel for the defence (“Defence”) did 
not want that to happen. 
Witness: It was about 7.15 in the morning. I was walking my dog on 
Davallia Road. I was walking south down Davallia Road on the 
footpath, which is on the eastern side - in other words, opposite 
the house in which this incident occurred - when I heard screams. 
Very loud screams. They sounded like terrified screams, so loud 
that I could hear them above the sound of three high- powered 
motorbikes that were going by at the time. 
At this point, Defence disrupted the storytelling. Witness did not know that, in a voir dire, 
conducted before the court had received any testimony, the judge had agreed with the defence 
that this specific part of the testimony was insufficiently probative. However, in Witness’ 





mind it did add an element to the storytelling, raising the nature of the screams to a level from 
fright to terror. Defence objected, so Prosecutor had to adopt the more common ‘adjacency 
pair’ form of adducing testimony.  
Brenda Danet
171
 describes the adjacency pair as the basic unit of social interaction. Broadly, 
it is a question and answer exchange, which is governed by a ‘chain maxim.’
172
 This means 
that when the interrogator asks a question, the interrogatee gives a direct answer, and gives 
the turn back to the questioner. When obtaining testimony, it is a safeguard against the 
witness adlibbing to the extent of straying from the point. It is ‘a summons to reply, a means 
to compel, require, or demand a response.’
173
 Relevantly, she adds,  
The "fact"-oriented genres publicly claim to deal with truth and facts but are actually preoccupied with 
elaborate rules governing the flow of talk and silence and have evolved a highly esoteric professional 
language, incomprehensible to those whose fate is at stake, that dominates the courtroom. To varying 
degrees, all these uses of language in legal settings reveal a preoccupation with language rather than the 
relation between language and the world.
174  
Preoccupied with the rules, of which Defence had reminded him Prosecutor politely tells 
Witness to follow his lead to avoid another transgression. 
Prosecutor: Now, Mr Fisher, thank you. I'm going to - we're going to 
take this step by step. 
Prosecuting counsel has moved from the conversational deference of the pre-trial proofing to 
the adjacency pair format. 
 Okay. Now, you mentioned some screams there? 
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Prosecutor: Could you make out any words?--- 
Witness: Initially, all I heard were the screams. And it were the screams 
that suggested to me that I needed to see… 




Defence realised Witness’ speculation would be prejudicial. Witness meant it to be; but, of 
itself, that does not mean it is unfairly damaging. A scream is a communication. And, the 
nature of the scream determines how a receiver will interpret the communication. It might not 
have been probative if looked at in the context of that particular event, which was one of five 
separate, discrete, charges that the prosecution was bringing against the accused. However, 
the conversational procedure that Witness, with the support of the Prosecutor was trying to 
sustain, did contribute to a narrative of a relationship based on fear and intimidation. The 
judge’s role in this situation is to negotiate a compromise between the antagonist parties 
within the constraints of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 and the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).  
Prosecutor: Mr Fisher, it - maybe - what this court is interested in is what 
you saw and what you heard? 
Witness: Very well.  
Prosecutor: And - and - - -? 
Witness: I understand 
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Prosecutor: Yes. Thank you very much. So you heard -  now, I'll go back to 
the question. Did you actually make out any words? 
Prosecutor’s oral stumbles at this point indicate that the defence had achieved its objective.  
Witness: At that point, no. 
Prosecutor: Okay. And what did you do as a result of hearing those screams 
Witness: I felt I needed to cross the road because of the nature of the 
screams. 
So, Witness finished at the same ending he would have reached had the storytelling 
proceeded uninterrupted. But, now, it was not storytelling. It was question and answer— the 
adjacency pair. What was not clear to the court at this stage is that Defence had another 
reason for not wanting Witness to explain during the examination in chief why he crossed the 
road. As I reveal later, Defence wanted to raise the same question in his cross-examination 
about why Witness crossed the road. However, he had a different objective in mind, as will 
be clear in the transcript of the exchange with Witness. 
By reinstating the chain maxim, which is the core element of the adjacency pair, counsel for 
the defence had disrupted narrative development. The prosecution had wanted to develop a 
narrative of fifteen years of sustained violence against the victim. Defence wanted a narrative 
of fifteen years cohabitation, which had produced nothing more than five instances of 
physical conflict. On average, this implied a physical conflict only every three years, which 
the parties had resolved amicably on each occasion. Thus, none was an assault, merely a 
‘domestic,’ in police vernacular. Furthermore, by reinstating the chain maxim, defence 
counsel had ensured that the locus of control did not shift from the court to the witness.  
At what stage Prosecutor might have felt it necessary to stop the storytelling to ensure the 
narrative developed according to his desired end we cannot say. However, because the 





deferential conversational exchange was leading to the type of understanding he hoped to 
reach with the jury, he was happy to let it run for now. Defence was not. This is the nature of 
courtroom advocacy; the Adjacency Pair had prevailed. What is more, the authors of the 
narrative of the case had retained control of plot development. The jury, however, retained 
the power to decide which of two alternative endings would carry the day. 
The Adjacency Pair format gives counsel control. The pervasive power of courtroom 
semiotics and numinous space gives them authority. Any disruption of the order makes 
counsel and judge slightly uncomfortable, as I explain in the next section. 
Numinous expression and the semiotics of courtroom space 
Laurie Kadoch argues that symbolism of the courtroom space affects both interaction and the 
interpretation of the interaction. The witness is, hopefully, made aware of the solemnity of 
his/her duty to tell the truth by the characteristics of Etlin’s “numinous” space.’ 
176
. 
At one point, Prosecutor asked me to refer to a wall-mounted enlarged photograph of the site 
of the incident I had witnessed. This meant that I had to stand, move slightly away from the 
witness box, and use a pointer, which a court orderly had handed to me. Now, I was above 
the level of the judge’s bench, and significantly above the level of counsel. Repositioned 
from my seated place in the witness box, which diminished my physical presence, I now 
surveyed the court from a privileged position. 
Prosecutor:  What street's that that we're looking at as it goes from bottom 
to top of the photograph?--- 
Witness:  We're looking down Granadilla Road towards Davallia Road. 
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And that's Davallia Road.  And that's the palm tree. 
Prosecutor: The palm tree there. Okay. Can you indicate with your 
pointer where you say this naked woman was cowering 
down?--- 
Witness: Roughly there but perhaps slightly - the - the -that fence 
goes - that wall, I should say, goes around a little bit and 
my recollection is that she was just slightly around the 
corner. In other words, she would not have been visible 
immediately - in - in line of sight from the gate. 
Prosecutor; So just around the corner from that grass on that grassed 
area -?--- 
Witness Yes, on - on the grassed area. 
Prosecutor: And when you said she was - she was facing the wall, is 
that the wall that you were referring to?--- 
Witness; Yes. 
Prosecutor: And did you see - I'm not asking - please do take another - a - 
take a seat. I'm not asking y o u  to speculate, but did you see 
where the man had come from?— 
Witness: It seems clear to me, from the way he appeared, that he must 
have come out of this gate here . 
Prosecutor; Out of the gate . Yes, thank you. Where were you when you 
first heard the screams?--- 





Witness; I was on the other side of Davallia Road. You can't see in this 
picture where I was. There. - There’s a bus shelter just about 
in that position. 
During this discussion, I did not return to my seat. I was more comfortable standing. I had a 
commanding view of counsel, the jury, and judge. Moreover, with a pointer in my hand, for a 
moment I had assumed the authoritative position, such that the orderly who had handed me 
the pointer was now smiling and nodding affirmatively as I gave my answers. Prosecution 
again motioned me to my seat in the witness box. The judge nodded in support of the motion. 
I complied. Numinous symbolism was back in place.  
To appreciate the nervousness of counsel about Witness moving outside the constraints of the 
rules of courtroom discourse, one needs to keep this first transgression in mind, as I discuss 
another moment of discomfort shortly after.  
Witness had crossed the road, and was approaching the victim of the assault. 
Prosecutor:  And what happened when you approached her to within 
two metres? What was the next thing that happened?--- 
Witness;  A man appeared,  
Prosecutor:  Okay. Now, for legal reasons, we're not going to go into 
the words that he may have spoken, if any, to you?--- (My 
emphasis) 
What the transcript—words on paper—cannot show is the anxiety in the 
prosecutor’s voice as he interjected quickly, ‘Okay. Now for legal reasons,’ in fear 
that the witness might again transgress the agreement of the voir dire to keep 
inflammatory, but non-probative, testimony away from the ears of jurors. 
Moreover, the qualifying phrase, ‘if any’ is not there for the jury; it is there to 





forestall any objection from Defence that Prosecutor had alerted the jury to words 
that were uttered, which were obviously prejudicial to the interests of the accused.  
Witness;  I understand. 
Prosecutor: When you saw this man - can you describe him?--- 
Witness: He was a taller man than I, muscular, looked to be about 
40. 
Defence: Your Honour, there's no - there's no dispute The witness's 
statement says he knew the man, he knew that Troy 
Mercanti lived there, he knew it was Troy Mercanti. So 
there's no dispute about identity. We're…  
Witness: If I may, your Honour?  I did not say… 
Witness was trying to insert himself into a conversation to which he had no 
right to enter, according to the rules of courtroom discourse organization. In 
my impatience to resolve a point of contention, which I could have done in 
one succinct sentence, I had ignored the rules of the game the lawyers were 
playing. Neither participant in this exchange wanted to reach an 
understanding with the other. Each wanted to exploit the point of contention 
for their own objective in persuading the jury to their preferred point of 
view.  
Prosecutor was intent on showing that Witness had not positively identified 
the man as Mercanti; he had never met him, and he could not match the man 
in the flesh with the images he had seen of him on television. Defence, on 
the other hand seemed equally intent on persuading the jury that he ‘knew 
the man.’ Why? Witness surmised that Prosecutor wanted to preempt any 





attempt by Defence to imply that his calling the police to a domestic 
‘incident’ was because of a prejudice against Mercanti in person.
177
 For 
what other reason could Defence be objecting so strenuously? Witness 
wanted to dispel that impression also, which was why he presumed to 
interject.  
Judge:  Just - no - no, just - just - just a moment, please, Mr 
Fisher. 
The two ‘nos’ and four ‘justs’ attest to the gravity of Witness’ presumption. 
As Kadoch reminds us, participants take cues from place when determining 
operative linguistic rules. For a moment, Witness had forgotten his place. 
Kadoch cites Gumperz who illustrates the difference between the 
preferences of conversation, and the obligatory requirements of courtroom 
discourse. ‘The point,’ he argues, 
is that at the level of conversation, there are always many possible alternative 
interpretations, many more than exist at the level of sentence grammar. Choice 
among these is constrained by what the speaker intends to achieve in a particular 
interaction, as well as by the other’s reactions and assumptions. Yet once a 
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Facebook page. 
I alerted the prosecutor, because I did not want defence to surprise the prosecutor with this piece, thereby 
alleging my prejudice, without his knowing about it. It also accounts for my attempt to shore up my 
independence by breaking the rule about my place in the narrative space. This was why he made more of the 
fact that I did not recognize the man than was necessary in the circumstances, because, it seemed, defence 
was not aware of the story.  





particular interpretation has been chosen and accepted, it must be followed.
178
 
The interpretation of the rules, which has established the place and 
conversational rights of Witness, had been decided at the voir dire. The 
judge could brook no challenge. To do so would contest the authority of the 
role. This disruption to building the narrative of the case raises the question 
whether counsel would be able to play the same ‘game’ in a trial before 
judge alone.  
Judge alone and the absent jury influence 
With no jury to persuade, but only a judge to convince would the judge have 
welcomed a speedy resolution of the dispute from the witness, who, 
logically, is best placed to provide it? However, the institution of the jury as 
the champion of democracy is well ingrained. Therefore, a judge sitting 
alone in a trial in which the accused has exercised the option to forego jury 
trial must adhere as closely as possible to the same rules of evidence and 
rules of procedure that operate in jury trials.  
There is tension in telling a story by assembling diverse testimonies into a version expressed 
in terms of a legal conclusion, and the moral imperative of revealing substantive truth. It 
confronts counsel organising courtroom discourse before a judge alone just as it does for a 
jury trial. However, they have differing ends in mind. 
The lawyer…begins with his client’s story and ends in the court of appeals, arguing a point of statutory 
interpretation or constitutional law. And the judge must take two or more such arguments—two ways 
of connecting a particular story with a system or theory that will explain and act upon it—and with 
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their aid fashion his own account, a version that concludes with a judgment or order in legal language, 
with words that work on the world.
179
 
The point of White’s observation is that, ultimately, the judge must take responsibility. This, 
he maintains, is how the judicial system makes law. Therefore, he asserts that judge and 
lawyer alike are concerned primarily with converting the ‘raw material of life—of the actual 
experiences of people and the thousands of ways they can be talked about—into a story that 
will claim to tell the truth in legal terms.’
180
 I think this is the difference between counsel 
organizing courtroom discourse for judge alone, who has one eye on ‘the court of appeals’ 
where law might be made, and counsel organizing courtroom discourse for a jury, which does 
not make law, but only makes unexplained decisions about the facts, to which law is applied. 
Nevertheless, the jury influence is still evident in trials before judge alone, as I illustrate in 
the next section. 
The State of Western Australia v Rayney 
Prominent Western Australian barrister, Lloyd Rayney faced a charge of having murdered his 
equally prominent lawyer wife, Corryn Rayney on or about 7 August 2007. Having the 
choice, Rayney chose to have a judge sitting alone try the case, a choice that surprised few 
people. Constant media speculation; the high profile of both victim and accused as members 
of the Western Australian justice system; police and Department of Public Prosecutions 
comments that there was no other suspect; the forensic focus on the family home; and the 
public image of Corryn Rayney as model mother fed a doubt that a representative jury would 
come to the trial with minds clear of predisposition or prejudice. Although there is no 
suggestion that a local judge would have been incapable of putting aside any predispositions 
they too might hold, the Court appointed former Northern Territory Chief Justice Brian 
Martin, to try the case. This was to ensure that not only would justice be done, but it also 
would be seen to be done. 
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In allowing an accused the right to choose between trial by judge alone, or by a jury of their 
peers, the Criminal Procedure Act section 118(4) says, the court can make such an order ‘if it 
considers it is in the interests of justice to do so but, on an application by the prosecutor, must 
not do so unless the accused consents.’
181
 That the court does so with some reservations is 
evident in section 119, which requires the sitting judge to apply as closely as possible the 
same principles that would apply to a trial before a jury. 
(1) In a trial by a judge alone, the judge must apply, so far as is practicable, the same principles of 
law and procedure as would be applied in a trial before a jury. 
 (2) In a trial by a judge alone, the judge may view a place or thing. 
 (3) If any written or other law —  
 (a) requires information or a warning or instruction to be given to the jury in certain 
circumstances; or 
  (b) prohibits a warning from being given to a jury in certain circumstances, 
the judge in a trial by a judge alone must take the requirement or prohibition into account if 
those circumstances arise in the course of the trial.
 182
 
In the event, Martin J found Lloyd Rayney not guilty.
183
 Reading his reasons for the decision, 
one could infer that the absent jury was never far from his mind. Relevantly, he sought to 
validate his decision: 
26 The State did not present an eyewitness to the death of the deceased. In order to prove objective facts 
from which the State contended I should be satisfied that the accused is guilty of wilful murder or 
manslaughter, the State relied upon evidence of surrounding circumstances commonly known as 
circumstantial evidence. 
27 Like direct evidence, circumstantial evidence can be good, bad or indifferent. I am required to decide 
what facts I find are proven by the evidence and then to determine what inference or inferences I am 
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prepared to draw, and to draw beyond reasonable doubt, from the proven facts. I am required to 
consider all of the proven facts together and to determine whether those facts in their entirety leave a 
reasonable doubt or lead me to a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of either 
wilful murder or manslaughter. 
28 The drawing of inferences from proven facts is different from speculation. There is no room in the 
criminal court for speculation or speculative theories. Inferences can only be drawn if facts proven by 
the evidence properly support the drawing of the inferences. 
29  The reliance by the State on circumstantial evidence requires that I consider the possibility that the 
proven facts do not necessarily point to guilt. A verdict of guilty cannot be returned unless the proven 
facts are such as to be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is guilty. 
Guilt must not only be a rational inference, but it must be the only rational inference that the proven 
facts enable me to draw. This principle and the approach to circumstantial evidence was described by 
Dixon CJ in Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 
31  The accused exercised his right not to give evidence. No inference adverse to the accused can be drawn 
by reason of the fact that he chose not to give evidence. 
32  [Deleted from published reasons] 
33 Throughout the trial and my deliberations, and in assessing the evidence and reaching my conclusions, 
I have applied these legal principles and other principles discussed in these reasons. 
34 In the context of principles to be applied, I have also borne in mind that many of the statements 
tendered by consent contain material that is either inadmissible or can only be used for limited 




I have reproduced this explanation in full because it suggests that in Martin J’s mind’s eye 
was a jury to whom he was delivering an admonition about the approach it should take in 
deciding Mr Rayney’s guilt or innocence. It shows the influence of the jury as institution in 
the justice system. It suggests, too, that Martin J shares James Boyd White’s generalised view 
that the final destination of his judgment was to be the ‘court of appeals.’ However, the jury 
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as upholder of democracy does not always deliver what it is supposed to ensure, as another 
high-profile criminal trial will attest. 
State of Western Australia v Martinez & Ors185 
Consider the case of three young men on trial in the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
before a jury. The case against them was that they launched an unprovoked attack on the 
victim, punching him, kicking him in the head, and finally throwing him off a footbridge to 
his death. The first trial resulted in a hung jury. Because of the enormous publicity 
surrounding the case, and the extent of public emotion it aroused, the accused sought to have 
the second trial conducted by a judge sitting alone. The judge who heard the application was 
the judge who was to preside at the second trial. He refused the application. The judge 
acknowledged the extensive publicity that the case had attracted, but did not believe it 
warranted a trial by judge alone. 
There is no reason to suppose that, suitably warned, a jury would not bring the customary approach of 
fairness, impartiality and objectivity to this retrial which would be expected. In other words, I do not 
consider that the publicity which has occurred in the past relating to the death of Phillip Walsham, or to 
the arrest, charging and prosecution of these accused will prevent a properly directed jury from 
delivering an impartial verdict. I do not even think that there is a serious risk that that might occur, but 




In a case of this difficulty and importance there seems to me to be a considerable advantage in 
requiring the unanimous agreement of a panel of 12 people for a verdict, rather than that of a single 
person no matter how great his or her experience may be. This seems to be a case, more than others, 
when a panel of 12 jurors is likely to bring a collective wisdom and evaluation of all the facts proved 
which would be preferable to that of any single judgment.
187
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At the new trial, in a highly charged atmosphere of public abhorrence at the nature of the 
alleged act, the jury returned a verdict of guilty; media reports implied that the result satisfied 
most people and surprised few.
188
  
The democratic jury does not always ensure justice 
On appeal, after a hearing that ran for ten weeks, the Western Australia Supreme Court of 
Appeal quashed the convictions.
 189
 The public was angry. Members of the jury, which had 
reached the guilty verdict, were incensed. Some of them made their anger public, and labelled 
the appeal court verdict a ‘farce’.
190
 Yet, a reading of the Court of Appeal’s cogently 
constructed judgment, invites the conclusion that the decision to quash was not only fair, but 
was also the only just conclusion the Court could have reached. As unpalatable as that verdict 
might have been to a public wanting someone to pay, it is reasonable to argue that—in spite 
of the jury in this instance—justice was done. Had the appeal court abdicated its 
responsibility by punishing what the ‘public deemed worthy of punishing,’
191
 it would have 
sacrificed justice in pursuit of its own legitimacy.
192
 
Without having heard the complete courtroom testimony, why was the public so adamant that 
the accused were guilty? According to Robinson and Darley,
 193
social science evidence 
suggests that the answer lies in intuition, as I discuss further in Chapter Three. I also examine 
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the question whether intuition—sensus communis—is the province of jurors only. That 
question is important in a trial before jury, where the court will consider questions of law and 
the probative value of testimony that witnesses will present, in voir dire. The judge dismisses 
the jury from the courtroom during this discussion. Should it become necessary, the judge 
will explain the rules and the jury’s obligation to observe them when they consider testimony 
that Judge and counsel have sorted out in voir dire. In that respect, jurors are no better 
informed than is the ‘lay audience.’ 
But, implicit in the claim to have sorted out the rules in voir dire is that lawyers have 
discussed them rationally, and that the judge has considered their discussion with an equally 
rational mien. Intuition, the voir dire principle implies, is the province of jurors. Yet, as I 
explain in Chapter Three, professionals are as prone to exercising intuition—even in the 
realm of their professional expertise—as are laypersons. Furthermore, if the perceived value 
of jurors’ deliberations is that they apply community common sense to finding the facts, then 
they should have access to all raw facts to which the witness has access.  
The significance of the voir dire effect 
In the case in which I was a witness, I based my intuitive application of community common 
sense on all the facts that I knew. Intuitively, therefore, I believed the jury should also have 
those facts. However, the rules of evidence, to which the court must defer, decreed otherwise. 
The following exchanges from my case study show the influence of voir dire decisions. 
The prosecution had wanted to lead evidence of the ferocity of the accused when he emerged 
from the house by having Witness recount what the accused had said to him. The negotiations 
on what part of that was admissible took the following form in voir dire. 
Prosecutor: But what we say is the jury is going to need to understand 
how Mr Mercanti appeared, and his attitude and 
demeanour. Did he appear angry during the course of 
this offence?- 





Judge: She can say all that 
Prosecutor; But Mr Fisher being an independent eyewitness, your Honour. 
Judge: Mr Fisher can describe everything up to, in my view, paragraph 11. 
Prosecutor: But is the jury not going to be perplexed if Mr Fisher is not asked, 
“Well, how did he appear?” 
Judge: “How did he appear to you, Mr Fisher?” or “How did he appear to 
Ms Kingdon?”  They’re two separate issues. 
Prosecutor: But the issue… 
 Judge: His attitude to Ms - to Fisher is not what he’s on - it’s got nothing to 
do with the indictment. 
Prosecutor; No, it’s not, your Honour, but it does indicate his state of mind and 
demeanour - because the State says this is relevant. He’s come out - 
because it may be ultimately that they say, “Yes, she was outside 
naked and he came outside because he was concerned about her”. 
Now, the State says if the jury hears that Mr Mercanti has come out 
of his house, hasn’t so much glanced at Ms Kingdon, and has 
abused Mr Fisher, that can rationally affect the jury’s assessment of 
the probability of a fact in issue. That is to say, was he being 
solicitous for the welfare of his wife and concerned because she was 
out there for some unknown reason? Or is it because he was in the 
process of assaulting her? 
If a jury is not provided with the information that he appeared to be 
angry, a jury is going to be completely baffled as to how they’re 





supposed to interpret this evidence. Whether he was calm, whether 
he was smiling, whether he was being friendly, whether he was 
being angry, whether he was raising his voice. A jury is going to 
wonder why no one’s asking him--- 
… 
about this thing. We simply can’t lead this evidence in a meaningful 
way, with respect, if we--- 
Judge: Well, I mean, you go back to paragraph 3: Even over the noise of 
the bikes I could still hear the woman screaming, ‘Somebody, please 
help me’. 
Prosecutor: Mm. 
Judge: I mean seriously, [Prosecutor].  The jury can’t follow that and work 
out what was happening?  What is being objected to at 
paragraph 11 is his attitude to Mr Fisher, “I’ll punch your head off, 
your fucking” - 
Punch your head off your shoulders, you fucking maggot. 
Well, what’s that--- 
After more argument… 
Defence; …Your Honour, there’s got to be an end to this. Your Honour made 
a ruling. 
Judge: Yes, I have made a ruling. 
The prosecutor makes a last, futile attempt to retrieve the initiative, which the judge ignores.  





Judge: It’s up to paragraph 11, [Prosecutor]. That is my ruling.
194
 
The inflammatory testimony lacks probative value, so it is inadmissible. 
Although Witness felt unfairly treated because he was unable to recount the full substance of 
the encounter, the judge’s application of the rule mirrors the letter of the law. Professor of 
Jurisprudence, W.L. Twining claims storytelling can impair the search for rational exposition 
of the facts.
195
 The judge had reasoned—rationally, if one accepts Twining’s view—that 
Witness had revealed relevant facts. The jury ‘could work out what was happening.’ Adding 
the accused’s dialogue would not make the facts clearer, it would merely add colour to the 
narrative, in the way a work of fiction would demand. However, had the judge surrendered 
narrative development to Witness at this point in the testimony, it might well have brought 
into contention section 31A of the Evidence Act. Relevantly, the section provides,
 
 
(1)  In this section — 
 propensity evidence means — 
 (a) similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; 
or 
 (b) evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a 
tendency that the accused person has or had; 
 relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused 
person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time. 
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 (2) Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an 
offence if the court considers— 
 (a) that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence 
adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and 
 (b) that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an 
unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public 
interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the 
risk of an unfair trial.
196
 
In the event, the argument on admissible testimony under s 31A was to take considerable 
time in the voir dire over whether the State should have made a section 31A application, as 
Defence asserted, or whether the State was able to rely on the Common Law position on 
relationship evidence. After extensive discussion, the judge sent the two adversaries off to 
negotiate an agreement on the inadmissible testimony.
197
 Kadoch has told us that ‘the jury is 
reminded… by the judge of their duty to interpret the discourse according to the rules.’ 
However, this lengthy negotiation of the circumstances in which the rules should apply 
suggests that the jurors and the ‘lay person,’ with whom Kadoch contrasts them, lack full 
understanding of the ‘multiple aspects of the discourse equally.’
198 
 
Danet has made a similar observation. She acknowledges that advocacy and argument are 
‘paramount’ in all genres of “fact” orientated disputing. However, she maintains that within 
the “fact” orientated genres, the public claim to be dealing with truth and fact is dubious. On 
the contrary, she states, practitioners ‘are actually preoccupied with elaborate rules governing 
the flow of talk and silence and have evolved a highly esoteric professional language, 
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incomprehensible to those whose fate is at stake that dominates the courtroom.’
199
 She refers 
to this as the ‘thickening’ of language, which forces its referential function to the background. 
That is to say, rather than using language in its referential function to tell us about the relation 
between language and the real world, they use it to mystify by highlighting the poetic 
function.
 200
 In this context, poetic function of language refers to the focus on the message 
‘for its own sake,’ as Jakobson explains. ‘This function cannot be productively  studied out of 
touch with the general problems of language ....Any attempt to reduce the sphere of poetic 
function to poetry or to confine poetry to poetic  function would be a delusive 
oversimplification. Poetic function is not the sole function of verbal art but only its dominant,  








In sustaining the objection the judge had cut in quickly to the extent of overriding the uttered 
“immaterial.” But counsel wanted more – this time, for the jury. 
 What do they say on television? Anyway, he’s not allowed to say it. 
At this point, I will insert a ‘flashback’—as “they say on television”—to when counsel 
introduced me to the jury.  
Prosecutor: And what do you do for a living? 
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Witness : I'm retired. 
His next question, in view of the testimony I was to give, I thought was irrelevant…  
Prosecutor: And what did you used to do for a living? 
…and—I thought—unnecessarily intrusive.  
Only minutes before I entered the courtroom, junior counsel had told me that the court 
would not allow me to recount the verbal abuse the accused levelled at me, because it 
was insufficiently probative and likely to inflame the jury. I had planned to use it to build 
my narrative about his demeanour. On the other hand, the court now wanted information 
about my background from many years ago so that the jury could gauge whether it was 
likely to influence my testimony about what I saw. Given anecdotal evidence of the 
inferences many people draw about the credibility of media and those who work in them, 
I hedged.     
Witness [W]: I [spent] my earlier life around TV stations and radio stations. 
My friendly cross-examiner left it at that. Nevertheless, the power relations were clear. My 
contribution to the narrative of the case as a witness would be only that which counsel 
approved. I reasoned that I needed to be on the defensive when the less-friendly interlocutor 
took his turn.  
Flash-forward to the present and the need to be on the defensive is evident. ‘What do they say 
on television’ becomes an alert to the jury, not a question to elicit information in order to 
reach an understanding. ‘What do they say on television’ is not referential; it is thickened 
language. The focus is on the message for its own sake. The register in which Defence 
delivers the rhetorical question is irony, which the non-expressive transcript—words on 
paper—cannot convey if we do not know the context. In this instance, that means keeping in 
mind the job description of Witness given to the jury (the addressee) at his introduction to 





them. It also requires a common understanding between addresser and addressee of the code 
in play.  
For Defence to believe his six-word ironic utterance—what do they say on television—will  
work requires that he also believes his jury share the interpretative code. If they do, they will 
be susceptible to even slightly nuanced difference in expressiveness according to context.
202
 
So, having made his point, Defence reinforces it by returning to the rules: ‘Anyway, he’s not 
allowed to say it.’ To which he receives judicial affirmation. 
Judge: That’s right.  
The tone of voice is almost admonitory, implying an added, “So There!” 
Of course, Defence was entitled to object; the rules of evidence are clear on this point, 
although a witness with no formal knowledge of law might not know this. In this instance, 
Witness did know but wanted to forestall any attempt by defence counsel to discredit him as a 
busybody trying to interfere in a mere domestic tiff. Therefore, in preparing for his 
performance in court, he had thought through his actions to clarify in his mind his reasons for 
crossing the road. However, as I have explained earlier, there is potential also for witness 
self-deliberation to metamorphose from clarification into rationalization. In other words, 
Witness is no longer thinking as the objective neutral observer, but as a participant. The 
question arises whether he mediates ‘raw’ testimony unfairly. Does he surrender his 
objectivity? 
Analogically, the witness is Roland Barthes’ historian’s informer.
203
 Barthes thinks of the 
informer either as a neutral observer of the historical event, or as a participant in it who is 
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now the present narrator of the event. The first purports to offer an unmediated account of it. 
This is presumed to be the unspoiled data-mother lode from which counsel construct their 
narrative of the case. But, for the second, this cannot be so when the witness is both a past 
actor and a present narrator.’
204
 The “I” of the utterance conjoins with the “I” in the uttering 
act to threaten objectivity, even when the utterer explicitly appears to be guarding against the 
threat. Barthes gives an example. 
The most famous example of this conjunction of the I in the utterance and the I in the act of uttering is 
doubtless the he of Caesar's Gallic War. This celebrated he belongs to the utterance; when Caesar 
explicitly undertakes the act of uttering he passes to the use of we…. Caesar's he appears at first sight 
to be submerged amid the other participants in the process described, and on this count has been 
viewed as the supreme sign of objectivity. And yet it would appear that we can make a formal 
distinction which impugns this objectivity. How? By making the observation that the predicates of 
Caesar's he are constantly pre-selected: this [sic] he can only tolerate a certain class of syntagmas, 
which we could call the syntagmas of command (giving orders, holding court, visiting, having things 
done, congratulating, explaining, thinking).
205
  
Barthes claims that choosing to use an apersonal pronoun is no more than a ‘rhetorical alibi.’ 
In spite of his alibi, however, the utterer makes clear his self-perceived status with the choice 
of ‘syntagmas with which he surrounds his past actions.’206  
Furthermore, I argue that in witness testimony, the more delayed the act of utterance is from 
the time of the event, the greater is the risk to objectivity from external influences. In my case 
study, Witness had made a written statement to the police, which, no matter how impartial he 
intended to be, was still open to that risk. From my privileged viewpoint as the “I” in the 
utterance” and the “I” in the uttering act, I (now using the personal pronoun in my authorial 
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role) can recollect the mental processes in the first person. Even recounting the event to 
acquaintances raised the spectre of self-delusion that I acted in good faith. The image of the 
terrified naked woman distressed me. Yet, when I related the event to men acquaintances, 
responses from many of them took me by surprise. They ranged from ribald comment about 
my good luck in coming across a naked young woman in need of help, to questions about 
whether she was attractive. I started questioning my motives in going to her aid. In my self-
deliberations, I reminded myself that I began to cross the road before the naked woman 
appeared. I convinced myself at that moment that my motives were Samaritan, not salacious. 
Yet, on my day in court, it is clear that, unbidden, the need arose to reinforce that point even 
in the knowledge that, according to the rules of evidence, it lacked probative value. This was 
in spite of the fact that I made an effort to remain impartial. I was not to appear until five 
days after the trial began. During that time, I did not read, watch, or listen to, any media 
reports of the trial; friends and family respected my request that they not discuss media 
coverage of the trial with me. Nor did I have the opportunity to sit in the courtroom to listen 
to testimony that preceded my appearance. Yet, if one assumes it only requires honest intent 
to be impartial, if all one need do to attain that goal is to gather up and present all the facts, 
then, according to Max Weber, this will still not be enough. ‘Any attempt to understand 
(historical) reality without subjective hypotheses will end in nothing but a jumble of 
existential judgments on countless isolated events.’
207
  
Just as we can insist that our judiciary acts impartially, that they treat all parties in a dispute 
equally, and that they decide without institutional bias, we can insist that witnesses present 
testimony without intentional bias. Whether by oath or affirmation, we demand the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth. The witness, at that moment becomes an impartial 
bystander, not an advocate. However, we cannot insist that they act objectively, because 
objectivity is external to the mind; the predispositions and prejudices they bring to court are 
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unconscious, and generally derive from the collective memory of the society to which they 
belong. Inga Markovits writes,  
As individuals, we have no power over our recollections: we forget what we would like to remember, 
remember what we would like to forget, are at the mercy of such volatile reminders as smell and 
taste…and have to accept that we recall events not only because they were important, but that events 
become important just because we remember them. In our individual memories, the past rules over the 
present.’ Public memory works differently, ‘the present rules over the past. In every generation, 




For the philosopher to get value from this witness’ reflection on his mental processes in 
deciding to cross the road, I suggest they would need to have asked the question of him 
immediately after he made the decision. But, that might still be too late. In that moment of 
decision, I contend, two alternatives only are in contest: an unreflected response to an appeal 
for help, versus an instinctive need for self-preservation. “Is it safe?” However, from the 
moment the philosopher puts the question, one might argue, the trigger for rationalisation has 
been squeezed. Even more so then, by the time the police officers asked that question, the 
window of opportunity for pure philosophic contemplation had closed. The witness now 
grasped the reality that, later, he might have to justify both his response to the appeal for help, 
and his decision to call the police. Is this the point at which rationalization overcomes sincere 
contemplation? The rules of evidence operate to guard against that possibility. Therefore, it is 
valid for Defence to object to that portion of the testimony. In his The critique of pure 
reason,
209
 Kant expresses a belief that a moral consideration should influence a subject when 
they reach a judgment. We then cannot subjectively distinguish persuasion from conviction. 
This is unimportant providing that the judgment remains a ‘phenomenon of its own mind.’ 
That is to say, it is merely privately valid. However, it is important if the subject, in 
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So, Defence’s objection is tactical because, as I have explained earlier, Defence will want 
there to be a narrative, but they are to be the author of it. Witnesses are to contribute to the 
plot development, but under the direction—the discipline—of counsel as author.  
However, in the cut and thrust of cross-examination, even a well-prepared defence counsel 
can inadvertently yield control to the witness. To illustrate, I return to my case study. Defence 
is cross-examining.  
Witness:   And - and that's when I heard the - the screams. And as I 
started to cross the road I was pretty much - I had crossed the 
median strip when I saw the woman appear for the first time 
running down there. 
Defence: All right. Thank you. So you're describing a section of the 
road which is sort of the - sorry, what's that road called 
again?--- 
Witness: Davallia Road. 
Defence: All right.  Well - and Troy Mercanti was someone who 
you knew of, is that right? 
Witness: ---Of course. Yes. 
Defence: And because you knew of him, you - putting it bluntly, you 
didn't want to tangle with him, is that right? 
Witness ---If I hadn't wanted to tangle with him -  
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The witness’s answer shows that the question took him by surprise because it seemed 
chronologically misplaced. Witness was in the process of crossing the road toward where 
he knew Mercanti lived, not away from where he lived, which is what one would expect 
to be the direction someone would take if they did not want to tangle with him. The first 
part of the answer shows that Witness was about to explain that point. He then realized 
that it was not in his interests to pick a fight with Defence on the point because he might 
have had a good, but for the moment obscure, reason for asking it at that stage. As soon 
became evident, Defence did have a reason. The thrust of his cross-examination was to 
instil doubt about this witness’ testimony in the cause of developing his preferred 
narrative of a man, not bent on violence, but on encouraging his distraught wife to return 
to the sanctity of the house. This becomes clear in the second stage of the cross-
examination. If he could persuade the jury that Witness, aware of Mercanti’s reputation, 
was fearful and, therefore, perhaps likely to misconstrue the scene unfolding before him, 
he could direct the narrative development along his preferred path. 
Witness: Yes, of course..Yeah, that's right. Who would want to tangle 
with him at my age? 
Mercanti threw his head back and laughed out loud. Court staff laughed. Jury members 
laughed. For a moment, by chance, Witness had control of the audience. 
Defence: Right. Well, I  wouldn't. 
This last stated almost in reluctant recognition that the reply was not what he wanted. 
A “Yes” would have been the ideal. Alternatively, more likely, that he had asked a 
question that he would have been better served not to ask.  
Defence followed that comment with a pause in the interrogation, as he turned toward 
his desk. 
Defence: Pardon  me. 





This was not an apology for asking the question, but an indication to the court that he was 
removing himself from the fray for a moment to prepare to move on. In the next stage, 
Defence would shift register; questioning would be more aggressive, both in delivery and in 
message content. 
Defence: The young woman that you saw, you saw her come out of the 
house. Now, by that you mean come out of the property line, is 
that right?---She - - -Out the front?--- 
Witness: She appeared a step of two behind the woman who came running 
towards - towards that palm tree. 
Defence: But - but - but she - the young woman wasn't running, was 
she?- 
Witness: --She was keeping pace with the - yeah. 
Defence: What, jogging? 
Witness: ---You could call it jogging, I suppose, yes. 
Defence:  Originally your statement read she was wearing a 
hooded top.  This is the young woman? 
Witness:  ---No. 
Defence:  And that - that was changed to blue shorts and a white 
top?.  
Witness:  Because that statement was incorrect I  never - never 
said that. 
Defence:  Never said that? 





Witness:  ---And it was corrected at - at - at my instigation, 
because what I only ever saw was a woman in blue 
shorts and white top. And the - the officer who tendered 
that statement to me had made a mistake, and we 
corrected it. 
The police officer had inserted the correction by hand, and Witness initialled it. Therefore, 
the opportunity to cross-examine aggressively on the point was opportunistic. A more 
cautious witness would have demanded that the police officer retype the statement 
completely to preclude the opportunity. 
Defence:  Somehow - - -? 
Witness: ---There was never any suggestion that she was wearing a 
hooded top. Never. 
Defence: Somehow - hang on. Somehow he got it into his head that you'd 
said and wrote down she was wearing a hooded top. Right? 
Witness: … and I corrected that though – 
Defence: Okay? 
Witness: ---, because I did not say that. I did not see it, so I - I could not 
say it. 
This exchange was not serving any probative cause. Defence knew that the corrected 
version was accurate. It did not matter. His questions had a tactical purpose only: to bring 
in to doubt the reliability of Witness’ recollection of the events. It had re-established the 
chain maxim, ‘a summons to reply, a means to compel, require, or demand a response.’211 
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What is more, Defence had regained the initiative quickly. Time to press home the 
advantage. 
Defence: Now, you say that that woman wasn't saying anything? 
Witness: ---I did not hear her say a word. 
Defence: Well, whether you heard her saying anything or not, are you 
- you're not going to stand there and - and - sit there and 
swear that she didn't say anything? 
Witness:  ---Of course I'm not. I did not hear her say a word. 
Defence:  Yes. We're going to hear from her. We know that she was the 
sister of the naked woman, you understand? 
Witness:  ---No, I did not know that she was the sister. 
Defence: Well, I'm telling you? 
Unnecessarily belligerent?  
Witness: Thank you. 
Unnecessarily sarcastic?  
Defence: She's the sister of the naked woman, and she was sleeping in a 
cabana, which is sort of an offshoot of the house, was woken 
by - ultimately by noise and went outside, and found her sister 
outside. That's what she's going to tell us. Now - and - and 
she's going to tell us that she was trying to get her sister to 
come back inside. After all, she was stark bollock naked, the 
girl - the young woman. Now, you're not suggesting for a 
moment that she wasn't speaking with her, albeit you weren't 





able to hear, are you? 
Witness: What I am saying is what I saw. And what I saw was a woman 
standing there looking indecisive, as was I, and not - and not 
saying anything that was audible to me. 
Defence: All right? 
At this point, the exchanges between Defence and Witness had become a battle of wills, a 
little more acrimonious.  
Defence: She was a bit nonplussed perhaps?--- 
Witness: She was like me, I suppose. Yes, nonplussed. Indecisive. 
Defence: Indecisive. I mean, I imagine you've never been 
indecisive in your life, but some people can get 
nonplussed when they're suddenly confronted by 
something that really shocks them, can't they?- 
Witness: I was indecisive because I didn't know what was the 
right - right plan of action to - to initiate at that point.
 Yes, course I was indecisive. 
Defence: Thank you? 
The last comment signalled the end of cross-examination. 
Counsel’s belligerence in this exchange is considered; it is feigned, not genuine. Having 
opportunistically challenged Witness on the veracity of his description of the young girl or 
woman, his tone, and sarcastic phrasing—‘you're not going to stand there and - and - sit 
there and swear that she didn't say anything?—is designed to persuade the jury that this 
witness is unreliable. Defence knows he has a tactical advantage. He knows that the court has 
ruled that witness testimony about verbal exchanges with the accused is inadmissible. Had 
Witness been allowed to develop the narrative he had in mind, his reply could have been, ‘an 





aggressive bikie standing centimetres from one’s face bellowing that he is going to “punch 
your fucking head off your fucking maggot shoulders” tends to concentrate one’s mind to the 
exclusion of all else.’ Had he done so, of course, he would have irritated the judge a little 
more than somewhat. And, the testimony would still have been inadmissible, albeit already 
uttered and digested. 
The exchange illustrates the advantage counsel have in organizing the nature of courtroom 
discourse. Compare what is happening here with what happened earlier after Judge 
admonished Prosecution for allowing Witness too much freedom to ad lib his testimony: “Mr 
Fisher, it - maybe - what this court is interested in is what you saw and what you heard,”  
which, in fact meant not mentioning what he had heard. What Witness heard became through 
voir dire something he did not hear. Now, however, Defence is telling the jury that something 
Witness did not hear was something he must have heard.  
Nevertheless, he was careful not to say the Witness was lying. He used the phrases “whether 
you heard her saying anything.” and, later “albeit you weren't able to hear.” He wanted 
to imply that the accused and the young woman had merely followed the other woman 
outside to encourage her to return to the house. Had he called the witness a liar, he would 
have opened the door to a rebuttal, which would have allowed the inadmissible evidence 
in, to show that, at no stage had the accused directed his attention to the woman on the 
ground.  
Lloyd Weinreb criticizes Counsel’s propensity to adopt this approach.  
There is no reason why the information that a witness gives need be controlled by someone who is 
determined to avoid the disclosure of evidence favorable to the other side, however relevant to the 
inquiry'. There is no reason why an intense, searching examination of a witness's recollections to 
ensure their accuracy need regularly be accompanied by deliberately manipulative efforts to 
obscure or discredit his testimony; or why the duty to be a witness at a criminal trial  
should  require  submission  to  almost  any abusive  questioning tactic that an opposing 
lawyer may devise. There is no reason why rules of procedure designed to ensure a fair 





trial need systematically to be distorted by lawyers into tactical ploys for which they were 
not intended. A criminal trial need not be from beginning to end an exercise in the tactics 




 On the other hand, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca say that in argumentation, it is not 
important what the speaker regards as true or important, but in knowing ‘the views of those 
he is addressing.’
213
 This differs from the rational nature of conviction. The authors draw on 
Pascal’s observation that ‘persuasion is something applied to the automaton—by which he 
means the body, imagination, and feeling, all, in fact, that is not reason.’
214
 The authors quote 
Dumas: ‘in being persuaded, a person is satisfied with affective and personal reasons’. He 
adds, ‘persuasion is often "sophistic”.’
215
 As it applies to courtroom discourse, Isocrates’ 
viewpoint—by implication—states the dilemma. ‘The arguments by which we convince 
others when we speak to them are the same as those we use when we engage in reflection. 
We call those able to speak to the multitude orators, and we regard as persons of sagacity 




I end this chapter by reprising one part of the case study I examined earlier, to show the 
difficulty confronting the jury in reaching a clear understanding of the facts. Each abstract 
exhibits the form of conversation, but fails to meet the criteria that Gadamer decrees are 
necessary. 
Oral exchange number one, to which Defence objected:  
Witness [W]: Initially, all I heard were the screams. And it Witness: ‘I heard 
screams. Very loud screams. They sounded like terrified screams, so 
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loud that I could hear them above the sound of three high-powered 
motorcycles that were going past at the time.’ 
Prosecutor [P]: Could you make out any words? 
The exchange between Prosecutor and Witness is not a conversation in the form of a 
reciprocal relationship that Gadamer asserts is necessary if a conversation is to reach an 
understanding. That is, when each participant opens themselves to the other and, in a spirit of 
reciprocity, weighs the other party’s arguments, whilst holding on to their own, until ‘it is 
finally possible to achieve, in an imperceptible but not arbitrary reciprocal translation of the 
other’s position (We call this an exchange of views)—a common diction and a common 
statement.’
217
 Therefore, this was not a true conversation in which one ‘opened himself to the 
other…’ with a view to developing an understanding of the substantive truth. Counsel had 
already proofed the witness before their performance in court. In other words, counsel had 
taken from the witness’ account in that pre-trial discussion only that which would serve his 
preferred end. Proofing of a witness is not coaching a witness about what to say. One 
participant in a conversation might hold the view that something is relevant, whilst the other 
holds the view that it is not. Finally, they will agree on a common diction and a common 
statement. What follows in court, then, is no longer a conversation between witness and 
counsel. It is a performance of that common diction and common dictum arrived at in 
proofing. Its purpose is to persuade, not to convince. Note that, in this case study, the witness 
was there because he had gone to the aid of the victim of the attack. He wanted to persuade 
the jury to his point of view that the incident was not ‘just’ a domestic dispute. His 
description of the nature of the screams aimed to influence the jury to this end. On this 
objective at least, counsel and the witness were as one. Thus, this witness could not claim to 
be a neutral observer. That, by itself, does not make the witness any less reliable.  
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Oral exchange number two 
Defence: He heard screams. What they suggested to him is – it-it – 
irrelevant… 
Judge: Yes 
Defence: …immaterial. What do they say on television? Anyway, he’s not 
allowed to say it. 
Judge: That’s right.  
Here too we must note that the defence counsel and the judge were not opening themselves 
up to the other with a view to developing an understanding. The exchange merely confirmed 
a direction that the judge had given to both counsel in a voir dire hearing before the first 
testimony, and before the court had empanelled the jury. 
Oral exchange number three 
Judge: But – [Mr Prosecutor] so just – you need to lead the witness 
carefully.  
Prosecutor:  I – I do, Your Honour 
Judge: Thank you 
Prosecutor: I’m obliged, your Honour. 
The judge’s gentle caution was a reminder that counsel and the court had reached a 
compromise on this part of the testimony. Counsel for the defence had wanted the judge to 
declare the reference to high-powered motorcycles inadmissible. The witness had wanted to 
make the point that the screams were penetrating, suggesting terror, rather than mere fright. 
Although junior counsel had advised the witness before his appearance that he was not to 
recount the threatening words the accused had directed at him when he went to the aid of the 





victim, she had not thought it necessary to warn the witness about drawing an inference from 
the intensity of the screams. Defence counsel was right to object. Nor does that, by itself, 
mean the witness was wrong in trying to get the testimony in. 
Oral exchange number four 
Prosecutor  Mr Fisher, it – maybe – what this court is interested in is what you 
saw and what you heard?... 
Witness:   Very well 
Prosecutor: …And, and… 
Witness: I understand 
Prosecutor: Yes. Thank you very much. So you heard – now I’ll go back to the 
question. Did you actually make out any words? 
Witness: At that point, no 
Prosecutor: And what did you do as a result of hearing those screams?  
Witness: I felt I needed to cross the road because of the nature of the 
screams. 
I have labelled this exchange as number four, rather than as number three-continued because 
the subject matter has changed from an account of the actions of the witnesses, to become 
that of a conflict between opposing counsel over what the witness ought to be allowed to say. 
In light of Defence’s vociferous appeals to the judge, Prosecutor might have been happy that 
Witness’ last comment on the matter had, retrieved the essence of the point he wished to 
make to the jury. That is, the victim was terrified. 





The jury, participating only vicariously, more than likely were now listening to this part of 
Witness’ testimony with a different mindset. The task they are set is to act as translator of 
these four exchanges. Gadamer has invoked the notion of translator as the ‘extreme case’ of 
hermeneutical difficulty. That is, difficulty in interpreting or explaining a text. 
A translator…must not leave open whatever is not clear to him… He must state clearly how he 
understands. But since he is always in the position of not always being able to express all the 
dimensions of his text, he must make a constant renunciation… Every translation that takes its task 
seriously is at once clearer and flatter than the original. Even if it is a masterly re-creation, it must lack 
the overtones that vibrate in the original.
218
  
When Defence objected, he illustrated Gadamer’s point that language, as the medium of 
understanding must be consciously created by an explicit mediation. ‘All understanding is 
interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of language which would 
allow the object to come in to words and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own 
language. ’
219
 The voire dire in Mercanti, is a demonstration of how a mediated 
understanding of language sets constraints on counsel as interpreters. The prosecution wanted 
to use the narrative language of literature to build their case. Defence counsel wanted to use 
the language of positivist law. Gadamer points out that this kind of explicit process is not the 
norm in conversation. ‘Reaching an understanding in conversation presupposes that both 
partners are ready for it and are trying to recognize the full value of what is alien and opposed 
to them.’
220
 So, if the witness and the jury were to reach an understanding according to the 
norms of conversation, they would not have needed counsel as putative translators. Oral 
exchange number four, therefore, is counsel as translator attempting to retain the meaning of 
the testimony given in the language of an ‘alien’ world while constraining it within a new 
language world decreed by the voir dire hearing.  
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Gadamer’s analogy is apt. In conversation and in translation, one must aim for empathy. ‘As 
in conversation one tries to get inside the other person in order to understand his point of 
view, so the translator also tries to get inside his author. But this does not automatically mean 
that understanding is achieved in a conversation, nor for the translator does this kind of 
empathy mean there is a successful recreation. The structures are clearly analogous.’
221 
Counsel share a common world: law and its language in the context of the adversarial 
criminal court, the laws of evidence, and the criminal trial procedures. This is not the world 
of the individual juror. It can be an alien world antagonistic in its character and in its 
expression. It is a world in which the mediation of language impedes the search for the 
substantive truth.  
More than one hundred years ago Oscar Wilde wrote, ‘A truth ceases to be true when more 
than one person believes in it… That would be my metaphysical definition of truth; 
something so personal that the same truth could never be appreciated by two minds.’
222
 As I 
show in Chapter Three, Roland Barthes has echoed the satirical Mr Wilde more prosaically in 
arguing that reality is the illusion of the utterer. Both, however, offer useful analogies to the 
nature of courtroom discourse and to why standard accounts of language are inadequate to 
assess it. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Creating the illusion of transparent 
portrayal of facts  
 
Introduction 
I begin this chapter by introducing selected theorists whose work facilitates the exploration of 
the essence of my thesis; namely, that there is a need to move beyond a standard analysis of 
language (which I discuss comprehensively in later chapters) to understand the potential for 
distortion of meaning in courtroom discourse. The chapter comprises two parts. In Part A, I 
discuss the adversarial trial before jury as a seminal speech event and introduce the key 
theorists upon whose viewpoints I draw to analyse the linguistic function of the rationalist 
rule that underpins it. In Part B, I move into an examination of the language “games” that 
courtroom advocates must play so that they conform to those rationalist rules, and I examine 
the language tools of their trade with which they accomplish their task. This chapter is pivotal 
to the elaboration of my thesis in Chapters Four and Five, in which I develop the idea that 
meaning resides in a state of mind beyond corporeality and beyond grammar.   
Introducing some key theorists  
Because the adversarial trial before jury fundamentally is a speech event, I begin by 
discussing the process of communication. That is, the manner in which the sender of a 
message transmits it to a recipient (the receiver). This process deals primarily with factors of 
encoding and decoding. The accent is on efficacy and accuracy of transmission. If the manner 
in which the recipient responds to the transmission differs from what the sender intended, the 
communication process has failed.
223
 The process of communication is a key element of the 
standard or monolithic hypothesis of language. But, I argue that analysis of courtroom 
advocacy must move beyond this standard account of language. Because the adversarial trial 
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is a speech event, one must consider communication as, what Fiske describes as, ‘the 
production and exchange of meanings.’
224
 This view moves analysis into the area of
semiotics, and especially into the cultural differences in finding meaning in a communicated 
text. Fiske sums up succinctly the difference between the two approaches. 
The process school sees a message as that which is transmitted by the communication process. Many of 
its followers believe that intention is a crucial factor in deciding what constitutes a message….For 
semiotics, on the other hand, the message is a construction of signs which, through interacting with the 
receivers, produce meanings. The sender…declines in importance. The emphasis shifts to the text and 
how it is “read.”
225
 
John Fiske’s discussion introduces Roman Jakobson, the first of the key theorists who 
develop the notion of communication as the production and exchange of meaning. Jakobson 
claims that if we are to get to the essence of the organization of discourse, we must move 
beyond language. He probes the realm of linguistics to expound a need to revise the notion of 
‘the monolithic hypothesis of language.’
226 
A monolithic approach would suggest that writing
and reading are manifestations of language used in speaking and listening. I explore the 
reason why this is not an adequate way to analyse the oral performance that is courtroom 
discourse. 
Jakobson’s structural analysis of language leads into my discussion of French literary 
theorist, linguist, and semiotician, Roland Barthes’ work on signs and signification, and on 
his concept of myth, both of which can influence how one extracts meaning from a text. 
Barthes’ work is significant because he discusses the way in which signs can work culturally 
in two different orders of signification. Broadly, the first order of signification is denotation, 
which one can describe simply as the obvious meaning. The second order is connotation, 
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which, as John Fiske explains, is where the denotative or obvious meaning interacts with the 
feelings or emotions of the user and the values of the user’s culture.
227
  
Fiske cites Barthes’ example of roses, which he used in his 1973 work, Mythologies.
228
 In its 
first order, a red rose stands for the signified physical object. But, as Fiske says, if one 
presents a rose to their ‘lady love,’ one invests it with a ‘type of romantic passion.’ So, the 
presented rose becomes a signifier and a sign. Connotation is mostly arbitrary according to 
one’s culture. Indeed, the red rose as signifier of romance is very much a semiotic cliché 
according to the values of culture with which I am most familiar. Also, in that cultural sense, 
the red rose is iconic. It is in my culture a ‘motivated’ sign for sentiment. But, as Fiske 
explains, one needs the ‘conventional; element’ of one’s culture to decode it that way. Thus, 
in the second order of signification, one can find culturally determined symbolic and mythic 
elements. The rose, for example, is a symbol of sentiment. Similarly, the myth, as Barthes 
uses that word, is culturally determined. It is a culture’s way of thinking about something, a 
way of conceptualizing or understanding it. Fiske, for instance suggests, ‘[o]ur sophisticated 
myths are about masculinity and femininity, about family, about success…about science.’
229
  
Barthes suggests that in discourse, the reality is very much the illusion of the utterer. 
Therefore, it is unsound to regard language as a direct reflection of reality. He concludes this 
from an observation of narration of history. He acknowledges that the narration of past events 
‘generally’ has the endorsement of historical “science,” which deems the exposition bound to 
the ‘unbending standard of the “real” [and, is therefore] “rational”.’ 
230
 He explains that this 
‘formal description of a set of words beyond the level of the sentence (what we call for 
convenience discourse),’ though not new, has taken on a new timeliness because of its 
relevance to literary analysis.231 But, he asks, ‘does this form of narration really differ, in 
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some specific trait, in some indubitably distinctive feature, from imaginary narration, as we 
find it in the epic, the novel, and the drama?’
232
 Barthes’ observation is an apt
correspondence to the way lawyers in the criminal courtroom listen to, and mediate, witness 
recollections of past events—their testimony—as they describe them to the jury. 
A compelling way to demonstrate the correspondence that Barthes’ observation implies is 
with two illustrative stories (or narrations) from real life. The first story is about signification. 
It is from the time (the early 1970s) in which Barthes was publishing his concepts of 
signification in Mythologies. It is an account of a television interview, in which discursive 
manipulation of the denotative sign of rose is analogous to what can happen in courtroom 
advocacy in a jury trial.  
Actor, Jack Lord, whose fame was worldwide as the star of the original television series 
Hawaii 50, was a guest of television station GTV 9 in Melbourne, where, at the time I was 
General Manager (the CEO in this incident). His character’s sign off at the end of each 
episode—“Book ‘em Danno”—had become a catchphrase. Mr Lord had accepted an 
invitation to appear on the television station’s annual Telethon, which raised funds for 
children with disabilities. A family orientated man, with no off-screen peccadillos to excite 
attention, some more sensationalist media had seized upon his love of his garden (roses 
especially) to imply a less than masculine person, quite the opposite of the strong manly 
character he portrayed on screen. This was an era in which an implication of homosexuality 
was derogatory. In this instance, it was also without substance.  
To promote his appearance on its telethon, Mr Lord was to pre-record a segment for inclusion 
in that evening’s edition of the station’s current affairs program. As the host of the program 
was away on assignment, another journalist was to conduct the interview. But, as the tape 
rolled to record, the journalist reached under his desk and withdrew a rose, which, with a 
scornful smirk, he handed to Jack Lord, whilst a second camera focused on the actor’s face to 
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capture his shocked reaction. Mr Lord abruptly stood and declined to continue. At this point, 
the station CEO, who, with Mrs Lord, was watching the taping, immediately called this 
attempt to embarrass—a “Gotcha” moment in today’s journalistic parlance—inappropriate. In 
judicial parlance, a judge would have declared it inadmissible. So with the unseemly material 
removed, and as both men were professionals, the interview pre-recording proceeded. But, of 
course, unlike the situation in a trial in which the jurors would already have seen the incident, 
pre-recording had ensured there was no risk that a shadowy doubt would linger despite the 
declaration of inadmissibility. 
The story offers a useful parallel to the judge in the trial in which I was a witness declaring 
part of my testimony inadmissible. If the television station chief executive officer—for my 
example,  corresponding to a judge—had not declared it inadmissible, the rose as signifier 
could have, through its intended innuendo, tainted public perception of the actor. As the chief 
executive officer and major protagonist in this incident, I had the power of a judge. In 
contrast, I, as witness in a jury trial, had no such power. I wanted to enrich the meaning of the 
story I was telling by describing the demeanour of the defendant when I approached him. The 
judge though, sensing that it could create an unfavourable impression in the minds of jurors 
disproportionate to what he considered its probative weight, disallowed the testimony. But, as 
I explain in this and the following chapter, truncating a witness’s story can abort its full 
meaning and deny its proper probative value. That is why I argue there is a need for law 
practitioners and legal theorists to understand better the functioning of language, and its 
limits, as the carrier of meaning in courtroom discourse. And, there is a need to move beyond 
standard accounts of language at the level of sentence into the field of socio linguistics. A 
need to explore beyond a standard or monolithic hypothesis, of language in the courtroom, 
into the organization of courtroom discourse. 
The second story is about myth. In Australia, the Anzac narrative is an affirmation of all that 
is good and valued about being Australian. Discursive manipulation, however, can render the 
Anzac myth as signifier of something else. During World War II, each Anzac Day was a 
84 
solemn ritual in which those who were serving in the theatres of war, and those who were at 
home waiting, reaffirmed their identities as worthy members of a society fighting for a 
perceived precious ideal. Post-war Anzac Day observances continued the process of 
affirmation, and helped heal the emotional bruises of those who returned from the fields of 
battle, as a grateful nation honoured their deeds. 
It was different during the unpopular Vietnam War. Anzac Day became a symbol of all that 
was wrong with war; people directed the anger they felt about Australia’s involvement in it to 
the annual Anzac ritual, calling it a celebration of war. Worse, when the young men, mostly 
conscripts, returned from Vietnam, they faced denigration rather than ratification as valuable 
members of the community. Their emotional bruises received no Anzac Day unguent. They 
had to seek identity in groups of their own kind, through which they would try to re-
authenticate themselves as worthy members of the people.
233
What the contrasting uses of the Anzac image show is not only that the present shapes our 
reconstruction of the past, but, more broadly, that people might take the iconography of an  
enduring narrative and impose it on the present in order to make sense of it according to a 
transient community mood. Furthermore, in a community comprising diverse cultures, the 
bonds of myth might be frangible.  
The notion of taking the iconography of an enduring narrative and imposing it on the present 
in order to make sense of it harmonises with philosopher and logician, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
idea of language games, which I introduce in this chapter. In addressing the reality of 
language use, Wittgenstein eschews the idea of language-as-concept, and gives preference to 
the more pragmatic viewpoint that language is a game in which it is only possible to play if 
one knows the rules.
234
 Moreover, the rules can vary according to the nature of the game and
the context in which it is played. Thus, he perceived meaning as that which moves beyond the 
static rules of grammar; beyond the practice that the rules of grammar express. I apply 
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Wittgenstein’s idea of the meaning of a word gaining coherence through affinity with its 
context to show how lawyers in courtroom advocacy can change the rules of the language 
games—more properly, the rules of discourse—in voir dire agreement. That is an agreement 
to which jurors have no input and of which change they have no knowledge. Wittgenstein’s 
notion of how meaning resides in language games provides the link to a third theorist on 
whom I draw, Hans-Georg Gadamer.
235
Gadamer holds that the truth of any fact already exists. Those who participate in 
conversation, merely reveal it. He holds the view that true conversation ‘has a spirit of its 
own’ that leads, not follows, participants to a conclusion. He contends that the language in 
which it is conducted ‘bears its own truth within it… that it allows something to “emerge” 
which henceforth exists.’ In Gadamer’s art of ‘real’ dialogue, “an [with emphasis] 
understanding” is not the same as “understanding.” Understanding a communication means 
that the words and the grammar comply with language rules as Chomsky explains them.
236
Thus, one can still exercise one’s own prejudices without reflection. In contrast, an 
understanding, in Gadamer’s opinion, already resides within the language of the 
conversation; the question and answer process has merely revealed it. In this chapter, I 
analyse Gadamer’s viewpoint as a means of explaining the illusion of transparent portrayal of 
facts. He describes a participant’s prejudices as forming a horizon that moves, moulds, and 
eventually fuses with the horizon of the other party to yield a shared understanding, which 
becomes the new reality.
237
 For such fusing of horizons to occur, the parties must engage as
partners in conversation, not merely as participants. We learn from this that the horizon is not 
a fixed place, that is, it is not a fixed point of view. However, if there is no shared history and 
no common horizon, which might be the case in a culturally diverse community, there can be 
no community common sense. In short, there will be no common basis upon which counsel 
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and jurors might carry on the type of hermeneutical conversation that Gadamer envisages. As 
Mootz explains Gadamer’s idea, ‘all understanding is founded on a decentring "fusion of 
horizons," an experience that is placed in sharp relief when two conversationalists find the 
path of their dialogue taking on a life of its own.’
238
To comprehend Gadamer’s viewpoint, one needs to know that his teacher was Martin 
Heidegger, whose theories, expressed in his influential work, Being and time,
239
 underpin my
discussions in Chapter Four. Heidegger, re-defined on his own philosophical drafting board 
the nature of human beings as subjects, each ensnared in traditional prejudices, or 
presuppositions, that shape their consciousness. Thus, his idea of self as Existentiale suggests 
an entity separate from that about which one wants to know. But, Heidegger rejects any 
notion of isolation. His rendering of the term human being is ‘Dasein’, which literally 
translates as ‘being there.’
240
 We can never be separate from the world. We are at the same
time, in it, and outside it. We cannot distinguish ourselves from it. We are Dasein. But, 
Heidegger stresses, Being is finite. Being is time. Being is that path between birth and death. 
In that sense, death is the horizon to which, if we are authentic human beings, we must 
project our being. This means that one has to put predispositions at risk if one is to question 
what it means to be human.  
It is clear that Gadamer has built on his teacher’s notion of horizon. The idea of projecting 
oneself towards that horizon is at the centre of Gadamer’s arguments, although, he discusses 
putting one’s predispositions at risk from a different perspective than that from which 
Heidegger defines Dasein. Gadamer gives us the idea of ‘Bildung,’ which he envisages as 
differing from what a community more generally considers its culture. He views Bildung as 
an essential element of ‘man’ as a historical being, embodying the collective memory of the 
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community, the source of the community’s collective consciousness. I analyse the nature of 
collective consciousness founding on collective memory in Chapter Five. 
In the meantime, as I develop the two themes of this current chapter, it helps to understand 
that, at a different conceptual level, Gadamer’s Bildung aligns with Heidegger’s concept of 
Dasein. I begin in Part A with an examination of how the trial functions as a seminal speech 
event. Then, in Part B, I examine the tools of the trade with which courtroom advocates toil. 
  





PART A: How the trial functions as a seminal speech event 
 
The effect of courtroom architecture and the regalia of authority 
In her work on the symbolism of courtroom space, Laurie Kadoch writes that the significance 
of the trial as a ‘seminal speech event’ is that the rules of evidence become the rules of 
discourse not to encourage storytelling but to deconstruct the story in pursuit of a reasoned 
outcome. This is the Rationalist Model of adjudication that Professor of Jurisprudence, WL 
Twining developed. He is a prominent member of the Law in Context movement, and I 
examine his model later in this section. Briefly, for now, the model aims at rectitude in 
decision-making, which stems from correctly applying substantive law to ‘true facts,’ 
obtained ‘through the accurate evaluation of relevant and reliable evidence by a competent 
and impartial adjudicator applying the specified burden and standard of proof.’
241
 Kadoch 
asserts that ‘scholarly conversations; about the trial focus primarily on what evidence gets in 
or can be kept out, rather than upon the effect of the use of a particular mode of language on 
the thought processes of jurors. 
242
  
Kadoch observes that the consensus amongst scholars is that ‘storytelling’ is the most 
‘effective tool of persuasion’ at trial.
243 
However, she argues that, from its beginnings, the 
Anglo-American trial aspired to achieve a Rationalist Model characterized by rectitude; 
hence the development of Rules of Evidence.
244
 The Rationalist Model rests on two premises. 
The first has its genesis in the social history of law, specifically, the trial by ordeal of the 
Middle Ages, when God was an essential component of Rationalism’s rectitude. Kadoch 
argues that rectitude still is an essential component, albeit without the deity’s imprimatur. 
This leads into the second premise, the linguistic function in managing the orality—or 
narrative—of the trial, which is dependent upon the presence of numinous symbolism (an 
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echo of God’s presence) in the courtroom. She argues that symbolism of the courtroom space 
affects both interaction and the interpretation of the interaction. Therefore, we need to 
harness numinous symbolism to help the rules of evidence guide the trial narrative away from 
storytelling to its ‘rational core.’
245
 I expand the notion of numinous symbolism in the next 
section. 
The linguistic function to which Kadoch refers ‘is related to and has been dependent upon the 
presence of God in the courtroom.’
246
 She contends that the significance of these premises to 
the oral event—the trial—is threefold. First, God or the symbolic presence of God was 
purposefully transported from the trial by ordeal into the Anglo-American courtroom
247
 as an 
integral part of the early attempts to form a Rationalist Model of adjudication. Second, as trial 
procedure gradually developed into a speech event, the need for rules that advanced the goals 
of the Rationalist Model emerged.
248
 Third, Kadoch proclaims that, ‘although the linguistic 
function of the rules is so inherent to the rationalist operation of the trial, and the presence of 
God and the trepidation of spoken language are such integral components of that function, it 
is surprising how conspicuously absent the topics are from any current scholarly dialogue 
about the courtroom, the trial process, or the Rules of Evidence.” 
249
 This absence, and the 
lingering echo of God’s presence, to which she refers drives my discussion, which follows. 
Ritualized actions as a “lingering remnant of God’s presence at trial 
Kadoch contends, correctly, I believe, that courtroom architecture and the regalia of authority 
give force to the transmission of the oral message, and shape the reception of it. She explains 
that ‘the embedded remnant of ancient ritual, belief, and the symbolism that survive’
250
 still 
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influence the trial and the linguistic rules that guide it. It starts with the oath, which, whether 
by affirmation or by Bible, is a lingering remnant of God’s presence. The very act of giving 
the witness the opportunity to decline the Bible in favour of an oath of affirmation ensures it. 
It might only be symbolic, but it begins to define the narrative space. This is an element of 
Etlin’s numinous space. Numinous space in the courtroom is the ambience created by 
architecture and semiotic placement of an authority figure to invoke a mood suggestive of a 
presiding deity or spirit. Any presence of a divine authority is, at most today, symbolic. 
However, the creation of such space, and the firmly observed rituals of court procedure 
impose an authoritative power that guides, and often controls, interactions between officers of 
the court and witnesses. 
Kadoch draws on Etlin’s work to argue, ‘the equivalent to the metaphorical character of a 
place is to be found in the narrative arrangement of the space. Expressive character has its 
counterpart in the expressive qualities of space that reflect values.’
251
 Etlin also asserts that
ritualized actions are significant. They profoundly affect the nature of the interaction between 
courtroom officials and witnesses. ‘Participants take cues from place when determining 
operative linguistic rules.’ She asserts that lawyers know the ‘unique rules’ of discourse of 
the courtroom discourse. 
The witness is made aware of [their] duty to tell the truth by the characteristics of Etlin’s “numinous” 
space. And the jury is reminded not only by the judge of their duty to interpret the discourse according 
to the rules provided, but also by Etlin’s “narrative and expressive” space. The lay audience, on the 
other hand, is not made aware that special language is being spoken or of the multiple aspects of the 
discourse. They may interpret the trial’s interactions to be “simply storytelling.”
252
 
However, although the judge will explain the rules, and the jury’s obligation to honour them, 
especially the rules of propensity and relationship evidence, the jurors often will not know 
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why the rule applies in some circumstances and not in others. My case study attests to this 
assertion. 
Kadoch makes the point that the regalia of authority in the courtroom are a faint echo of the 
authority that God wielded even in—especially in, it should be stressed—the trial by ordeal. 
The court does not need expressly to summon God to the bar; it simply needs to retain the 
numinous symbolism that bespeaks God to underscore a rationalism mode of evidence based 
on rectitude. God is not “there” in the way he was there in the trial by ordeal, but the trial 
process retains sufficient of his presence to preserve the pre-eminence of rules of evidence 
based on rationalism with rectitude.
253
 Yet, the justice system, in searching for assurance of 
legitimacy through the institution of the jury, places great store on community common 
sense.  
In some sense, though, common sense is pragmatic and is at odds with an authoritarian 
Rationalist Model based on rectitude, with its foundation in the authority of God. The ritual 
of courtroom discourse, which retains its numinous symbolism, imposes its rules at the same 
time as it tells the jury to use its community common sense. I examine this apparent conflict 
in the next section.  
A new discussion of the linguistic function of rationalist rules, and trepidation 
of spoken language. 
Did Enlightenment empty and intellectualize the concept of sensus  communis? 
Hans-Georg Gadamer quotes the 18
th
 century German Lutheran theologian, Friedrich 
Oetinger’s appeal to common sense—sensus communis—as a tool to limit the claims of 
science. “The sensus communis is concerned only with things that all men see daily before 
them, things that hold an entire society together, things that are concerned as much with 
truths and statements as with arrangements and patterns comprised in statements…”
254
 That, 
though, introduces a contradiction. The Rationalist Model that Kadoch describes uses the 
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trappings of ritual based on God to imbue courtroom discourse with its authority. The trial 
process allows all who present testimony to promise to tell the truth with or without declaring 
obeisance to God’s omnipotence. That is to say, the process allows them to swear on the 
bible, or to take an oath of affirmation. However, courtroom architecture and regalia retain 
the echo (even if gradually softening) of God’s essentialness. Rules of evidence maintain the 
authority of the rationalist method. Trial held before a judge sitting alone vests in the judge 
the authority to apply the law to the facts to reach a decision. But, trial before jury entrusts 
interpretation of the rules of the Rationalist Model to sensus communis, or common sense. 
Historically, as we have seen in Chapter One, the perceived omnipotence of God heavily 
influenced the formation of sensus communis, or common sense. Gadamer is aware of the 
contradiction, as his earlier quoting of Oetinger illustrates. He emphasises his awareness, 
quoting Oetinger again, “the ratio governs itself by rules, even without God; but this sense 
[sensus communis], always operates with God.”
255
 That is to say, a communal sense invoked 
the presence of God pre-Enlightenment to grant privilege to “sensible truths” over rational 
truths. 
Heidegger’s influence is clear. Dasein and Bildung similarly define the essential human 
being. Moreover, the essence of truth—authenticity as Heidegger describes it—is intimated 
in the respective titles of the seminal works of teacher and student. Being and time are 
connected to the extent of envisaging time from the moment of birth up to the horizon of 
death. Human as Being can only find their authenticity by considering it in the perspective of 
the ultimate horizon of death. Truth and method—not truth through method it must be 
emphasised—correlate, but one is not causative of the other. Truth will be realised only 
through shared horizons in conversation. Method must not subjugate the revelation of truth. 
Theologically based sensus communis  reduced to a post-enlightenment corrective 
Christianity was Anglo-Australian law’s wellspring, and its reduction to a pool paved the way 
for a more secular humanism to replace it. During the Renaissance, the faithful could 
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embrace humanism as an extension of religious belief. God’s plan, they believed, was that 
humankind should pursue the values of humanism, such as the dignity of the individual, the 
celebration of optimism in the powers of human reasoning, and a rediscovery of the pleasure 
of life.
256
 However, propagators of anti-religious influences disdained the God-centred beliefs
of medieval times and arrogated humanism to pursue social and political objectives. 
Humanism had considerable influence because it emphasised human welfare without resort to 
God. It relied instead on the power of human reasoning. Richard Norman argues that 
humanism is an alternative to religious belief because of the human capacity for art, 
literature, and imagination.
257
 He cites Bertrand Russell’s speech, ‘Why I am not a Christian’,
to the National Secular Society in 1927. ‘According to Russell, the natural ally of humanism 
is not religion but science. Religion and science are seen to be in conflict with one another 
and a belief in the powers of human beings to make a good world for themselves is contrasted 
with the craven tendency of human beings to abase themselves before a god.’
258
 Gadamer
acknowledges that by the late eighteenth century, theologically based sensus communis 
certainly had weakened to a corrective. He explains, ‘that which contradicts the “consensus” 
of feelings, judgments, and conclusions—i.e., the sensus communis—cannot be correct.’
259
This negative function, he claims, shows that the German Enlightenment ‘emptied and 
intellectualized’ the concept.
260
But, widespread death of God theology gained its secular significance well before the 
Enlightenment. Mirjan Damaška reminds us, ‘Angevin
261
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long before formal evidence doctrine crystalized…. (partly) in the desire to influence 
decision-making by occasional, amateur triers of fact.’
262
 And, as we saw in Chapter One, the
Crown instructed these self-informing juries that, when the facts were not clear, ‘ it will be 
requisite to speak from belief or conscience at least.’
263
  But, as the self-informing juries
‘retreated before juries which required instruction in court’—God now proving unavailing—
corroboration rules ‘were always numerous and acceptable in a variety of contexts. So were 
mandatory instructions to the jury on evidentiary matters.’ Hence, Damaška adds, ‘Common 
law was thus never averse to legal instruments specifically designed to affect analysis of 
evidence.’
 264
Sir Thomas Smith in his De republica Anglorum 
265
 makes clear that, by the 16
th
 century, the
common law had embedded the de-emphasis of personal conviction as a decisional criterion. 
Moreover, an empanelled jury would be hearing many cases on any given day, and for any 
juror inclined to indulge his faith, there were incentives to encourage him (they were always 
men) to do otherwise. Smith writes of the jurors departing to consider their verdicts, ‘And 
there is a bailife to wait upon them, and to see that no man doe speak with them, and that they 
have neither bread, drinke, meate, ne fire brought to them, but there to remaine in a chamber 
together till they agree.’
266
 Fulfilling a social media role of his time, Alexander Pope used his
classic mock-epic narrative poem about human frailties, The Rape of the Lock, to shock his 
readers to awareness of jury trial scorn for human rights.  
Meanwhile declining from the Noon of Day, 
The Sun obliquely shoots his burning Ray: 
The hungry judges soon the Sentence sign, 
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And wretches hang that Jury-men may Dine;
267
  
His is a caustic assessment of the trial process at that time.  
The diminution of God’s perceived role in the secular affairs of humankind prevailed into the 
modern era. In the 20
th
 century, Antoine de Saint Exupéry, used metaphor to propose a 
distinctly secular understanding of the cause and effect of God’s putative death. In his 
contemplative work, The Wisdom of the Sands, he presents conflict of beliefs metaphorically 
to suggest an alternative point of view, ‘When faith burns itself out, ′tis God who dies and 
thenceforth proves unavailing.’ He does not present the putative death of God as a cause, but 
as an outcome. God is not dead, faith is. Implicit in this observation is the possibility that, 
though faith needs an object, it does not have to be sacred.
268
 It does not matter whether one 
believes there is, or ever was God, whether God has died, or whether humankind has always 
been on its own. Literature, in this example, suggests another way of looking at how the 
Enlightenment era might have occasioned the emptying and intellectualizing of sensus 
communis.
269
 It is the faith in something that underpins the sensus communis one needs to 
understand. Profane will work as effectively, just so long as the profane belief is accepted 
inter-subjectively. As corollary, if there is no sustaining communal belief, there can be no 
sensus communis—sacred or profane. This raises the question of what, after the 
enlightenment, a jury can reasonably represent. A further question then, is whether common 
sense reflects deep-seated cultural values or prevailing community standards (perhaps 
masquerading as values), which can be transient and contingent. 
It is problematic to lift a form of jury trial and the behaviour of jurors from its contextual 
history and submit it to evaluation against modern values and standards. Although one can 
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say the jury in the trial that Smith describes was representative (geographically at least), his 
description encourages the inference that it is not a logical leap from there to a claim that 
representation furthered the cause of justice done and seen to be done. James Whitman 
observes that ‘English law guaranteed itself a technically adequate accusation, and 
technically adequate witness testimony, by empanelling a jury to testify and convict.’
270
 
Therefore, the history of a technically adequate trial by judge and jury is elevated to the status 
of metaphor of justice done and seen to be done; and, the metaphor becomes the reality, on 
which a social history—especially when illuminated by literature—can throw light.
271
 And, 
in that form, can help explain a tendency in the law academy of today to look at the social 
history of law in a way that consigns God to a footnote on superstition. 
But, to focus on my earlier question, if there is no communal underpinning of belief—in 
someone or something—can there be a true sensus communis that informs the jury? Or, do 
jurors merely bring their individual intuitions to bear on their deliberations?
272
  And, if they 
do, might intuition be as much an indulgence of lawyers as of laypersons? Might intuition 
influence courtroom discourse? I address these questions in the next section. 
The role of intuition in organization of criminal courtroom discourse 
In their work on criminal behaviour, Paul Robinson and John Darley
273
 contend that social 
science evidence shows that judgments people make about deserved punishment—especially 
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in ‘core’ criminal wrongdoing—are not reasoned, but intuitive. Moreover, even education or 
life experience does not play much part in these judgments, at which they usually arrive 
quickly and with ‘strong feelings of certainty.’ Importantly for counsel wishing to understand 
better how to influence a jury, the authors argue that the reasons people reach this state of 
certainty with such judgments are ‘inaccessible’ to us.
274
 The problem—Robinson and Darley
maintain— is these judgments are frequently wrong. Furthermore, trained professionals are 
as likely as non-professionals are to make these intuitive judgments even within their own 
area of specialization, and then to act on them.
275
 Therefore, they contend, ‘it is useful to
distinguish between decisions arrived at by reasoning, and decisions with similar content but 
arrived at via intuitive processes.’
276
 Intuitive decisions are ‘heuristic,’ that is, based on
experience, in contrast to reasoning processes, which are conscious and deliberative.  
One can deduce from their contention that professionals and non-professionals are equally 
prone to intuiting wrong judgments, that those who work in the justice system are just as 
likely as laypersons to be prone to ad-lib judgments. For example, while debating a Bill in the 
Western Australia parliament
277
 to reduce the number of allowable peremptory challenges,
the Shadow Attorney General admitted, ‘I always thought it was important as counsel, if 
there was a predominance of men on the jury, to use my challenges to ensure there were some 
women on the jury, or vice versa, or to try to see some Indigenous people balloted on to the 
jury when a good mix of the community was wanted.’
278
 By implication, he reasons that
random selection has stacked the jury; he was merely unstacking it, relying on his intuition 
that women and men, and Indigenous people, will process evidence differently. In each 
instance, the shadow Attorney General offers no evidence to support the intuition. So, the 
question is whether the organization of courtroom discourse is heuristic, or conscious and 
deliberate. Intuitively, one would say they are both. In the next section, I seek a substantive 
274
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answer to the question by examining alternative methods of fact analysis in courtroom 
advocacy. 
Evidence, proof, and fact-finding in courtroom advocacy 
I begin my examination of alternative methods of fact analysis with the question that William 
Twining asks provocatively. ‘What, if any, are the legitimate functions of narrative in 
rational argument by advocates on disputed questions of law and disputed questions of 
fact?’
279
  In Rethinking Evidence, he ‘challenges’ the role of storytelling in courtroom 
advocacy. Contrarily, it seems, in his essay, Lawyers’ stories,
280
 he ‘challenges any 
suggestion that narrative has a marginal role of dubious legitimacy in legal discourse,’ but, as 
I consider next, he also ‘challenges the converse idea that constructing stories is “the central 
act of the legal mind” as White and others have suggested.’
281
   
Twining made these observations first in a paper published in 1980, titled Taking facts 
seriously,
282
 ‘which,’ he subsequently remarked with undue modesty in a much later journal 
article, ‘is quite well known but has made almost no impact.’
283
 In that later journal article, 
Twining cleared up what he saw as mere polite acceptance of his paper and its place in 
Rethinking evidence
284
, which he hoped would support his thesis that ‘the subject of 
evidence, proof, and fact-finding (EPF) deserves a more salient place in the discipline of 
law.’
285
 Wryly perhaps, he draws on literature to confess a failure to advocate persuasively. 
‘Its fate reminds me of a dictum of Karl Llewellyn: “When Cicero made a speech, you said 
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‘no mortal man so eloquent’, when Demosthenes made a speech, you yelled: ‘WAR!’ It 
seems, he confesses, to have been a failure of advocacy.
286
 
In Taking facts seriously—again, Twining explains his challenging the proper role of 
storytelling in courtroom advocacy, emphasizing  the importance within EPF of, 
‘constructing, communicating, and countering persuasive stories.’
287
  Nevertheless, he adds 
an important footnote: If one believes that stories play an important role in fact-
determination, but are also prime vehicles for cheating, then teaching skills of persuasive 
story-telling raises some difficult ethical issues…’.
288
 What is more, he takes issue with the 
agenda of ‘most legal theorists.’
289
 He asserts that it is ‘odd’ that the relationship between 
narrative and argument, ‘between “holism” and “atomism,” and questions of coherence’ are 
not seen as central to theories of legal reasoning and rationality. Thus, what Twining is 
challenging is not the relationship between narrative and argument, but failure to 
acknowledge the ‘centrality’ of stories.  
The role of narrative in legal discourse and questions about the relations between narrative, reasoning, 
argumentation, and persuasion are distorted if narrative and stories are only considered in relation to 
disputed questions of fact in adjudication. Stories and story-telling are also important in investigation, 
mediation, negotiation, appellate advocacy, sentencing, and prediction of dangerousness, for example. A 
general theory of narrative in law and legal argumentation needs to encompass all such questions.
290
 
A key point from Twining’s paper is his argument that the ‘label’ “law of evidence” is too 
narrow, as is—he claims—Wigmore’s focus on “Trial Rules.” Twining prefers to see trial 
rules in two parts: principles of proof (or logic of proof), and the law of evidence. He sums up 
his preference in these words: 
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The term “the law of evidence” has too strong an association with the exclusionary rules and often leads 
to the fallacious assumption that the subject of evidence in law is co-extensive with the rules of evidence. 
See, for example a successful American casebook entitled Evidence,  which defines the subject of the 
book as follows: “evidence law is about the limits we place on the information juries hear”….This in turn 
leads to exaggerating the importance of rules…and paying insufficient attention to aspects that are not 
governed by formal rules, such as relevance, weight, and argumentation.
291
 
Twining asserts his ‘quite orthodox’ view that our law of evidence is based on the theory that 
‘rules of evidence are a series of disparate exceptions to a principle of free proof, meaning 
‘principles of practical inferential reasoning.’
292
 And, he adds the important condition that
rules of evidence ‘need to be conceived within a framework of argumentation.’
293
 He points
out also, ‘a clear distinction needs to be drawn between learning about reasoning and learning 
how to reason.’ Twining grants that, in its first iteration, his advocacy of this viewpoint 
failed. Nevertheless, his viewpoint finds confirmation in the work of Gadamer,
294
 and that of
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
295
 and their views, respectively, on conversing to an
understanding, and arguing to persuade, which I consider later in this chapter. Further, as one 
would expect, Twining also accepts the merit of Paul Roberts’s alternative approaches to 
fact-analysis, namely narrative, and storytelling. But he claims that ‘the literature Roberts 
cites consists of discussions about these methods rather than vehicles for developing the 
particular skills involved in constructing arguments about questions of fact.’
296
 His essential
point is that a multidisciplinary approach to teaching evidence raises questions on the subject 
of transferability of ideas about evidence across disciplines, cultures, and different practical 
contexts.
297
 For my purpose here, it is the transferability of “ideas” about evidence, rather
than the more narrow relevance criterion that is important. Twining contends that, 
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Perhaps the central theoretical question should be: how far can we generalize about evidence and 
inferential reasoning across disciplines, contexts, and types of inquiry. If so, more specific issues that 
need to be addressed include: 
4. What is the relationship between narrative and reasoning in the context of argumentation? To what
extent does that relationship vary according to disciplinary and practical contexts? What exactly is
meant by the claim that stories help us “to make sense of the world?” What can legitimately be
claimed that can be done by narrative that cannot be done by reasoning?
298
It is the differing ideas across disciplines and across cultures that feed into the development 
of argumentation, which, as I have explained above, is an important element of Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work on arguing to persuade. Twining also acknowledges Roberts and 
Zuckerman’s recognition of Bayesian theory—a statistics model—and its use in the legal 
context. 
299
 Although, he does have reservations: ‘Roberts and Zuckerman under the heading
of “taking facts seriously,” devote over twenty pages to introducing basic concepts of 
inferential reasoning, probabilities, and debates about Bayes’ Theorem in legal contexts. It is 
one thing to consider such debates, it is another to learn how to manipulate the theorem.’
300
And, in an accompanying footnote on ‘Bayesians and “Bayesio-skeptics,”’ Twining writes, 
‘The main disagreements are about the conditions for the applicability of Bayes Theorem 
rather than its validity.’
301
 He differentiates Roberts and Zuckerman’s viewpoint from ‘a less
skeptical [sic] view’ of Philip Dawid.
302
 A statistical model at first seems an unlikely aid to
understanding the potential for discursive distortion of meaning in courtroom advocacy, 
especially if, as Richard Posner claims, most judges would not have heard of it.
303
 However, I
explain in the next section why Bayesian theory—even if those who apply it do not know it 
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by that name—helps reveal the potency of inference and predisposition in adversarial 
criminal trials, whether before jury or judge alone. 
Bayes’ theorem and probability 
Bayes’ Theorem comprises a mathematical treatment of probability, which 18
th
 century
mathematician, Thomas Bayes, devised for use in statistics. His formula defines the 
likelihood of an event happening, by calling up prior knowledge of what had happened in 
conditions similar to that of an event now in question. Richard Swinburne describes Bayes’ 
theorem as it is concerned with probability in this way: 
When from the seventeenth century onward people began to talk about things being probable in 
somewhat like modern senses and reflected on what they meant, sometimes they supposed there was 
only one kind of probability and sometimes they supposed there were two kinds of probability – one a 




At first glance, Bayes’ theorem, as a statistical concept, is an unlikely tool for analysing the 
way judges or juries reason. But, as I discuss below, Bayesian theory offers a method of 
understanding judicial and jury preconceptions. I examine first how the theorem might 
influence the single judge at trial, either consciously or unconsciously. I begin by drawing on 
Richard Posner’s work, How judges think,
305
 because, as he explains judges’ application of
the theorem, one might infer that this use of prior knowledge, or preconceptions, can lead to 
arbitrary decisions. That conclusion can lead to a preference for trial by jury—one of the 
perceived key benefits of which is the avoidance of arbitrary judgments by relying instead on 
community common sense. 
Using Bayesian theory to understand judicial reasoning 
Posner argues that although most judges would not have heard of Bayes’ theory, they apply it 
unconsciously. He uses the theory to explore the possibility that non-legalist influences on a 
304
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 He discusses the probability of a judge responding to a stimulus, in 
the form of evidence, in the same way that they have responded to similar evidence in the 
past. He speaks of the judge having formed an ‘estimate of the likelihood’ that testimony will 
be truthful.
307
 The judge might derive that estimate from experience of witnesses in similar 
cases, on a ‘general sense’ of the honesty of the class to which the witness belongs, or even 
on the manner of the witness ‘striding to the witness stand.’ He calls this a ‘prior probability’. 
It might, he points out, be unconscious.
308
 This is ‘subjective’ probability
309
 (His emphasis).  
Posner nominates Bayesian theory as the best aid to understanding judicial preconceptions; 
although he does acknowledge that judges would not themselves use this theory to describe 
their thought processes. He describes Bayesian theory ‘as a way of systematising the 
elementary point that preconceptions play a role in rational thought.’
310
 In How judges think, 
he warns his readers—without apology—that he intends to discuss the way judges think in 
terms ‘likely to alarm readers of a book about judges.’
311
 He adds, ‘I do not apologize for 
these terms or, more generally, for discussing judicial thinking in a vocabulary alien to most 
judges and lawyers. Judicial behaviour cannot be understood in the vocabulary that judges 
themselves use, sometimes mischievously.’
312
 Moreover, he contends that nothing in a 
judge’s training equips them to deal with non-routine cases. The solution, he asserts lies 
within the discipline of ‘Law and Economics.’  
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Maintaining the “pretence” that judges just do legal analysis. 
Speaking from a ‘law and economics’ point of view, Posner compares judges to workers in 
the private sector, where ‘management by exception’ is the norm. Workers at ‘the bottom of 
the organisation’ do only routine work, whilst non-routine matters go up the hierarchical 
ladder. The difference, though, is that judges at all levels handle both routine and non-routine 
cases. Managers in the organisation call upon workers at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder 
to handle routine cases. Those workers do what their role requires. They legitimately invoke, 
what I explain elsewhere as the institutional excuse.
313
  Posner argues that judges call on a
legal equivalent, ‘legalist techniques.’ In fact, ‘judges are committed to using those 
techniques and usually do so.’
314
 The reason, he postulates, ‘may be a desire by the judicial
establishment to maintain the pretence that judges just do legal analysis, that they are entirely 
rule-bound. But the result is to leave them not only at large but at sea when confronted with a 
case that cannot be decided by such analysis.’
315
 He cites Friedrich Hayek’s epistemology to
suggest that ‘an individual’s classificatory apparatus is the product of idiosyncratic factors of 
personality and culture rather than the basic hardwired features of the brain....In other words, 
people see things differently (literally and figuratively), and the way in which they see things 
changes in response to changes in the environment (footnotes omitted).
316
 The answer, he
asserts, lies in training judges in economics.  
Can Law and Economics be the answer to assertions of subjectivity? 
Posner maintains that judges who have ‘basic economic skills’ are well equipped to achieve 
the objectivity for which legalists aim. By which, I infer, he refers to those who demand a 
strict adherence to the principles (at least) of law.  
In areas such as antitrust, contract law, public utility… financial law, intellectual property, procedures 
and remedies, large swathes of environmental law…criminal and family law, the courts have adopted 
an economic approach to the resolution of those issues that are not governed by a rule sufficiently  
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But, I submit that, if law is to be more than ‘a mere system of rules’ that must address, what 
Jeanne Gaakeer describes as ‘questions of value and community’
318
 then economic
rationalism is inadequate. One could conclude that judges’ use of prior knowledge, or 
preconceptions, can lead to arbitrary decisions. That conclusion can lead to a preference for 
trial by jury, as I have noted above. However, as I explain, both here and later,
319
 community
common sense can also be judgmental.  
A contrary view on value-free jury decision making 
Professor A P Dawid, a prominent proponent of Bayesian statistics, has used the Bayes’ 
theorem to examine how juries weigh evidence. Although, he acknowledges that statistics 
and law appear not to have much in common. But, ‘[o]n closer inspection it can be seen that 
the problems they tackle are in many ways identical—although they go about them in 
different ways. In a broad sense, each subject can be regarded as concerned with the 
interpretation of evidence (Emphasis in the original)’
320
 Dawid echoes the views of Thomas
Kuhn in that he describes the current state of legal analysis as being similar to science before 
Galileo, who had the ‘revolutionary idea’ that scientists should examine how the world 
works, not how the old books says it should work. The authority of Aristotle controlled their 
thinking; they were ‘loth to concede the need to break away from old habits of thought’.
321
Dawid suggests that ‘[i]t may be equally revolutionary to suggest that lawyers might look at 
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how others have approached the problem of interpretation of evidence, and that they might 
even have something to learn from them.’
322
Reid Hastie and his collaborators assert that to conclude that a trial by jury obviates possible 
arbitrary decision-making by a judge sitting alone is a conclusion too hastily reached.
 323
 He
gives the ‘shortest shrift’ to, ‘the role of “the juror’s sense of justice” in juror decisions.’
324
He reports that from his and his collaborators’ research, and ‘on the conclusions of many 
other studies…there is little evidence that jurors depart from the factfinding [sic] task to 
follow dictates of conscience or to apply their sense of fair play when deciding criminal trial 
verdicts.’
325
 Rather, he selects descriptive models of jury decision-making, based on
probability theory, as the preferred ‘academic’ method of evaluating the way jurors process 
intellectually the evidence before them. He excludes normative theories because, ‘[t]here is 
little empirical research to evaluate their merits as descriptive theories, and the few results 
that have been reported suggest they do not describe everyday reasoning processes.’
326
 But,
he ‘hesitates to generalize’ too far because ‘surely, there are conditions where jurors’ ultimate 
verdicts are guided by considerations of fairness, equity, and justice that conflict with the 
“official” legal definition of their task.’ Giving further voice to his hesitancy, he adds, ‘it may 
be that behavioural scientists have been insensitive to the discrepancies between the “laws of 
the officials” and the “laws of the community.”’
327
 On that note, he acknowledges that there
is an unknown factor that influences the application of Bayesian theory. However, he asserts 
that ‘what constitutes an item of evidence appropriate to input into the belief updating process 
322
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[lies] outside the scope of Bayesian theory.’
328
  In the next section, I analyse some of the
appropriate processes that lie beyond Bayesian theory. 
Laws of community beyond the Bayesian scope 
In Chapters Five and Six especially, I argue a cross-discipline approach to reminding lawyers 
and judges to consider questions of value and community. Moreover, in Chapter Six, I 
contend that literature serves to remind lawyers and judges that interpretation is not passive. 
It requires that they participate actively in the process, which means being conscious of their 
own roles in finding meaning.
329
 Posner, on the other hand, sees an answer in economics. He
does talk about law and literature, but here too he compares them in economic terms. He 
claims that although a novelist might be an independent contractor, and the judge an 
employee, the judge’s ‘judicial independence negates this apparent ‘critical difference.’ In 
fact, it gives ‘him’ greater autonomy than the ordinary contractor has.
330
 The risk is that
Posner’s metaphor is mistaken for his reality. But, he seems to mix his metaphors by noting 
an important similarity with literature in the ability of the good judge to ‘influence’ law in the 
same way as a good writer can influence the development of literature. And, he finds 
resemblance in ‘the rhetorical cast of their written product.’
 331
  This observation echoes his
claim in Law and literature that judges use literature only for style—as he thinks they 
should—not for critical substance.
332
 Yet, elsewhere, speaking about judges, he writes,
They might...assess [the same information] differently, for the same reason that their priors were 
different – because they had different “cognitive structure(s) of organised prior knowledge”, based on 
such things as prior temperament, personal background characteristics (such as race or sex), life 
experiences, and ideology... (Footnotes omitted).
333
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In Chapters Five and Six, I explain how similar considerations that can affect how jurors 
interpret testimony.  
Summary of Part A 
To sum up Part A of this chapter. My discussion has revolved around a claim that storytelling 
is important in extracting substantive meaning from evidentiary testimony. Against this 
claim, I have posed the view that the probability that interpretation of a story will reveal 
substantive truth is dependent on diverse—and often divergent—ideas of the reliability. To 
flesh out this countering viewpoint, I have introduced the discussion of Bayesian theory, 
which might support a claim that a judge’s Bayesian “priors” (or predispositions) of 
probability might lead to arbitrary judgments by a judge sitting alone. The question that arises 
is whether a jury is sufficient safeguard against arbitrary judgment. Intensifying the 
importance of this question is the admonitory direction that a judge gives to jurors that they 
must arrive at a verdict that is beyond reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt imposes a higher 
threshold, which jurors must cross than probability imposes. I examine the equally 
challenging consideration that jurors too might have their equivalent of a judge’s “priors” in 
later chapters, especially, in Chapter Five. The organization of courtroom discourse in trial 
before a jury must take account of these challenges. 
Therefore, in Part B, I expand my argument that standard accounts of language are 
inadequate to account for the nature of courtroom discourse. Nor, I suggest, is a monolithic 
hypothesis of language sufficient to interrogate the nature of the language games that the 
adversarial trial before jury as an oral event encourages advocates to play. 
109 
Part B: The language games that courtroom advocates play and the 
tools of their trade. 
Introduction 
Wittgenstein advanced the notion that language is a game in which it is only possible to play 
if one knows the rules.
334
 Furthermore, he perceived meaning as that which moves beyond
the static rules of grammar, that is, beyond the practice that the rules of grammar express. 
Andrew Halpin describes Wittgenstein’s game as the application of a word multiplying by 
affinity rather than through applying the rule consistently.
335
 Because of diverse meanings
given to the word, ‘we may fail to grasp what rules are appropriate to govern the proper uses 
of a particular word. We may fail to see that the same word is being used in different 
applications governed by different rules of a language game, or even that one word is 
governed by the rules of a different language game.’
336
 So, before going further, I need to
consider in some detail the courtroom advocates’ tools of trade. I consider them in two parts. 
First, I consider the rules of the language of the grammarian, that is, as they operate in a 
monolithic hypothesis of language. In the second part, I examine the social linguists’ 
understanding of language as discourse, which operates at a level beyond the monolithic 
hypothesis. 
The tools of the courtroom advocate’s trade  
Roman Jakobson talks about a need in structural linguistics to revise the notion of ‘the 
monolithic hypothesis of language.’
337 
He explains the need by distinguishing ‘scholarly
discussion’ from—in his example—political conventions, where success is measured by the 
‘general agreement of the majority or the totality’ of those who participate. 
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The use of votes and vetoes…is alien to scholarly discussion where disagreement generally proves to 
be more productive than agreement. Disagreement discloses antimonies and tensions within the field 
and calls for novel exploration…exploratory activities in Antarctica present an analogy to scholarly 
meetings: international experts in various disciplines attempt to map an unknown region and find out 
where the greatest obstacles for the explorer are the insurmountable peaks and precipices.
338
 
Jakobson poses rhetorical questions to those who profess a monolithic hypothesis of 
language, ‘Have we not realized what problems are the most crucial and the most 
controversial? Have we not also learned how to switch codes, what terms to expound or even 
to avoid to prevent misunderstandings with people using different departmental jargon?’
339
He maintains that in any speech community there exists a unity of language with an over-all 
code, which, however, represents a system of interconnected sub-codes. Moreover, ‘each 
language encompasses several concurrent patterns which are each characterized by a different 
function.’
340
 At the level of linguistic construction, that is beyond the level of sentence, a
traditional or monolithic conception of language will not suffice. We need to understand the 
sub-codes and how they work. 
A monolithic hypothesis of language.  
A traditional model of language takes a form proposed by Karl Bühler—his “Organon 
model.”
341
 This is a ‘triadic’ model consisting of an addresser, a message, and an addressee.
Bühler limits his model to three communication functions; he names them “Expressive,” 
“Representation,” and “Conative,” or what he calls “Appeal (Appell).”
342
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The Expressive (Jakobson calls it the ‘emotive function’) is an interjection, or a sound change 
that expresses something about the attitude of the addresser but does not change the 
denotative meaning of the utterance. The Representation (or referential function) sets the 
context of the utterance, describes the event, the object, or emotional circumstance of the 
utterance. The Conative aims at the addressee, and is most commonly expressed in the 
vocative (“I don’t like vegetables, Mum”) or the imperative (“Eat your vegetables, they’re 
good for you”) form. These are essential elements of a message—the ‘three apexes’—and in 
the diagram below, I have numbered them one, two, and three to indicate their rank in the 
hierarchy of constitutive factors of the message. 
However, Jakobson has modified the model, which now shows that he adds three other 
constitutive factors and their functions to the triadic model. These are Context, Contact, and 
Code.  
CONTEXT 
     MESSAGE (3) 
ADDRESSER  (1)     -----------   ADDRESSEE (2) 
     CONTACT 
         CODE   
The addresser sends a message to the addressee. But, to communicate the addresser’s 
intention effectively, the message must have a context, and embrace a code, which is 
common to the addresser and addressee. 
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Jakobson holds that, the ‘Contact’ is more than a physical channel of communication; it also 
is a ‘psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee, enabling both of 
them to enter and stay in communication.’
344
 This is why he adds the ‘constitutive’ factors, 
which must be present if communication is to take place.
345
  Jakobson overlays his 
constitutive factor on each of the processes in his model to show how they affect the function 
of language.  
Referential (3) 
     Poetic (6) 
Emotive (1)    -----------   Conative (2) 
     Phatic (4) 
     Metalingual (5) 
The numbers in this diagram reflects ‘the hierarchy of functions.’
346
 But, they are all 
essential. 
 
The functions of the constitutive factors 
1. Emotive  
Through the ‘so-called EMOTIVE or “expressive” function,’ the addresser displays their 
emotions, that is, their attitudes both to the context and to the addressee. Through this 
function, the addresser also will signal their understanding of their status and class relative to 
the addressee. However, Jakobson also notes that the Addresser’s impression of a certain 
emotion can be true or feigned.
347
  Therefore, he prefers to use the term ‘emotive’ rather than 
‘emotional.’ Whether true or feigned, Jakobson asserts, ‘If we analyse language from the 
standpoint of the information it carries, we cannot restrict the notion of information to the 
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cognitive aspects of language. A man, using expressive features to indicate his angry or ironic 
attitude, conveys ostensible information.’
348
 Jakobson calls them “expressive tints” and gives 
as an example the difference between ‘[big] and the emphatic prolongation of the vowel 
[bi:g].’ He holds that this is a ‘conventional coded linguistic feature. He takes issue with the 
view that the emotive difference is a non-linguistic feature that, quoting Sol Saporta, is 
“attributable to the delivery of the message and not to the message.” That point of view, 
Jakobson emphasizes, ‘arbitrarily reduces the informational capacity of messages.’
349
  
The emotive function is an important element of the oral adversary trial. In the official court 
transcript of proceedings, the expressive tint of oral discourse is not evident. The context 
might enable one to infer its presence by merely reading the text, but one can never do more 
than infer. What is more, the person interpreting the transcript text will bring their own pre-
understandings, or prejudices, to the task. Jakobson illustrates the importance of the 
expressive tint with an anecdote. He tells how an actor auditioning for ‘Stanislavskij’s [sic] 
Moscow Theatre’ had to make forty different messages from the phrase ‘This evening.’ The 
actor envisaged forty different emotional situations, and uttered the phrase to suit each 
situation. The audience had to recognize the emotional situation only from the change in the 
‘sound shape’ of the same two words. Jakobson replicated this successful experiment using 
fifty situations. He records that most of the messages ‘were correctly and circumstantially 
decoded.’
350
 An important element of this experiment is that the same actor performed the 
function in both instances. Moreover, in each instance, the listeners comprised ‘Moscovites’ 
[sic]. Can one infer a common code? I shall return to the question later. Jakobson accepts 
Sapir’s claim that in idea generation and communication, the role of language is a paramount 
                                                 
348




 Ibid. Jakobson adds that all the emotive cues ‘easily’ submit to linguistic analysis. 







 However, this does not ‘authorize’ linguistics to disregard the emotive 
elements of speech. 
Jakobson  takes issue with linguist, Martin Joos who claims that because one cannot define 
the emotive elements of speech “with a finite number of absolute categories” they are “vague, 
protean, fluctuating phenomena…which we refuse to tolerate in our science.”
352
 He 
concludes, acerbically, ‘Joos is indeed a brilliant expert in reduction experiments, and his 
emphatic requirement for an “expulsion” of the emotive elements from “linguistics science” 
is a radical experiment in reduction—reductio ad absurdum.’
353
 
2. Conative:  
The conative is the mental process that the message triggers in the addressee. The message 
effect might occur by design—as in advertising—or by a direct command. Or, it might be 
unintended. It might happen because of noise on the communication channel. Noise might 
stem from faulty communication; the addressee might misread the code the addresser is 
using, or they might misinterpret the relative status of addresser and addressee. I am talking 
here only about the oral element of the communication, in other words. I ignore for now such 
things as gestures, and posture. Appeal court judges are aware of the limitation, which is why 
they are reluctant to override the opinions about witness demeanour that judges in the original 
trial have formed.  
Jakobson, however, shows how it might work. He describes this ‘emotive stratum in 
language’ as differing from referential language ‘both by their sound pattern (peculiar sound 
sequences or even sounds elsewhere unusual) and by the syntactic role.’
354
 He defines them 
as being, not components of sentences, but as ‘equivalents’ of them. “Tut! Tut! said 
McGinty.” Jakobson interprets: 
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the complete utterance of Conan Doyle’s character consists of two suction clicks. The emotive function 
laid bare in the interjections, flavours to some extent all our utterances, on their phonic grammatical, 
and lexical level. If we analyse language from the standpoint of the information it carries, we cannot 
restrict the notion of information to the cognitive aspect of language.
355
 
“Tut! Tut!” works only because Conan Doyle presumes his readers bring the same code to 
bear on interpretation as he brought to its declaration as words on paper. He can alert his 
readers to its presence by writing “Tut! Tut! [Tʌt! Tʌt!].” In this demonstration of its function, 
Jakobson shows he shares the code. Not all cultures do. “Tut! Tut” is, he explains, primarily a 
British expression. Were counsel in court to rebuke with a “Tut! Tut!” in the form of a two 
suction click, the court stenographer would need to record it in the form, ‘Counsel interjected 
with “Tut! Tut!” made by emitting a noise consisting of a two suction click.’ More likely, the 
stenographer would, as Saporta does, ignore the interjection as merely “attributable to the 
delivery of the message and not to the message,” unless counsel had uttered the words 
phonetically—[Tʌt! Tʌt!].  
The role of phatic communication 
How do we know addresser and addressee do share the same code? Charles Osgood explains 
that there are as many potential indicators of style in messages as there are features open to 
variation. For example, he names ‘frequency of the first-person-singular pronoun “I,” pitch 
variation in speaking, rarity of the vocabulary items employed, frequency of infinitive 
construction’,
356
and so on. Moreover, he claims that potential characteristics of human 
sources ‘are as numerous as the pooled ingenuity of psychologists and other social scientists 
can make them.’
357
 They can include such things as intelligence, occupation, social status, 
and association alliance.  
                                                 
355
 Ibid 354 
356
 Charles E. Osgood, 'Some effects of motifvation on style of encoding' in Thomas A Sebeok (ed), Style in 
language (M.I.T Press, c1960) 294 
357
 Ibid 294 





Osgood differentiates between code styles, according to whether they are idiographic, or 
nomothetic.
358
 That is to say, whether the code is particular to specific cases of functioning 
individuals, or whether it accords with a universal code. Only the nomothetic is bound by 
rules or laws. The nomothetic style is more evident in the natural sciences, where the primary 
task is to explain objective phenomena. It tends to generalize, and will not concern us here. 
The idiographic style is present in the distinctive situation, which is how I portray courtroom 
discourse. There, idiosyncratic style is also on display. Osgood holds that part of the ‘credo of 
psycholinguists’ is that events that speakers produce in messages depend upon ‘states and 
processes in these sources—their habits, their intellectual levels, their motivational and 
emotional states, their previously developed associations, their attitudes, and so on.’ Other 
message events are part of the ‘obligatory structure of the code, which [the producer of the 
message] must learn if they are to communicate at all.’
359
 One can add variables to this, such 
as distinction in the ‘momentary situation’ in the speech occasion, or ‘persistent variation in 




This is the third of what are really the self-evident functions of communication. Fiske calls 
the referential the ‘reality orientation,’ which ought to be the principal aim of courtroom 
discourse, that is, objective and factual.
361
 Jakobson, although accepting Sapir’s claim that 
“ideation reigns supreme in language,” argues, ‘[l]anguage must be investigated in all the 
variety of its functions.’
362
 However, context—the referential function—is sometimes 
ambiguous.  
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 claims that context will determine the standard by which we can attribute 
knowledge of something to a speaker. This is ‘Contextualism.’ Its obverse is Invariantism. As 
I explained earlier, he argues that a speaker might claim knowledge of something in a context 
in which they do not think absolute certainty is necessary, but for which they would not think 
the evidence adequate in another context. One situation requires only a ‘low standard’ claim 
to knowledge; the other requires a ‘high standard.’ An Invariantist would demand that the 
‘high standard’ always prevails. De Rose offers as an example a reply to a question whether 
‘Mike is in,’ “yes, I saw his car in the parking lot” as being acceptable if the questioner can 
substantiate the answer by walking a few paces down a corridor to Mike’s office. However, if 
the questioner is phoning from the other side of the city and must see Mike urgently to have 
him sign a document; the acceptable reply would be “I don’t know.” The first situation is 
low-standard, the second is high standard. Therefore, the contexualist would claim that 
positively attributing knowledge in the first case is true, and the denial of knowledge in the 
second case is true also.  
He argues that in terms of ‘ordinary language philosophy,’ when a speaker uses ordinary, 
natural and appropriate language, and is not basing their claim on false beliefs they have 
about underlying matters of fact, how they naturally and appropriately describe a situation, 
especially by means of common words, will be a true description. However, in criminal trial 
testimony, a true description as De Rose describes it, still has the potential to lead a witness 
into controversy. 
For example, in the criminal trial 
364
 in which I was a witness, counsel for the prosecution 
asked me to point out on an enlarged photographic display the position of the victim of an 
assault relative to a palm tree outside the home of her alleged assailant. Counsel wanted to 
establish that my line of sight allowed me to see both the victim and the alleged assailant as I 
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approached. As I was explaining this to the court, I noticed a tight-lipped smile, sardonic as I 
interpreted it, on the face of the accused. He knew, as I did because I live close by, that the 
palm tree had been removed since the day of the alleged assault, and only days before the 
trial. Because I was answering the question in Contextualist mode, the fact that the tree was 
no longer there, seemed irrelevant; it had been there at the material time about which I was 
testifying. Therefore, I did not think Defence would challenge my testimony on this point, 
whether or not they knew the tree was no longer there. But, in the intensity of the moment, I 
interpreted the smile as a smirk, and I reacted to it defensively. I changed from contexualist to 
invariantist mode. I pointed out that were the court to inspect today the site of the alleged 
attack, the palm tree was no longer there. Its absence was not pertinent to the facts of my 
testimony, but my reaction says something about the pervasive power of court semiotics and 
the numinous space to which Kadoch referred. Seated, whilst counsel stood, and alongside 
and below the elevated and robed judge, I felt my physical presence diminished. I had come 
to the court intending to convey the image of an authoritative witness. Irrationally, I now felt 
I needed to protect my personal authority by answering what I took to be a smirk of superior 
knowledge of the facts, by showing that I had done my homework. Instead, I had allowed a 
smirk— which the court transcript could not record—to deflect me from my purpose. In a 
nanosecond an irrational thought invaded my mind, “what if that tree becomes important, and 
I am shown to be an elderly man unable to recall situations accurately.” In the event, and self-
evident in hindsight, it was a small digression of no consequence, and the invading thought 
was absurd. However, it illustrates the influence of architecture and regalia, and of numinous 
space to influence the demeanour of witnesses. It shows that ‘noise’ on the communication 
channel can take diverse forms. 
4. Phatic:  
This is the first of what are not-so-evident functions of communication. The Oxford English 
Dictionary describes phatic as words ‘used to convey general sociability rather than to 
communicate a specific meaning.’ More generally, however, one can describe it as a function 
to confirm that the channel of communication is still open. One does this when, for example, 





there is a silence on the other end of a telephone conversation during one’s turn to talk. ‘Are 
you still there?’ is our phatic reaction to the disconcerting silence. Thus, as Fiske notes, ‘[i]t 
is…orientated towards the … physical and psychological connection that must exist.’
365
 How 
well the phatic communication works is likely to be culturally determined. Bronislaw 
Malinowski coined the term “phatic communion” in his study of meaning in primitive 
language, in which he discusses ritualized formulas of which the direct aim is ‘binding hearer 
to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in 
this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action.’
366
 He adds, ‘but they 




The phatic corresponds to Jakobson’s ‘CONTACT’ (His capitalisation) set, and in his use of 
the term, it has a psychological component that goes beyond ensuring the communication 
channel is still open. Psychologically, we gain reassurance from an affirmative nod or a 
murmured “Hmm, hmm” response when we interrupt our own turn in the conversation pair to 
ask phatically, ‘Do you know what I mean?’ The expressive tint we apply, and, perhaps, the 
length of the pause that precedes and follows our question will indicate to the addressee 
whether we merely seek the affirmation that the channel is still open, or whether we are 
ceding the conversation turn to them. Clearly, then, an open channel can mean as little as 
allowing noise to travel through it. However, if one wants understanding, not merely noise, 
one cannot talk about “contact” without also talking about “Code” and “Context,” and the 
risk of code confusion.  
When Andy Warhol exhibited illustrations of 32 varieties of Campbell’s soups, the cans 
changed from a food commodity into a comment on the consumer society of his time. The 
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context (an art gallery) and the framing of the illustrations asked us to look at them 
aesthetically and metaphorically. Moreover, when I changed “displayed” in my first draft of 
the opening sentence in this paragraph to “exhibited” in my second draft, I too showed that I 
knew the code. In a supermarket, cans of soup are displayed; in a gallery, they are exhibited. 
In the context of discourse organization, understanding how someone talks about what they 
talk about rather than their lexical choice in what they talk about is important. One is lexical 
choosing, the other is structural. Of course, in courtroom discourse, we are concerned with 
both content analysis, and with style. The important point, however, is that when we think we 
are engaging in content analysis in search of cognitive facts, we more often than not are 
actually analysing a performance. This is also the province of metaphor, to which I alluded 
earlier. Counsel has already discerned the cognitive facts; discourse organization is the time 
to persuade the jury to accept counsel’s interpretation of them. 
 Later in this chapter, I discuss Gadamer’s ‘art’ of questioning as it applies to the courtroom 
advocate adage of never asking a question to which one does not already know the answer. 
The goal of courtroom performance is to persuade the jury to accept counsel’s preferred 
interpretation of the facts. Therefore, ‘how’ they say it trumps ‘what’ they say, which brings 
us to metalanguage.  
5. Metalingual:  
This is using language to discuss language, that is, metalanguage. In the context of my 
discussion, it identifies the communication code. A can of soup displayed in a sign in a 
supermarket aisle is food. Photographed, framed, and hung on a wall in an art gallery by 
Andy Warhol, it is art. Code confusion if not recognized might put addresser and addressee at 
cross-purposes. Jakobson uses the slogan of the time at which he was writing to make this 
point. “I like Ike” as a lapel badge did not express personal admiration for Dwight 
Eisenhower the man, but was a political communication. It said that the wearer supported 
Eisenhower as a candidate for presidency. The three-word slogan is still common in politics 
today. It serves the same purpose as the “I like Ike” slogan did when Jakobson wrote. 





Jakobson reminds us that we practice metalinguistics every day. Every message we impart or 
interpret has an explicit or implicit metalingual function. In the famous Andy Warhol 
example, if we do not share the code, we cannot share his metaphor.  
6. Poetic:  
Fiske calls the poetic function ‘the relationship of the message to itself.’ 
368
 He cites 
Jakobson’s example of substituting ‘innocent bystander’ for ‘uninvolved onlooker’ because 
‘its rhythmic pattern is more aesthetically pleasing.’
369
 Similarly, I suggest, “Death with 
dignity” stirs emotions more than the emotionally neutral, “euthanasia.” In its neutrality, it is 
nevertheless a euphemism for the emotionally disturbing, and criminal act
370
 of one person 
aiding another in the taking of his or her own life. “The stolen generation”—a three-word 
slogan—is emotionally less distressing than a personal account of a child forcibly and 
permanently wrenched from their parents. ‘Generation’ is a genealogical term that masks the 
individual human tragedy in each act of separation. The debate moves to the higher 
conceptual plane of politics, away from the vale of human, personal anguish. Language in 
context becomes a game. In the courtroom, the story of a little Aboriginal boy stolen from 
hospital on Christmas day without justification, and ‘given’ to a White foster family will stir 
emotions and would, more than likely, have persuaded a jury to see it as a foul deed. That the 
act was a consequence of government policy would not mitigate its foulness. 
371
  However, at 
the abstract level of political debate,   the personal tragedy is suppressed. It becomes a 
different language game, with differing rules.  
Language at the level of discourse and the role of shifters. 
The tools of the trade of courtroom discourse include what Jakobson labels shifters.
372
 
Broadly, shifters are the organizing elements the person who transmits the utterance uses to 
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authorize the act by which they do so. The two categories of shifters in the limited application 
that I need to make my point about the issue of unmediated testimony in adversarial jury 
trials comprise listening and the explicit signs the utterer—for my purposes, counsel,—
employ in their own discourse.
373
 I suggest that in the operation of shifters lie the seeds of 
doubt that the jury receives unmediated testimony.  
The listening shifter 
Barthes’ explanation of how the historian uses the listening shifter is pertinent to counsel 
working with witness testimony. After all, what is courtroom discourse in a criminal trial but 
narration of past events, or history? The listening shifter for the historian consists of three 
relationships. There is the reported event  the act of the informer (in the trial, this would be 
the witnesses to the event)  and the speech of the historian as utterer (in the trial, this is 
counsel). In the trial, the listening shifter does most of its work before the trial begins, which 
means before the court has empanelled the jury. Thus, when the trial gets under way, counsel 
are not listening in the sense Jakobson uses the word, but engaging in a performative act 
before the jury as audience.  
The performative act is the point at which the second shifter—the explicit signs the utterer 
engages—determines the nature of the discourse. If an unrehearsed departure from the script 
threatens the performance, counsel call for an interval—in the form of a voir dire—and there, 
they re-engage the listening shifter. It seems that Barthes regards the informer either as a 
neutral observer of the historical event, or as a participant in it. In either capacity, the 
informer gives an unmediated account of it. I suggest that is unlikely to be the case for an 
informer of history, less likely for a criminal trial witness.   
I have focused on Jakobson’s listening shifter, which, in the criminal trial before a jury, 
operates largely before the performative function takes place in the adversarial courtroom. 
My point is that Counsel interpret the ‘core message’ of each witness according to cultural 
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predispositions, or to institutionalized pre-understandings. However, they might not know—
or might choose to overlook—the cultural pre-understandings that mould the contextual truth 
of the witnesses. As they shape the discourse, which best suits their purpose to persuade the 
jury, they are doing so from an already self-mediated base. Yes, the raw material of counsel’s 
trade is language. However, when they mine it for elements to persuade rather than to 
convince, are they merely uncovering fool’s gold— legal truth?  
Word games of contextual truth. 
When Australia’s first woman Prime Minister, Julia Gillard accused some of her critics of 
misogyny, her speech attracted worldwide attention.
374
 Some questioned whether she 
understood the meaning of the word. A lexicographer from Macquarie Dictionary
375
 seemed 
to suggest that it did not matter. Amend the lexicon to conform to the new meaning in social 
discourse. Interest in the nature of truth according to context is not new, nor is amending the 
lexicon to give a word a new meaning to conform to contemporary use. It is common in the 
evolution of language and its semantics. However, ambiguous meaning in courtroom 
discourse can be more damaging. It can distort communication if the court mistakes the 
silence (albeit enforced) of the jury as a common understanding of meaning arrived at 
through use of a shared code when it might actually signal perplexity resulting from code 
confusion. Worse, the jury might have arrived at a contrary interpretation. The enforced 
silence of the jury means that phatic communication cannot resolve the potential risk.
376
  
To add to the difficulty of understanding meaning, at least two language games take place in 
the courtroom. There is one game between—on one side—the officers of the court 
collectively, and—on the other side—the jury. Then, there is another game—in which only 
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the lawyers know the rules—between counsel and witnesses. Take, for example, the 
exchange between Defence and Witness in the recent criminal trial in the District Court of 
Western Australia to which I referred earlier. 
Witness: Initially, all I heard were the screams. And it were the screams 
that suggested to me that I needed to see… 
Defence: He heard screams. What they suggested to him is – it-it – 
irrelevant… Anyway, he’s not allowed to say it.
 377
 
To that last declaration, the collective unspoken retort from the jury might well be—
querulously—“says who?” Or, more politely questioning, “why not?” Which reaction counsel 
evokes might depend on how persuasively counsel has engaged the rules in discourse. And. 
on how well counsel has engaged with the jury! 
Although the witness could have structured the phrase “And it were the screams that 
suggested to me…” more elegantly, the rules of grammar do not prevent him expressing it 
that way. In the game the witness was playing (and, more than likely, the jury), the rules 
allowed him to use the phrase ‘…suggested to me...’ to develop his narrative of the screams 
as communication. In his game, they screamed “terror,” not merely rage or a reaction to an 
unpleasant and unheralded occurrence. In the game the lawyers were playing, the rules did 
not allow for inferences.  
There was only one game for the jury as interpreters. An implicit rule of that game was that 
the witness was to communicate the unmediated facts of the matter of which they had 
knowledge. Another way of looking at this is that the jurors are spectators of a conversation 
that leads to a “text,” which they must interpret. That is to say, the interpreter has a 
conversation with the text, out of which they develop an understanding of a new reality. I will 
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return to the point later. However, in the illustrative example I have used above, the jury was 
not to know that in a voir dire hearing, which took place before this witness had presented his 
testimony, the court had decided that witness inferences were not part of the message. The 
lawyers had changed the rules of the game (importantly, though, not the rules of evidence). 
But, in playing to those rules, they had pre-understandings that were not available to the 
jurors. Therefore, the jury must draw its own inference, in spite of the absence of an essential 
component of the message. Different rules create a different context, and can produce a 
different truth.  
Although Wittgenstein did not offer a completely developed example of an actual word 
game, Halpin suggests how it might play. We see how the word we are examining works, and 
decide that, even if its uses are diverse, the use is ‘coherent.’  
Suppose that in our observations we come across some inconsistent usage which cannot be 
accommodated within a coherent body of rules. Wittgenstein allows for this possibility—we simply 
acknowledge that there are two different games going on: the players of one game although they appear 
to be playing with the same word are in fact playing a different game to the players in the other 
game…This means we cannot enter the game through the word.
378
 
This means that Wittgenstein’s language game is not only linguistic, but gains coherence 
from the practice ‘not merely of what is said, but of what is spoken about, the practice of 
using words in a particular context.’
379
  
Halpin puts forward a suggested solution. We need only ‘select’ the appropriate practice, and 
use the word in that context. But, he suggests that if we rely on the practical context to set the 
parameters of the game, we cannot rely on determining the grammar of the word, or the rules 
of the language game to show us reality. ‘[T]he confused state of the language game simply 
reveals our confusion over the way things are in that particular practical context.’
380
 For 
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example, in my case law example, because the court does not explain the voir dire context to 
the jury, each individual can be playing different language games.
 
 
Prosecutor: And what happened when you approached her to within two metres? 
What was the next thing that happened ?--- 
Witness: A man appeared, yelling loudly at me. 
Prosecutor: Okay. Now, for legal reasons, we're not going to go into the words 
that he may have spoken, if any, to you?--- (my Emphasis) 
Witness: I understand. 
… 
Prosecutor: Okay. But - so this man approached. He was, I think you said, 
shouting. What sort of volume are you talking?---(my emphasis) 
Witness: Loud. 
The question and answer exchange I have quoted is a performance; it does not elicit new 
information. However, although the witness knows it is a performance, and the lawyers know 
it is a performance, the jury might not also surmise it is a performance. Counsel and judge 
cannot know whether jurors also realize that.  
The phrases ‘If any’ and ‘What sort of volumes are you talking’ point to an ellipsis in the 
message. It is, as Wittgenstein seems not to resolve, a clash between meaning and training. 
The lawyer trains to work around the problem of inadmissibility. To insert ‘if any’ and ‘what 
sort of volume are you talking’ might appear an honest request for facts about which the 
lawyer has no inkling. On the other hand, it might be deceitful. It is, in my example, an 
attempt within the rules of the game to imply—with a metaphorical nudge and a wink—to the 
jury that the accused said something that the court thinks is too inflammatory for them to 
hear. It is a form of cheating, which, in sporting parlance, falls under the euphemism, 
“gamesmanship.” In the exchange above, the witness enters into the game only to the extent 
of offering a single word response. The witness knows that a better description of the 





shouting would be “angry” or “enraged,” but he also knows that response would break the 
rules of this game to which the court has bound him.  
In the courtroom contextual game, lawyers reach agreement on rules, not meaning 
Wittgenstein’s language games idea explains what is happening. It does not validate it. The 
lawyers have reached an understanding, not of meaning, but of rules. They have also reached 
a tacit understanding about the need to control what happens in open court to ensure that 
development of the narrative of the case does not pass to witnesses.
381
 Thus, within the rules 
about which they have reached an understanding, they also have reached an understanding 
about meaning within that context. However, this points to a likely difference between what 
those operating outside those rules see as the optimum way of communicating meaning to the 
jury, and the process that the lawyers prefer. I explore that difference in the next section. 
The dialogic path to reaching an understanding 
I begin my exploration with Gadamer’s proposition that conversation is the way to meaning. 
Then, I introduce the views of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca on rhetoric.
382
 I explore 
Francis Mootz’ statement that Gadamer and Perelman share opinions on ‘the dialogic 
character of understanding, the inadequacy of neo-Kantianism as an account of knowledge, 
and the overriding ethical imperative of holding oneself open to questioning and challenges 
rather than proceeding as if one is possessed of apodictic truth.’
 383
 
Partners in conversation must not talk at cross purposes 
Gadamer holds the view that true conversation ‘has a spirit of its own’ that leads, not follows, 
participants to a conclusion. He contends that the language in which it is conducted ‘bears its 
own truth within it… that it allows something to “emerge” which henceforth exists.’
384
 He 
explains that to engage in dialogue requires that the participants do not ‘talk at cross 
                                                 
381
 I elaborate, and provide illustrations of how they do this in Chapter Two (above)—the case study. 
382
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, above n 12 
383
 Mootz, above n 32, 499 
384
 Gadamer, above n 22, 345 







 Therefore, of necessity, dialogue consists of a question and answer format, the 
first condition of which is that ‘the other person is with us.’ He adds, ‘[w]e know this only 
too well from the reiterated yesses of the interlocutors in the platonic dialogues.’
386
 As 
monotonous as these repeated “yesses” might be, they do signal ‘the inner logic’ that the 
conversers use to develop their dialogue. He adds, 
To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the object to which the partners 
in the conversation are directed. It requires that one does not try to out-argue the other person, but that 
one really considers the weight of the other’s opinion. Hence it is an art of testing. But the art of testing 
is the art of questioning.
387
 
Gadamer talks of ‘partners’ in conversation, not ‘participants.’ One can participate in a 
conversation whilst intending to argue the other person down. As a partner in conversation, 
one works with the other to develop an understanding. His description, “partner,” is apposite 
to the nature of the communication process—the art of questioning—that he describes. When 
Gadamer talks of the ‘art’ of questioning, he means something more than a knack or flair. 
Those terms suit better the performance of the courtroom advocate when they are asking a 
question to which they already know the answer. That is, when the questioning serves the 
purpose of persuading the jury, not the purpose of eliciting new knowledge. Gadamer 
requires more. 
For we have seen that to question means to lay open. As against the solidity of opinions, questioning 
makes the object and all its possibilities fluid. A person who possesses the “art” of questioning is a 
person who is able to prevent the suppression of questions by the dominant opinion. A person who 
possesses this art will himself seek for everything in favour of an opinion.
388
  
The question and answer performance from my case example, which I introduced earlier in 
this chapter, differs from the opening up process that Gadamer promotes. Had the prosecutor 
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and witness engaged in dialectic—that is, discussion—rather than having to comply with the 
defence need to make a strong case out of a weak one we would have discussed the actual 
words the accused used. The rules of evidence—strictly applied—had shut down the 
opportunity to question all possible meanings of that confrontation. Another viewpoint is that 
defence had argued more strongly to persuade the judge in the voir dire of his need than the 
prosecutor had argued his rebuttal of the need. One can claim this because the rules of 
evidence are clear on the need to establish probative value if the court is to admit testimony, 
but the voir dire transcript shows that the means of arriving at that decision are not clear-
cut.
389
 In any event, the decision had reduced the question and answer processing of the 
witness’ testimony to argumentation. The dialectic that Gadamer espouses is, as he states, 
‘the art of thinking.’
390
 It is dialogue on the path to an understanding. 
In Gadamer’s art of ‘real’ dialogue, ‘an understanding’ is not the same as ‘understanding.’ 
Understanding a communication means that the words and the grammar comply with 
language rules as Chomsky explains it.
391
 Thus, one can still exercise one’s own prejudice 
without reflection. In contrast, an understanding, in Gadamer’s opinion, already resides 
within the language of the conversation; the question and answer process has merely revealed 
it. From that moment on, therefore, an understanding is the new reality. It is common to all 
partners in the conversation.  
Someone who wants to know something cannot just leave it a matter of mere opinion, which is to say 
he should not hold himself aloof from the opinions that are in question…. The speaker…is put to the 
question… until the truth of what is under discussion…finally emerges….[T]he art of using words as a 
midwife, is certainly directed towards people who are the partners in the dialogue, but it is concerned 
merely with the opinions that they express, the immanent logic of which is unfolded in the dialogue. 
What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and hence so far transcends the 
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Of course, ‘an understanding,’ even if it is common to the partners, can still be prejudiced. 
An understanding might simply mean that each partner shares a cultural code. For example, 
earlier I used the expression ‘I had done my homework,’which in my culture is code for I had 
checked my facts. For someone from a different culture, the expression might merely 
confuse. More insidiously, a shared cultural code can have unjust consequences for an 
accused who displays the attributes of a feared or misjudged minority group.
393
 Thus, an 
important aspect of Gadamer’s idea is that prejudice is not a barrier to fruitful conversation; it 
is an inherent part of it. He argues that for any participant in a conversation to come to it 
without prejudices would be to exist outside of history. If there is no history, there is no 
common basis on which to carry on the conversation.  
Indeed, Gadamer claims that only with the advent of the Enlightenment did prejudice acquire 
its negative meaning of ‘false judgment.’ He cites German legal practice in which prejudice 
meant only a preliminary judgment before reaching a final verdict. In other words, it is a 
preliminary judgement arrived at ‘before all the elements that determine the situation have 
been finally examined…. Thus, “prejudice” certainly does not mean false judgment, but is 
part of the idea that can have a positive and a negative value.’
394
 Any negative consequence 
ultimately depends on the ‘positive validity, the value of the provisional decision as a 
judgment, which is that of any precedent.’
395
 He describes these prejudices as forming a 
horizon that moves, moulds, and eventually fuses with the horizon of the other partner to 
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yield a shared understanding, which becomes the new reality. 
396
 We learn from this that the 
horizon is not a fixed place, that is, it is not a fixed point of view.  
The question and answer game that opposing counsel play does not apply the ‘pre-
understanding that motivates and shapes all later interpretive encounters,’ which Gadamer 
proposes.
397
 The game opposing counsel play is ego centred, which means it is concerned 
with counsel’s own needs or interest. Each plays to win, that is, to persuade the jury to the 
cogency of their argument. Conversely, conversation to the point of reaching an 
understanding is not binary; there is no winner and loser. What Gadamer proposes is ego 
decentring. As Mootz cites Gadamer, ‘all understanding is founded on a decentring "fusion of 
horizons," an experience that is placed in sharp relief when two conversationalists find the 
path of their dialogue taking on a life of its own.’
398
 Thus, he continues, ‘a conversation 
yields understanding when two people, working from their own prejudiced starting points, 
find common ground sufficient to develop a topic that informs both participants.’
399
 
Therefore, the route to understanding through conversation is verbal. 
As I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, if there is no shared history and no common 
horizon in a culturally diverse community, there can be no community common sense. That 
means there will be no common basis upon which counsel and jurors might carry on the type 
of hermeneutical conversation that Gadamer envisages. In fact, the trial process generally 
comprises many conversations in which members of the jury are not participants, let alone 
partners. Arguably, they are spectators of conversations, which lead to a “text,” which they 
must interpret. This thwarts a necessary condition of reaching an understanding through 
conversation. This raises the question of the difference between convincing and persuading, 
and of the manner in which conversation and argumentation differs. In the next section, I 
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analyse the difference Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca assert exists between ‘persuasion and 
action’ on the one hand, and between ‘conviction and intelligence’ on the other hand. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca on arguing to persuade 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca talk of argumentation and its relationship to rhetoric. 
Argumentation, they contend, does its work in the realm of ‘the credible, the plausible, the 
probable, to the degree that the latter eludes certainty of calculations.’
400
 That is also the 
dominion of courtroom discourse, which exemplifies the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
contention that what is self-evident, does not need arguing. They put it this way: ‘we cannot 
develop a theory of argumentation if every proof is conceived of as a reduction to the self-
evident.’
401
 Thus, their study is of the discursive techniques that allow one to persuade a 
receptive mind to accept the proposition one offers for judgment. Their point, when one 
applies it to the courtroom advocate, is that the aim is not to insist on ‘the mind’s adherence’ 
to a thesis that is proportional to the degree of self-evidence of the proposition offered for 
assent.’ Rather, it is to induce or to increase the mind’s acceptance of (that is, ‘the mind’s 
adherence to’) theses offered for agreement. That is they structure an utterance so that it 
seems so logical as to be irrefutable. It is, as I explain later, quasi-logical. In fact, they 
emphasize, ‘It is good practice not to confuse, at the beginning, the aspects of  reasoning 
relative to truth and those relative to adherence, but to study them  separately, even though 
we might have to examine later their possible interference or correspondence.’ Nor can it 
require that the adherence identify self-evidence with truth. In due course, we need to 
consider the extent to which argumentation interferes with, or corresponds to, substantive 
truth. In the first instance, all we need is to understand the nature of courtroom discourse as 
persuasion, which means being aware of the theory that underlies it. 
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The distinction that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca propose expresses indirectly the 
connection between ‘persuasion and action’ on the one hand, and between ‘conviction and 
intelligence’ on the other hand. Persuasive argumentation is only valid for a particular 
audience; convincing argumentation ‘presumes adherence of every rational being.’
402
 They 
acknowledge that the distinction between convincing and persuading is ‘unprecise [sic] and 
in practice must remain so.’
403
 To make their point, they cite the comment by Claparède in 
the preface to his ‘La genèse de l’hypothèse’ that he only agreed to publishing a manuscript 
in response “to the request of Madame Antipoff, who persuaded (but did not convince) me 
that the publication of these investigations was desirable.”
404
 They explain the action 
Claparède took by suggesting that Madame Antipoff convinced him with her argument, but 
he did not believe she would convince others with the same argument. That is to say, 
Claparède did not differentiate—at least for publication—between persuasion and conviction. 
The differentiation might be slight but in ignoring it, an action that it motivates, might not be 
so slight. I might argue, for instance that Claparède succumbed to vanity, and then later 
sought to justify his decision. It was just a momentary surrender to vanity and the 
consequences did no one any harm.
405
 However, a juror who has been persuaded by an 
argument that could not convince other jurors has to make a more difficult decision. They can 
stand firm against the derision—or, in the extreme, hostility—of the other jurors. Or, 
although not convinced, they can succumb to the persuasive attraction of being at one with 
their fellows. 
Kant on persuasion as mere illusion 
On the other hand, Kant introduces a moral consideration. He claims that when the subject 
reaches a judgment on a matter, we cannot ‘subjectively’ distinguish persuasion from 
conviction. However, this does not matter ‘so long as the subject views its judgment simply 
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as a phenomenon of its own mind.’
406
 It is only when they question whether the grounds for 
their reaching the judgment would be effective on others that they have means of ascertaining 




Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish their views on the difference between persuasion 
and conviction from that of Kant in his Critique of pure Reason, in which he concludes, 
If a judgement is valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed 
a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is 
termed persuasion.408  
Kant calls persuasion ‘mere illusion.’ In the grip of that illusion, a reason for arriving at a 
judgment is subjective, albeit the one who judges regards it as objective. Therefore, that 
judgment can be valid only for the one who judges, and, ‘as a phenomenon of the subject’s 
mind ‘cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction,’ but only in private. One must 
acknowledge ‘the element of mere persuasion’ and not try to bind others to that judgment as 
if, objectively, it were a substantive truth.
409
  
The mere illusion of which Kant speaks has something in common with the uncertainty of 
self-deliberation. When we persuade our self of the morality of a decision to act in a certain 
manner, how do we know whether we have invoked a substantive truth to arrive at this 
decision? How do we resolve the potential dissonance of self-interest and the conscience call 
of moral rectitude? In the next section, I give an example from my illustrative case study of 
how one might rationalize a decision, and discuss the implications. 
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Self-deliberation and the phenomenon of rationalization 
Immediately following the incident to which, in my case example, I was witness, I did not 
consciously think about why I crossed the road to investigate it. My reaction to the scream 
had been instinctive. It was only after the police later had questioned me directly that I 
thought about whether I needed to clarify my action, although in neither word nor in manner 
did they suggest other than that they merely wanted the facts. Nevertheless, I felt a need to 
justify myself. Was I a neighbourhood busybody? Or, was I the Good Samaritan? In my 
testimony at trial, I was presenting myself as the Good Samaritan. Defence wanted to 
discredit me by portraying me as a neighbourhood busybody intruding into what they wanted 
to depict as a mere domestic quarrel. In opting for the Good Samaritan version, had I 
persuaded, or had I convinced, myself.
410
 In the privacy of my own conscience, it did not 
matter. In the courtroom, the jury held a man’s freedom in their control. Defence counsel had 
to persuade them that it did matter.  
Was Defence’s concern real of feigned? Were he and I—as advocate and witness 
respectively—each playing the game with a clear conscience? This is the essence of Kant’s 
insistence on morality being an element of such a game. Chaignet contends, ‘When we are 
convinced, we are overcome only by ourselves, by our own ideas. When we are persuaded, it 
is always by another.’411 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca elaborate: ‘Just as one attaches more 
importance to arguments presented in a closed session than to those presented at a public 
meeting, the secrecy of self-deliberation seems to guarantee its value and sincerity.’
412
 
However, they dispute the philosophers’ suggestion that, because speech directed at another 
is ‘simply appearance and illusion,’
413
 the methods of one’s own thought ought to be the only 
method worthy of a philosopher’s interest. 
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On the other hand, William Twining draws attention to some of the deficiencies of orthodox 
evidence scholarship.
414
 It tells us, he argues, ‘almost nothing  about how the rules  of  
evidence operate in practice, about the actual mental processes of witnesses, triers of  fact or 
other participants, nor about any aspects of the actual dynamics of information-processing in 
litigation.’
415
 Twining gets to the core of the problem. If one accepts Chaignet’s viewpoint, 
self-deliberation is an internal negotiation between persuasion and conviction. How the battle 
plays out determines the potential for simple ‘appearance and illusion’ to deny the truth of the 
self-deliberating outcome when we try to present an ideal self to the external world. As I 
discussed earlier, Isocrates succinct analysis of the quandary is constructive. ‘The arguments 
by which we convince others when we speak to them are the same as those we use when we 
engage in reflection. We call those able to speak to the multitude orators, but we regard as 




When the rules of evidence prevent a witness from revealing their mental processes, those 
rules might also block substantive truth.  
Conclusion: The play’s the thing 
The premise of the jury receiving ‘raw’ facts is that they receive them unmediated. However, 
for the jury to reach an understanding of those facts would require a conversation of the type 
that Gadamer describes. In the case examples I have used, that did not happen. Moreover, the 
nature of criminal trial procedure precludes that possibility in any adversarial criminal trial.  
My discussion so far has suggested ways in which the work of counsel, and the actors as they 
develop the narrative of their case, mirrors that of a play as a work of art. Gadamer discusses 
it in terms of self-representation, which he describes as ‘being derived from the idea of play, 
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in that self-representation is the true nature of play….The playing of the play is what speaks 
to the spectator, through its representation, and this in such a way that the spectator, despite 
the distance between it and himself, still belongs to it.’
417
 In this analysis, the role of the jury 
first as spectator to the performance and, ultimately as interpreter and critic is evident. 
Therefore, the performance—in my discussion, courtroom advocacy—is not an isolated 
object for the spectator to judge apart from the play. Gadamer points out that, for the 
spectator who reflects on the conceptual underpinning of the performance—whether it occurs 
on a stage or in real life—it is all one if it is to be a meaningful whole. So, if, as Gadamer 
claims ‘in the performance and only in it—as we see most clearly in the case of music—do 
we encounter the work itself,’
418
 then we must conclude that the performance only resonates 
perfectly when it is mediated, that is to say, when it is performed. This, in itself is significant 
to the trial. It resounds more abundantly when one considers the trial’s oft-remarked 
relationship to religious performance in which the ritual mediates the rite it celebrates.
419
  
We need to understand discourse as performance and the linguistic tools counsel use to 
manipulate language as an instrument of communication that aims to persuade. In the next 
chapter, I discuss how the instrument of language with which lawyers in court toil, can yield 
differing versions of reality. And, I propose a role for theory in courtroom discourse to help 
unearth the real gold—substantive truth—that  can remain buried in the mediated storytelling 
of witnesses. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Standard accounts of language and law 
inadequate to assess distortion of meaning in courtroom 
discourse 
Introduction 
I have shown that the adversarial trial before jury is a structured oral event founded on ritual, 
and bound by the rules of evidence. In Chapters Two and Three, I have examined the 
influence of these constraining influences on the organization of courtroom advocacy. In 
Chapter Two especially, I have used my case study to show how counsel, arguing from 
opposite sides of the point in question, and each claiming that a desire to preserve the 
probative integrity of witness testimony guides them, will try to convince the judge to accept 
their assessment of what testimony is acceptable. Once the judge has ruled, counsel will each 
present their narrative of the case to the jury within the newly defined constraints. Counsel, as 
rhetors, will each try to persuade, but not necessarily convince, jurors to accept their narrative 
as the embodiment of substantive truth. 
A presumed strength of the adversarial trial is its orality. The adjacency pair—chain 
maxim—process is, on the face of it, an effective way of getting to the certitude of the 
rational core of witness testimony. However, unlike storytelling, which favours the witness 
account of events, the adjacency pair approach aims at the “what” rather than delving deeper 
into the “why” of what happened. As my case study in Chapter Two shows, the rules of 
evidence suggest that in the “what” lies probative integrity. But, as Martin Heidegger claims, 
there is no intentional act unless there is a performer.
420
  
It seems self-evident, therefore, that, if an intentional act requires a performer, it also requires 
a “why.” A “why” requires a consciousness, which is an aspect of the mind, not merely a 
response to a mechanistic stimulus from the brain. An intentional act exists only when a 
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person performs it. Therefore, the act and the performer of it give unity of meaning. On that 
understanding, in my case study, there is no unity of meaning in Witness’s act of crossing the 
road without the consciousness from which the act emanated. Without that unity, the 
narrative is incomplete. 
Significantly, in my analysis of the illustrative case study, “Witness crossed the road” has 
become a kind of rhetorical trope; it denotes something beyond that act of crossing from one 
side of the road to the other. That missing “something” is the need for a narrative of the case 
to encompass a unity of meaning. Therein lies the potential for discursive distortion of 
meaning. So, in this chapter, I draw on the thoughts of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer to address my argument that the new diversity of society creates a need to turn to 
socio linguistics to interpret and understand the meaning in the narrative of the case, which 
each counsel tries to persuade the jury to accept. In this way, Gadamer’s shared horizons and 
Heideggger’s Being-in-something have in common a need for an existentiale.
421
 This is a 
state of mind beyond corporeality. It is also beyond grammar.  
I develop the theme in this chapter, drawing also from Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
notion that the universal audience is merely a concept, a perception of what such an audience 
might accept as fact and truth, on which counsel base their own worldview. I elaborate on the 
theme by analysing Gadamer’s notion of Bildung, which Gadamer envisages differing from 
what a community more generally considers its culture. He views Bildung as an essential 
element of ‘man’ as a historical being, embodying the collective memory of the community, 
the source of community value. In many ways, Bildung aligns with Heidegger’s concept of 
Dasein. In basic terms, Dasein is the peculiarly human experience of being. It involves being 
aware of one’s own existentialism, or chosen way of living. It is within these deeper 
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understandings of ways of being that one can find the “why” to an act, and hence reveal its 
true probative essence.  
I explore the concepts I have identified in this introduction under the broad heading of 
seeking meaning beyond corporeality and beyond grammar. I examine each concept under 
five sub-headings: 1) managing discourse to direct the narrative, 2) conversing as a route to 
understanding, 3) developing attitude, and relationship to the world through the living act of 
speech, 4) rhetor and hearer assigning meaning according to their own understanding of the 
world, and 5) the structure of assertion as communication. 
Meaning resides in a state of mind beyond corporeality, and beyond 
grammar 
1 Managing discourse to direct the narrative 
On the surface, persuading the jury seems to be a straightforward challenge for counsel. 
Understand the nature of the predispositions that the jury, as a particular audience, brings to 
its decision-making, and play to it. Manipulate the organisation of discourse to persuade 
jurors that the narrative, which counsel is building for them is the narrative that a universal 
audience would accept. However, the perception of what a universal audience would accept 
might itself be a product of counsel’s own ways of viewing the putative world of a universal 
audience. So, we are now concerned with the nature and organisation of discourse, which 




Gadamer distinguishes the particular audience—the jury—from a universal audience by 
engaging the notion of ‘Bildung.’ The essence of his theoretical conception of Bildung is that 
it derives from memory, not memory as a mere psychological function, but as an essential 
element of ‘man’ as a historical being. In other words, it is the collective memory of the 
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community—the source of community values.
423
 But, the rules of evidence, and the 
structured nature of the adversarial trial as an oral event, stand in the way of genuine 
conversation, which is the essential element of Gadamer’s search for truth through a shared 
horizon. Furthermore, if counsel misunderstand the nature and extent of cultural diversity in 
their jury, there is the risk that they organize discourse against a criterion of common sense, 
which they understand only in terms of their own constructed universal audience. That will 
magnify the potential for discursive distortion of meaning.
424
  
Manipulating witnesses to fit Counsel’s imagined plot 
I have shown in my illustrative case study in Chapter Two how counsel, as authors of the 
courtroom narrative, seek to manipulate the witness to fit the plot they “imagine.”
425
 The 
manipulation might start with the blatant, as in this example from my case study. 
Witness: Sworn 
Defence: I'd ask that my learned friend speak up, please. He does have a 
habit of really mumbling into his socks, and I'd like to be able to 
hear him. 
Up to this point, Prosecutor had not spoken since Witness entered the courtroom. 
Judge: Yes 
Defence: It's the only grounds(?) that I really - - - 
Judge: I’m sure [Prosecutor] heard that. So, yes, keep your voice up, 
please. 
The trial had started on 25 February 2013, and this witness (the authorial “I” of this thesis) 
testified for the first time on 7 March, leading him to infer that this apparent request was in 
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fact a performance. If Prosecutor’s imputed mumbling had been a continuing problem since 
the trial began—nine days earlier—Defence would have raised the issue before now. Witness 
knew that Defence had already won a battle—waged in the presence of the judge but in the 
absence of the jury—to have certain parts of his testimony declared inadmissible. This later 
performance was for Witness. Defence wanted him to understand where the power in the 
battle for control of narrative development lay. It was meant to unsettle the witness. Let the 
Wittgensteinian games begin.  
This kind of manipulation is transparent, and Witness, now alerted, can deal with it, as I have 
shown in Chapter Two. The jury, too, having watched the relative performances of counsel 
for several days, probably is alert to this obvious attempt to assert command. However, 
unlike Witness, jurors cannot be aware of the manipulation of his testimony that has taken 
place in the voir dire hearing. They might be aware that counsel and judge have discussed it 
in their absence. However, from the moment the witness takes the stand, jurors will deal only 
with what is before them, which includes the flagrant and obvious gamesmanship
426
 they had 
just witnessed. I do not concern myself with this overt type of competitiveness in this chapter. 
I concentrate on the discursive organisation of language, which is subtle, strategic, and 
manipulative. In most cases, it will be culturally determined, or at least culturally influenced.  
A new cultural diversity creates the need for a new rhetoric of courtroom advocacy. 
The increasing diversity of society creates the need to draw on lessons from socio linguistics 
to interpret and understand meaning in the narrative of the case. But, in courtroom advocacy 
to a jury, meaning—like beauty— is in the eye of the beholder. The apparent straightforward 
challenge for counsel is not as clear-cut as it might seem. I described it earlier as grasping the 
nature of the prejudices that inform the jury as a particular audience, and manipulating 
discourse to persuade them that the narrative counsel puts to them is what a universal 
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audience would accept. However, as I also pointed out, the perception of what a universal 
audience would accept as truth might be intuitive. But, in counsel’s intuition as a product of 
their own prejudices and predispositions, lies the risk of discursive distortion. The 
insensitivity of the standard accounts of language to the relationship of social entities with 
language use means it falls short of revealing this risk. 
 In Chapter Three, I raised two points that are germane to this topic. First, is Mootz’s
427
 
observation that the route to understanding through conversation is verbal (what I call, in the 
setting of the adversarial trial, “oral,” to avoid confusion with a wider  understanding of 
verbal as meaning to express in words). Second, is the notion of horizon, and, as Mootz 
explains Gadamer’s contention, if there is no shared history and no common horizon, there 
can be no hermeneutical conversation.
428
 In this circumstance, there can be no revelatory 
conversation. Gadamer uses the term horizon in the phenomenological sense of historically 
effected consciousness. That is to say, he is talking of a history of experience as perceived, 
not necessarily as objectively real. Thus, partners in dialogue willingly put their own 
historically influenced prejudices at risk to establish a larger context in which to reach an 
understanding. That is, they agree upon a common framework of meaning, in which to come 
to an understanding of meaning in a particular circumstance. Gadamer calls this a fusion of 
horizons. Moreover, as Mootz explains, in this broader understanding, even when interpreting 
a text, one must appreciate that before there was a text there was first a conversation, in 
which language is the intersubjective medium.  
However, I have also argued that standard accounts of language do not explain adequately the 
nature of courtroom discourse. I have cited Barthes’ contention that we should not regard 
language as a direct reflection of reality. I have explained why his theory suggests the need to 
understand better how the manipulative use of language in courtroom discourse leads to 
mediated meaning, which distorts the raw reality from which it is drawn. Rules of evidence 
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and court procedures reflect Law’s preoccupation with language competence, and with faith 
in the detached coherent legal viewpoint. Here too is a site of possible conflict between the 
rational and the reasonable. Counsel will argue that testimony, which does not advance their 
preferred narrative of the case, and which, in their opinion, does not add to the probative 
value of evidence ought to be inadmissible. As we have seen in my illustrative case study, the 
judge—having recourse to the rules of evidence, and to criminal court procedures—will 
decide. Yet, to use only a standard account of language to assess probative value of testimony 
is to overlook the relationship of social entities with language use. The justice system needs 
something more than mere language competence as a measure of the jury trial as legitimate 
standard-bearer of universality and truth in justice. And, as I argue in the following section, 
the adversarial trial before jury is not a conversation forum, as Gadamer would envisage it. It 
is a forum in which counsel argue to persuade, not to convince. I begin by clarifying why it is 
important to understand the difference between persuasion and conviction when counsel 
organize their courtroom discourse. 
2 Conversing as a route to understanding  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca insist that the rhetor must always have regard to the quality 
of minds they address. This means that, because the rhetor needs to persuade rather than 
convince, they must tailor their argument, not only to the occasion, but also, to the quality of 
many independent minds. In this instance, they argue, ‘nothing constrains us to limit our 
study  to a particular degree of adherence characterized by self-evidence, and nothing 
permits us to consider a priori the degrees of adherence to a thesis proportional to its 
probability and to identify self-evidence with truth.’
429
 The jury is such a composite of 
potentially independent minds, which ‘must be resolved into its constituent parts for the 
purpose of argumentation.’
430
 But, it must be reformulated into a single entity to make a 
decision.  
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In distinguishing their notion of conviction and persuasion from Kant’s explanation in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca contend that facts and truth are the 
reality, which is the province of a universal audience. Values, on the other hand, are the 
preferences of a particular audience.
431
 But, the universal audience is a concept, not an 
aggregation of real people. The arguer uses this conceptualised universal audience as a 
benchmark to establish which self-evident data the particular audience will accept. So, the 
arguer fails to persuade if they base their argument on premises that their audience will not 
accept.  
In framing courtroom discourse to persuade the illusory audience—the rhetor’s paradigm of a 
universal audience—courtroom advocates move beyond practices that standard accounts of 
language can explain. The jury, as representative of a particular audience, differs from a 
universal audience, and counsel, as speakers, must adapt to that difference. Yet, at the same 
time, they must persuade the jury that the verdict they want it to reach is the verdict any 
reasonable member of the universal audience would reach. However, if counsel is to manage 
the organization of courtroom discourse to achieve their preferred case narrative outcome, 
they must first understand the nature of the universe from which their jury is drawn. Although 
intuitively one might think of the jury as a particular audience and the wider community it 
represents as the universal audience; courtroom advocates must not understand it this way. In 
fact, the jury is a specific audience, and the community from which it is drawn, is the 
statistical specific audience universe. I emphasize that for jury trial argumentation, a 
particular audience is the statistical universe; the universal audience is a construct of the 
arguer. Counsel must understand the difference at the conceptual level before they can 
understand individual differences of the particular audience—of which the jury is a specific 
representative. They need to understand that community common sense might in fact, not be 
common. 
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One way of looking at counsel construction of the narrative of the case is that jurors confront 
two truths in conflict. They must wait for one or the other counsel to persuade them that their 
truth is the truth that accords with community common sense. How persuasive each counsel 
is will depend on how clearly they understand the difference between persuasion and 
conviction as a precursor to action. How persuasive they are will depend also on how clearly 
they understand the difference between the particular audience—influenced by community 
standards and values—and the rational universal audience, which is committed to facts. 
Christopher Tindale suggests, ‘[f]rom the point of view of evaluation, argumentation may 
address us through our particular involvements, in groups, families, religions, and so on. But 
if it addresses us simply as reasonable people without recourse to the values of the group or 
religion, or other involvement, then we are addressed as a universal audience.
432
 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use this method of evaluation to clarify their rules for 
constructing universal audiences, as Tindale explains. 
In each case, one begins with a particular audience on which imaginative operations are performed. 
Thus, we might set aside the local features of an audience and consider its universal features. Or we 
might exclude from the particular audience all members who are prejudiced, or irrational, or 
incompetent. Or we might combine particular audiences so as to cancel out their particularity 
(eventually reaching all humanity).
433
 
The magnitude of the advocates’ task in developing the narrative of the case with a jury 
chosen from a culturally diverse community is evident. Evident too is the risk that, when they 
manipulate courtroom discourse to arrive at their preferred narrative outcome, counsel distort 
meaning. We must also keep in mind that counsel from each side of the adversarial process 
proceed from the premise that each of them has access to the same raw facts. But, as I have 
discussed earlier, those facts are raw only to the extent witnesses who have given testimony 
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have already mediated them before they present them to the court. They are raw, therefore, 
only in the sense that courtroom mediation has not yet treated them.  
The important point for courtroom advocates is that the jury behaves in the particular, not the 
universal, realm. It is representative, therefore, not of a universal truth, but of the particularity 
of the statistical universe from which jurors are drawn. Argumentation and its relationship to 
rhetoric is the domain of courtroom discourse. And, as I have pointed out earlier, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasize, one cannot have a theory of argumentation if one must 
reduce every proof to the self-evident.
434
 That is the realm of science, not of persuasive 
advocacy.  
Universal truth residing in conversation 
Gadamer too differentiates the particular from the universal within his concept of Bildung, or 
what we name, “culture.” He does not mean culture as in the development of capacities or 
talents. It is something more. Bildung ‘calls rather on the ancient mystical tradition, according 
to which man carries in his soul the image of God after whom he is fashioned and must 
cultivate it in himself.’
435
 It is what a person should be ideally. 
Man is characterised by the break with the immediate and the natural that the intellectual, rational side 
of his nature demands of him. “In this sphere, he is not, by nature, what he should be’’—and hence he 
needs Bildung….He cannot turn his gaze from himself towards something universal from which his 
own particular being is determined in measure and proportion.
 436 
Thus, Bildung cannot be a goal. It is, as Heidegger would explain in his words, a way of 
Being. Clearly, though Bildung and Dasein in this context have much in common. 
Because it has no goals outside itself, Bildung ‘transcends that of the mere cultivation of 
given talents. The cultivation of a talent is the development of something that is given, so that 
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the practice and cultivation of it is a mere means to an end.
 437 
Gadamer describes Hegel’s 
understanding of theoretical Bildung as leading ‘man beyond what he knows and experiences 
immediately.’
438
 It means learning to verify what is different from oneself ‘and to find 
universal viewpoints from which one can grasp the thing, “the objective thing in its freedom,” 
without selfish interest.’
439 
Gadamer accepts Hegel’s concept, but emphasizes the ‘general 
characteristic’ of Bildung, which means staying open to other more universal viewpoints, 
without necessarily surrendering to them. In other words, universality does not determine a 




Every single individual that raises himself out of his natural being to the spiritual finds in the language, 
customs, and institutions of his people a pre-given body of material which, as in learning to speak, he 
has to make his own. Thus, every individual is always engaged in the process of Bildung and in getting 
beyond his naturalness, in as much as the world into which he is growing is one that is humanly 
constituted through language and custom.
441  
The essence of theoretical Bildung is history. Its practical application derives from memory. 
However, this is not memory in the sense of a capacity to bring to mind something one has 
learned. As Gadamer explains, someone who uses memory ‘as a mere faculty—and all the 
technical side of memory is such a use—does not yet possess it as something that is 
absolutely its own.’
442
 Human sciences work from the premise that ‘scientific consciousness’ 
is already formed and, therefore, already possesses ‘the right, unlearnable, and inimitable 
tact
443
 that bears the judgment and the mode of knowledge of the human sciences.’
444
 He 
adds, ‘[i]t is time to rescue the phenomenon of memory from being regarded as merely a 
psychological faculty and to see it as an essential element of the finite historical being of 
                                                 
437
 Ibid 12 
438
 Ibid 14 
439
 Hegel, XVIII,  p 62, cited in ibid 14  
440
 Ibid 17-18 
441
 Ibid 15 
442
 Ibid 16 
443
 One could perhaps substitute “perception” for “tact” in this context. 
444
 Gadamer, above n 22, 15 







 Thus, without contradiction, Gadamer can argue for the importance of prejudices 
and preunderstandings in conversation.  
Bildung in conversation: preparedness to put prejudices and predispositions at risk 
When it absorbs history into memory, culture will displace a means of learning that has lost 
its function to prejudice and preunderstanding. That is, culture in the sense of the practice and 
cultivation of a talent as a means to an end. On the other hand, in Bildung, ‘what is absorbed 
is not like a means that has lost its function…nothing disappears, but everything is 
preserved.’
446
 The former is particular; the latter is universal. The fact that everything is 
preserved, means—Gadamer asserts—that the universal truth resides in conversation. But 
‘man’ has to rise above particularity—sacrifice it for the sake of the universal—to reveal it.
447
 
That is the nature of conversation as a partnership. It is clearly something more than the 
nature of conversation as participation. Moreover, because conversation is the route to 
understanding, he stresses that the ‘process’ is verbal. In his view, the role of conversation in 
any matter in dispute is to facilitate an understanding. It is not a zero sum game. The 
understanding at which the partners have arrived becomes from that point on something, 
which they both believe. One can argue; therefore, that Social Media in today’s diverse 
culture is not a cohering force for a community common sense. It is a cacophony of 
individual predispositions (or prejudices) each vying for attention. Thus, social media is 
contrary to Gadamer’s notion of a shared horizon and a common understanding, or common 
sense, of which a jury can be representative.  
The question arises then, whether the jury is representative, not of a community common 
sense but of a dissonance of individual predispositions. If it is, the courtroom is not a 
conversation forum in which to resolve those dissonances. In fact, numinous space, 
procedural rituals, and institutionalized traditions contribute to an acknowledgment of 
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‘authority’ and an acceptance of ‘methodological discipline as the touchstone of reason, and 
the safeguard against judgmental error. According to Andrew Halpin, we like it that way. 
Even if sceptics question how detached the legal viewpoint can be, and the legal viewpoint is seen as 
one chosen to favour a particular way of life or vision of society, nevertheless the sense that the legal 
viewpoint offers a coherent or principled approach to resolving the conflicting interests within society 
is somehow reassuring.
448 
It might be reassuring in its promotion of certainty, but it has other consequences. The 
difficulty arises because agreement is attainable when facts are self-evident, such as in 
putative normal science. However, in courtroom testimony, what the witness puts forward as 
fact can be in dispute and, therefore, argumentation is inevitable—and necessary. Here is the 
site of the contest between facts and values—a potential conflict between the rational and the 




Earlier, I have discussed how conversation to reach an understanding differs from question 
and answer to reach a desired goal. Conversation to reach an understanding favours a 
partnership in search of meaning, a meaning that participants will share from that point on. 
On the other hand, argument through question and answer, favours selective questioning to 
draw a conclusion from competing premises, which helps to confirm the thesis that the 
questioner propounds. If substantive truth were the goal, counsel would engage witnesses as 
partners to a conversation, which reveals the unmediated reality. Thus, courtroom advocacy 
is the antithesis of Gadamer’s notion of conversation that reveals the truth contained within it.  
                                                 
448
 Halpin, above n 15, 168 
449
 Tindale, above n 432, 137  
151 
Moving beyond formal Language competence to the horizon of hermeneutic 
understanding 
On the face of it, there is incongruity in Gadamer’s discussion of the oral nature of 
conversation to the point of an understanding. It arises because, in the first line of his 
Introduction to Truth and method, Gadamer writes, ‘[t]hese studies are concerned with the 
problem of hermeneutics,’ which he identifies historically as a methodological approach to 
the understanding and interpretation of texts.
450
 However, he asserts also that the problem of
hermeneutics goes beyond the limits that the concept of method sets to modern science. ‘The 
understanding and the interpretation of texts is not merely a concern of science, but is 
obviously part of the total human experience of the world.’
451
 And, as Mootz clarifies, in this
broader understanding, language is ‘the intersubjective medium of all hermeneutical 
experience.’
452
 Furthermore, an understanding is inter-subjective when two or more minds
can access it subjectively. Therefore, Gadamer claims that, in this circumstance, 
‘understanding’ is always ‘interpretive.’
453
However, the hermeneutic interplay clearly is not the same in a conversation, which takes 
place between two people, as the interplay in a “conversation,” which a person has with a 
text. This is because the text can ‘speak’ only through the other participant as interpreter in 
the conversation. Mootz explains that when interpreting the text, ‘the interpreter’s horizon is 
decisive,’ but not as a hard and fast viewpoint that they will try to enforce. The interpreter 
willingly puts it forward and ‘at risk,’ and only as a ‘possibility.’
454
 This willingness to
assume risk, Mootz explains, is part of what Gadamer sees as the give-and-take of everyday 
conversation. ‘Beginning with the observation that "the more genuine a conversation is, the 
less its conduct lies within the will of either partner," he argues that the understanding 
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emerging from a conversation is "like an event that happens to us.”’
455
 That “event” helps 
‘truly to make one's own what the text says.’
456
 To appreciate fully the point Mootz makes, it 
is useful to consider Gadamer’s discussion of the unity between language and tradition, that 
is to say, language as experience of the world. I analyse the nature of this unity in the 
following section. 
3 Developing attitude, and relationship to the world through the living act of 
speech 
Gadamer builds on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s claim that if one is to learn a foreign language, 
one must acquire a new view of the world that differs from one’s own view. However, we 
cannot do this in ‘a pure and perfect way’ because we ‘always’ impose our own worldview—
sometimes totally—on the acquisition of a new view. 
457
 To the linguist, this is weakness 
because, in imposing one’s worldview, one also imposes one’s view of language. For 
instance, Gadamer claims that when teachers use foreign works of literature to help one learn 
that foreign language, the literary tradition is ‘killed in the process.’
458
 
Gadamer’s point is that if we want to learn the nature of the worldview by using the language 
in which it is represented, we cannot approach it with the dogmatism of a grammarian. He 
contends, ‘[i]t is not the learning of a foreign language as such, but its use, whether in 
conversation with its speakers or in the study of its literature, that gives one a new standpoint 
in regard to the view of the world one had held hitherto.’
459
 He draws his conclusion from the 
insights of Humboldt, who stresses that ‘language was human from its very beginning.’ As 
Humboldt sees it, 
Language, indeed, arises from a depth of human nature which everywhere forbids us to regard it as a 
true product and creation of peoples. It possesses an autonomy that visibly declares itself to us, though 
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inexplicable in its nature, and, seen from this aspect, is no production of activity, but an involuntary 
emanation of the mind, no work of nations, but a gift fallen to them by their inner destiny. They make 
use of it without knowing how they have fashioned it.
460
 
In other words, language is not merely something humankind possesses in this world; rather, 
‘on it depends the fact that man has a world at all.’
461
 This means, that if we are to understand
this other world, which is ‘not only strange, but also different in its relations,’
462
 we need
more than an objective relationship to the language. We have to seek this world’s own truth 
that lies within it, because this also is its truth for us.  
[T]o have learned a foreign language and to be able to understand it…means nothing else than to be in
a position to accept what it says as said to oneself. The exercise of this capacity for understanding 
always means that what is said has a claim over one, and this is impossible if one’s own “view of the 
world and of language”’ is  not also involved.
463
 
Gadamer explains the ‘living act of speech’ as the essence of language. One develops a 
‘particular attitude and relationship to the world’
464
 through language. One develops it
through being a member of a linguistic community. Therefore, he emphasizes, language can 
only exhibit its ‘true being’ in conversation, in the understanding between people.’ That 
means language is not just a communicating tool, ‘it is a living process’ through which a 
community lives out its life.
465
Thus, the world is the common ground, trodden by none and recognized by all, uniting all who speak 
with one another. All forms of human community are forms of linguistic community: even more, they 
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154 
constitute language. For language in its nature, is the language of conversation, but it acquires its 
reality only in the process of communicating. That is why it is not a mere means of communication.
466
Hence, Gadamer’s claim that the truth already resides in the conversation. The conversation 
partners merely explore until they reveal it, which shows the importance of a shared—and 
extended—horizon.  
The human world is a linguistically constituted world. 
Gadamer’s assertion that language is a living process, not just a communicating tool, is 
relevant to our consideration of the adversarial trial before a jury, because we live in a 
linguistic world. Moreover, we live in a particular linguistic tradition that is synonymous with 
its culture, which means that one will see the “world” in a way that differs from the “world” 
as another culture sees it. But, this does not constitute a barrier, or, more pertinently, it should 
not constitute a barrier. Knowledge can and should “be” in itself. It can and should increase 
and enhance our insight. No matter which tradition one inhabits, it is, as Gadamer explains, a 
human world, which means a ‘linguistically constituted’ world.
467
 But, the different ways of
seeing the world are not relative views ‘in the sense that one could set them against the 
“world in itself”, as if the right view from some possible position outside the human, 
linguistic world, could discover it in its being-in-itself.’
468
 However, the nature of the
adversarial trial before jury, and the conventions we apply to the formulation of its rules, are 
implicitly trying to establish just such a world, through discursive manipulation. To do this 
requires that the adversarial trial rules must avoid genuine conversation. And, without 
genuine conversation, there is no willingness to put one’s horizon at risk in order to uncover 








The adversary trial must avoid genuine conversation 
According to James Boyd White, ‘All languages threaten to take over the mind and to control 
its operation, with all this implies for one’s feelings, for one’s sense of self, and for the 
possibilities of meaning in one’s actions and relations. The art of speech, all expression, thus 
lies in learning to qualify a language while we use it: in finding ways to recognize its 
omissions, its distortions, its false claims and pretensions, ways to acknowledge other modes 
of speaking that qualify or undercut it.’
469
 White makes clear, it is in the orality of language,
and, I suggest, in its use with others in genuine conversation—that is, in partnership with 
another, as distinct from participation with another—that we can explore and resolve 
omissions, distortions, false claims, and pretensions. The orality of the adversarial trial, 
however, does not give way to genuine conversation. It subjugates it. 
In the following excerpt from a transcript of trial before judge alone, Diana Eades shows how 
what seems to be a conversation between counsel and an Aboriginal witness is not the 
genuine conversation that Gadamer requires for the partners to it to reach an understanding. 
The witness is Aboriginal.  
Counsel:  So the only time when you’ve seen him take the medication is once in the last year? 
Witness:  Yes, that’s right 
Counsel: And surely the family would have been concerned – must have been concerned to 
make sure that he take his tablets to prevent him getting ill? [My emphases] 
Witness: Well for that question I would say the family knew he was sick in the head and from 
my experience living in the one house, know him very well, the way he get sick in 
the head, we could wait for the right time and just cool ourself and just go politely 
to ask him if he wants a tablet or not. 
Counsel:  And if he didn’t take them, you just let him get sick in the head? 
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Witness:      Yes. If he didn’t want to take it he could just walk away. 




To anyone sharing the same cultural traditions as Counsel, the family seems unperturbed 
about the welfare of their relative. Moreover, Counsel has implied that they must share 
responsibility for him getting ‘sick in the head.’ Whether it is a deliberate tactic, or a 
misunderstanding of cultural differences, this cross-examination questions the family’s 
creditability. An alternative construction is that, by not trying to force their family member to 
take the medication, the family acknowledges his individual right to decide for himself. In the 
family’s culture, it is a sign of respect. To those sharing the cultural code that Counsel 
assumes is universal, and applying that code to the Wittgenstein ‘game,’ it is a sign of 
unsympathetic disregard.  
The courtroom transcript, from which I have drawn that conclusion, cannot show intonations, 
or identify spoken emphases. However, if one shares a cultural code with Counsel, one more 
than likely would  infer from the transcript that oral emphases fell on the words ‘surely’ and 
‘must’ in Counsel’s second question, to create a sense of incredulity that the family could 
have felt no sympathy. In other words, the exchange is not a genuine conversation in which 
one puts forward their horizon, ‘at risk,’ and as a ‘possibility only;’ it is as linguistic 
organization towards a desired outcome. Counsel is framing the discourse on an assumption 
that the final decision maker—whether that is judge alone, or jury—will share the same 
cultural code. How each interprets and assigns meaning to a narrative will depend on the 
understanding of the world they bring to it.  
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4. Rhetor and hearer assign meaning according to their own understanding of 
the world. 
In this section, I draw on the thoughts of Martin Heidegger
471
 to analyse how both rhetor and 
hearer bring their own understanding of the world to interpreting and assigning meaning to 
texts. This is where the philosopher’s search for absolute truth and the rhetor’s pragmatic 
focus on action can clash.  
Heidegger asserts that understanding does not come from interpretation. On the contrary, he 
claims that in interpretation, understanding becomes itself. He means that interpretation does 
not lead to the acquisition of information. It is the ‘working-out of possibilities projected in 
understanding,’
472
 which means possibilities within the ambit of our understanding of the 
world, as we perceive it. We consummate our perception when one ‘addresses oneself to 
something as something and discusses it as such (emphases in the original).
473
 This is what he 
calls interpretation ‘in the broadest sense.’ That act of interpretation makes one’s perception 
determinate.  
What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and 
preserved as what has been asserted. This perceptive retention of an assertion about something is itself 
a way of being-in-the-world; it is not to be Interpreted [capitalised in the original] as a “procedure” by 
which a subject provides itself with representations...of something which remain stored up “inside” as 
having been thus appropriated, and with regard to which the question of how they “agree” with 
actuality can occasionally arise.
474
 
He explains how interpretation can take two forms. He uses the German term Auslegung to 
cover any action through which one will ‘interpret something “as” something.’
475
 Auslegung 
translates into English as interpretation (lower case). However, he differentiates that from 
Interpretation (Upper case), which applies to ‘more theoretical or systematic’ processes, such 
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as the exegesis of a text.
476
 Heidegger is saying that we interpret by applying a value to the 
thing interpreted that reflects our understanding of the world. What he emphasises is that 
whenever we interpret an entity, we ground our interpretive act in a perception we have 
already made determinate because of the way we see our world. It is something we have in 
advance—in a fore-having [Italics in original].
477
 
I perceive Heidegger’s notion of having an understanding in advance, not as foresight (or 
fore-conception, which is what he calls it), but as preconception. In English, one thinks of 
foresight as foreknowledge, insight, or even wisdom. Preconception, on the other hand, one 
thinks of as predetermination, presumption, or prejudice, which—in his terms—we have 
made determinate. ‘This fore-sight “takes the first cut” out of what has been taken into our 
fore-having, and it does so with a view to a definite way in which this can be interpreted.’
478
 
In other words, this “fore-sight” sets the pattern for how to understand the totality of the 
entity from that point on. 
In such an interpretation, the way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be conceived can be 
drawn from the entity itself, or the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is 
opposed in its manner of Being [capitalised in the original]. In either case, the interpretation has 
already decided for a definite way of conceiving it, either with finality or with reservations; it is 
grounded in something we grasp in advance—in a fore-conception [Italics in original].
479
  
Heidegger describes the Being [capitalized] as fundamental to every inquiry, and stresses the 
‘necessity for explicitly restating the question of being.’
480
 Yet, he states that at the beginning 
of this investigation, ‘it is not possible to give a detailed account of the presuppositions, and 
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It suffices for my discussion that we understand that the Being of an entity, as Heidegger 
views it, is not itself an entity. In other words, we do not get the answer to what Being is in 
this context by tracing entity back to its origins in some other entities. Rather, if our inquiry is 
about the entity’s Being in the world, it is the entity itself that one interrogates. Thus, one 
must have ‘obtained and secured in advance’ the correct way of gaining access to the entity. 
Heidegger maintains that everything we talk about, everything ‘to which we comport 
ourselves in any way, is being [sic]; what we are is being [sic], and so is how we are.’
482
  And 
what we are, as entity, he labels Dasein. 
Dasein: the peculiarly human experience of being 
Simply put, Dasein is the peculiarly human experience of being. It involves being aware of 
one’s own existentialism, or chosen way of living, one’s own morality and the potential 
paradoxes of negotiating one’s own moral stance with regard to others, whilst, nevertheless 
accepting that one is alone in their Being. 
Looking at something, understanding, and conceiving it, choosing, and access to it— all these ways of 
behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities 
which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must 
make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being…. This entity which each of us is himself 
and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote “Dasein.” If we 
are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an 
entity (Dasein), with regard to its being. [All capitalisations in the original].
 483
  
Now, here is the crux of Heidegger’s explanation as it pertains to the jury trial rhetor. If we 
apply it to courtroom discourse, the possibility of circularity arises in that the inquirer as 
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Being needs to frame their inquiry to elicit the entity as Being as of the world of the inquirer. 
However, Heidegger argues there is no circular reasoning, only a ‘remarkable “relatedness 
backward or forward” which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a 
mode of Being of an entity [All capitalisations in the original].’
484
  
If the aim of this presupposition of Being is merely ‘taking a look beforehand’ to facilitate the 
entity’s provisional articulation in their Being; this ‘guiding activity of taking a look at 
Being’ beforehand is sufficiently explanatory. However, if we were to presume that the aim 
of the inquirer primarily is to frame that question to ensure an answer that is compatible with 
Dasein, then every question becomes a leading question. In other words, in identifying the 
object of interrogation, the matter of Being thus requires that the inquirer determines in 
advance the ‘right way of access to entities’ if it is to fit into the inquirer’s world, because 
whatever we talk about is being, ‘and so is how we are.’
485
  
If both what we are, and how we are is Being, we need to consider Alisdair MacIntyre’s 
claim that the expectations we bring to any new experience stem from our cultural way of 
being,
 
‘an amalgam of our past social and cultural fragments,’
486
which means culture that 
conforms to Gadamer’s Bildung. Geoffrey Hazard makes a similar claim. We do not come to 
a new experience neutrally. We have an already-formulated moral standpoint, ‘a relatively 
coherent set of ideals, commitments and expectations.’
487
 These coherent ideals are at the 
heart of the purported community common sense, which the juror brings to their task, an 
important consideration to which I return in Chapter Five. However, they are also at the heart 
of Counsel’s view of morality, or—which is just as relevant for the task of persuading—what 
Counsel thinks are the moral values of the jurors, or even of a judge sitting alone. Recall 
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Counsel’s accusatory comment in Eades’ example, ‘And if he didn’t take them, you just let 
him get sick in the head?’
488
Hazard acknowledges that, in a ‘single community’—which I take to mean a community 
whose common language informs its culture—the expression of these ideals is simpler. 
Therefore, in Heidegger’s terms, that fact of Being is going to ‘shape the kind of questions 
that we ask, and, in a sense, determine what we are able to discover.’
489
 We understand the
‘ready-to-hand’ by a ‘totality of involvement’ that we do not need to grasp through thematic 
interpretation. He means by ready-to-hand something we use to achieve something else 
without the need for further theorising. That is, we operate as a Being who already 
understands. He states, 
As the appropriation of understanding, the interpretation operates in Being towards a totality of 
involvements which is already understood—a Being which understands. When something is 
understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation, and this is always done 
under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be 
interpreted. In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance—in a fore-sight.
490
 
This is an important point when considering how an individual might interpret an 
experience—be it a text or an observation of a new event—from a standpoint of fore-
structured, or pre-suppositional, reality. As I explain in the next section, Heidegger is saying 
that ‘in every case,’ interpretation operates in this fore-structure.  
Foresight is not neutral. 
Ready-to-hand differs from present-at-hand
491
 (that is, unreadiness-to-hand) in which one
adopts a scientific approach of observing something without preconceptions. It is a neutral 
attitude. The observer looks at the thing—or concept—only as it presents itself so that they 
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might hypothesize. However, the neutral mindset is elusive. The ready-to-hand gets in the 
way.  
In our dealings with the world of our concern, the un-ready-to hand can be encountered…as 
something…which stands in the way of our concern. That to which our concern refuses to turn, that for 
which it has ‘no time’, is something un-ready-to hand in the manner of what does not belong here, of 
what has not yet been attended to. Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing to us, 
and enables us to see the obstinacy of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance 
before we can do anything else. With this obstinacy, the presence-at-hand of the ready-to-hand makes 
itself known in a new way as the Being of that which still lies before us and calls for our attending to it
.
 
(Emphases in the original).
 492
 
Heidegger, too, advances the similar notion that interpretation is never a ‘presuppositionless 
apprehending’
493
of something we approach to understand. ‘If, when one is engaged in a 
particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual Interpretation, one likes 
to appeal [beruft] to what “stands there”, then one finds that what “stands there” in the first 
instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption [Vormeinung] of the 
person who does the interpreting.’
494
   
That is to say, we take for granted (“gesetzt”) any aspect of understanding that we have 
already resolved to our satisfaction in our ‘fore-having, our fore-sight, and our fore-
conception.’
495
 Thus, what our interpretation is revealing is not new knowledge, but the 
possibilities that exist within the entity, the character of which corresponds to the ‘kind of 
Being of the entity which is understood.’
496
 In other words, Heidegger contends that all 
interpretation operates in the fore-structure. In Heidegger’s use, fore-structure means reality 
that stems from the individual’s experience of everyday living. This allows the observer to 
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interpret external occurrences in a preliminary way. So, for interpretation to contribute to 
understanding, it must already have ‘understood what is to be interpreted.’ 
497
 
Criminal courtroom discourse is not a search for scientific knowledge 
Heidegger’s contention helps us to understand the formulation of discourse, and the types of 
questions that counsel pose. Criminal Courtroom discourse is not a search for scientific 
knowledge. Heidegger argues—as do Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
498
—that such 
knowledge demands rigorous demonstration to support it. One cannot presuppose the proof 
for which science searches to support its hypotheses. Therefore, it is not interpretation. But, 
how can interpretation, which must operate within the bounds of what is already understood, 
‘bring any scientific results to maturity’ without moving in a vicious circle (‘circulus 
vitiosus’) especially if the presupposed understanding still functions within ‘our common 
information about man and the world?’
499
 
Recall, for example, the shadow attorney general (a former lawyer) to whom I referred 
earlier,
500
 trying to justify his unstacking of a jury, which—he implied—random selection has 
stacked, by applying such presupposed understanding. 
I have mentioned before that I would also use the peremptory challenge very occasionally, not to 
gender stack a jury, but quite the opposite, because I think it is the height of arrogance for any lawyer 
to see someone coming forward and determine that he will not be able to talk to or relate to that 
person.... However, I always thought it was important as counsel, if there was a predominance of men 
on the jury, to use my challenges to ensure there were some women on the jury, or vice versa, or to try 




                                                 
497
 Ibid 194 
498
 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, above n 12, 1 
499
 Heidegger, above n 239, 194 
500
 Western Australia, Parliamentary debates, Assembly, Thursday, 24 February 2011 
501
 Ibid  p1107-1118 (Mr J.R. Quigley (Mindarie)) 





 But, his use of the peremptory challenge relies on intuition, and on an assumption that 
women and men will process the evidence differently. He has tried to persuade parliament 
that his practice of unstacking the jury stemmed from knowledge gained through experience. 
It does nothing more than suggest that, in all his appearances as counsel, he has relied on 
cultural predeterminations, the point Heidegger makes.   
Heidegger argues that, because we have enclosed our understanding of what we are 
interpreting in this circle of common knowledge about our world, the fact already exists. 
Therefore, in seeking possibilities for appropriation of these facts, how we interpret must 
depend on our point of view as observer. He maintains, 
If the basic conditions which make interpretation possible are to be fulfilled, this must rather be done 
by not failing to recognize beforehand the essential conditions under which it can be performed. What 
is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it the right way. This circle of understanding is 
not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential 
fore-structure of Dasein itself. 
502
 
According to Heidegger, there is a positive possibility of ‘the most primordial kind of 
knowing’ hidden in the circle. However, we ‘genuinely’ only grasp this possibility in our 
interpretation when we acknowledge that our ‘constant task’ is not to allow ‘fancies and 
popular conceptions’ to influence our ‘fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conceptions. What 
we must do for authentic understanding is to see these fore-structures in terms of the things 
themselves. In other words, we must secure them scientifically.  
However, the very notion of Dasein confounds in principle the rigour of ‘exact sciences,’
 503
 
because, unlike the natural sciences, human sciences relate to one’s own self-understanding’. 
It exists, but in our reality.
504
 In this respect, I understand Heidegger’s “primordial” as being 
synonymous with truth or authenticity. In other words, it relates to the essence of Being. It is 
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in its everydayness the essential nature of Being; it needs no further interrogation. So, the 
authentic understanding already exists, but Heidegger implicitly promotes the importance of 
openness to uncover it. This means openness to experience, and to alternative possibilities. It 
means, then, openness to others. It has that in common with Gadamer’s notion of shared 
horizon, that is, a shared history. 
In this way, as I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, Gadamer’s shared horizons and 
Heideggger’s Being-in-something have in common a need for an existentiale. This, as I have 
argued earlier, is a state of mind beyond corporeality. And, beyond grammar. Nor is “being-
in” connected with spatiality in the sense of a physical relationship to something. It signifies 
familiarity with, or some state of, being with which one is comfortable. In other words, it is a 
pervasive mood that comes from familiarity with the Being, and which permeates all one’s 
encounters with the world.  
What one’s state of being means to understanding and interpretation 
Fore-having, as Heidegger, uses the term, prescribes a dominant mood of Being. It acquires 
its dominance—its concreteness—from one’s basic experience. The time and place in which 
one is thrust into their world determines the possibilities that are open to one. For instance, 
travel into space is a possibility today. It has not always been so. This is an overly optimistic 
illustration that determinate possibilities are technological. But, they are also socio-economic, 
political, and cultural. Moreover, Heidegger reminds us, in the world into which we have 
entered, language determines how we understand it. Dasein means Being-in-the-world, but 
‘Dasein as discursive Being-in, has already expressed itself. Dasein has language.’
505
  
But, he posits an articulation that is beyond, and before, the sentence. For him, the doctrine of 
signification ‘is rooted in the ontology of Dasein,’
506
 specifically, in Dasein’s existentialia. 
Existentiale as Heidegger relates it to Dasein differs from the average concrete or definite 
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way of existing. The ‘average everydayness’ of Dasein constitutes characteristics that are not 
just “categories.”
507
 Fundamentally, in the ‘Being-in-the-world’, they are states of mind and
understanding. What is more, when one understands, one harbours the possibility of 
interpreting that, which is now understood.
508
Heidegger turns to the Greeks to show what he means by reaching an understanding. He 
explains that, in discourse terms, they did not found grammar in language. In fact, they had 
no word for language. Nevertheless, ‘their everyday existing was largely diverted into talking 
with one another.’
509
 He describes ‘man’ as the entity, which talks, but he is not referring to
the capacity to create a ‘vocal utterance,’ but as ‘the entity which is such as to discover the 
world and Dasein itself… They understood this phenomenon “in the first instance” as 
discourse.’
510
 Thus, grammar ‘sought its foundations in the “logic” of this logos’ (Emphasis
in the original).
511
I take it that, in his application of logos, Heidegger is talking about the principles of order of 
speech, reason, and with a focus on discourse. However, he also argues that grammar sought 
its foundations in the logic of science, from which, he asserts, we must ‘liberate’ it.
512
 He
goes further. He maintains that, since ancient times, assertion is the ‘primary and authentic 
“locus” of truth (his emphasis).’
513
 The difficulty, however, is that he posits truth as
‘problematic,’ and we can only resolve it through analysing the structure of assertion.  
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5 The structure of assertion as communication 
Heidegger’s three significations of the structure of assertion 
To assert something in English language is to proclaim something as if one holds the truth of 
the assertion to be self-evident. Synonyms include words like “declare,” “emphasize,” “insist 
on.” An assertion is suggestive of a self-evident truth. But, in this use, one does not assert 
truth as a possibility for mutual exploration of its validity. An agonist might rebut it, 
certainly. But, it is imperious rather than an invitation to discuss. That is, it does not invite—
it does not welcome—a contrary point of view. We saw this in my illustrative case study. 
Heidegger, however, moves beyond language and its grammar. He identifies assertion as 
structure that encompasses three significations. He identifies these as ‘pointing out,' 
‘predication,’ and ‘communication.’ They are, he explains, ‘drawn from the phenomenon 
which is thus designated, they are connected among themselves, and in their unity they 
encompass the full structure of assertion.’ 
514
 I now examine these significations in more 
detail. 
‘Pointing out,’ the starting point for determining entity as more than an objectified 
self 
The first signification he defines as ‘pointing out,’ by which he means we adhere to a 
primordial identity of the entity as itself. In that signification, the entity is a ready-to-hand. It 
is not ‘merely represented.’ Nor is it the ‘psychical condition in which the person who makes 
the assertion “represents” it.’
515
 To explain adequately the significance and limits of 
Heidegger’s ‘pointing out’ to my thesis, I must refer back to my “Introduction” to this thesis, 
where I noted that standard accounts of language do not explain adequately the nature of 
courtroom discourse in criminal trials before a jury. This is because the rules of evidence 
discourage consideration of the social relations of language to the world it represents. The 
court demands that discursive organization reveals the “what,” “when,’” and “how” of 










witness testimony. It should not speculate on the “why.” But, as I elaborate later in this 
section, it is when we understand why the witness acted, that we understand that a person 
exists in performance. In other words, we need to understand that it is the person with a 
psychical attribute that gives them a transcendent presence beyond the physical act. This is 
substantive truth, which rises beyond legal truth.  
One can see that Counsel’s adjacency pair—the chain maxim—method of distilling putative 
true facts from witness testimony tries to remove the psychical condition (that is, of a person 
transcendent as to experience) because of a view that this mediates truth. A contrary 
viewpoint, however, is that, for instance, in my case study, the act of witness crossing the 
road falls short of revealing substantive truth if we do not understand why he did so. 
Heidegger helps us understand why. 
Heidegger challenges the notion that in any ‘serious and scientifically-minded “philosophy of 
life,” (this expression says about as much as “the botany of plants”) there lies an unexpressed 
tendency towards and understanding of Dasein’s Being.’
516
 The problem with this approach, 
he points out, is that life itself ‘as a kind of Being does not become ontologically a 
problem.’
517
 By dismissing the phenomenal content of life ontologically, we do not have to 
consider the ‘reification of consciousness,’ nor talk about the soul, the consciousness, or the 
spirit of the person. We think merely of ‘the unreified Being of the subject, without 
orientating our thinking to the ‘psychical elements and atoms,’ or trying to ‘piece the life of 
the soul together.’
518
 This means understanding ‘life as a whole,’ which, I take to mean 
accepting the everydayness of Dasein as our starting point. 
He cites Max Scheler’s viewpoint of a person as ‘never to be thought of as a Thing or 
substance; the person “is rather the unity of living-through [Er-lebens] which is immediately 
experienced in and with our experiences—not a Thing merely thought of behind and outside 
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what is immediately experienced” (Italics and capitalisation in the original).’
519
 The essential 
element of this explanation is how its emphasis is on the fact that a person is not a ‘Thing,’ 
nor a substance or an object. A person has a ‘Constitution’ that differs essentially from that 
unity of ‘Things of Nature.’
520
 However, Scheler adds an important rider to his explanation. 
He states, nor is an act an object. The very Being of acts requires that they “are Experienced 
[Capitalisation in the original] only in their performance itself and given in reflection.”
521
 
They have no psychical condition.  
Essentially the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not 
an object. Any psychical Objectification of acts, and hence any way of taking them as something 
psychical, is tantamount to depersonalisation. A person is in any case given as a performer of 
intentional acts which are bound together by the unity of meaning. Thus psychical Being has nothing to 
do with personal Being. Acts get performed; the person is a performer of acts’ (Emphasis and 
capitalisation in the original).
522
 
This leads Heidegger to the question, ‘What…is the ontological meaning of “performance”? 
How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained ontologically in a 
positive way?’ The answer goes to the unity of the body, soul, and spirit. ‘But,’ Heidegger 
explains, ‘What stands in the way of the basic question of Dasein’s Being (or leads it off 
track) is an orientation thoroughly coloured by the anthropology of Christianity and the 
ancient world, whose inadequate ontological foundations have been overlooked by the 
philosophy of life and by personalism.’
523
 
The Christian definition in modern times has cast off its Christian theology, but, as Heidegger 
points out, ‘the idea of “transcendence”—that man is something that reaches beyond 
himself—is rooted in Christian dogmatics, which can hardly be said to have made an 
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ontological problem of man’s Being. The idea of transcendence, according to which man is 
more than a mere something endowed with intelligence, has worked itself out with different 
variations.’
524
 Christian dogmatics versus personalism rooted in a declaration of ‘man’s 
autonomy, values, and reality show something of the nature of those variations, but they need 
not concern us here. As the Christian Bible tells us, “sufficient unto the day is the evil 
thereof.” 
If I apply the notion of sufficiency to my case study, I do not need to delve into an 
ontological exploration of the unity of body, soul, and spirit. I only need to accept that a 
person is something more than an objectified self, that a person exists in the performance of 
intentional acts. So, when Scheler argues acts require that they are experienced only in the 
performance itself and given in reflection, he is claiming that they are bound together by a 
unity of meaning.  
Thus, in my case study, when Witness heard screams, and crossed the road because he heard 
them, the action was not instinctive, even if it seemed on reflection to have been. The 
stimulus-response—Screamcross the road—is not involuntary. It is the act of ‘man…that 
reaches beyond himself.’ It is “man” transcendent. Whether it is a result of values rooted in 
Christian dogmatics, or in personalism is contemplation for another day. What is relevant is 
that, contrary to what Defence asserted (in the English language sense), the integrity of 
Witness’ Act is bound up in the unity of meaning occasioned by transcendent witness 
performing the act. The meaning of the act of crossing the road is incomplete without 
acknowledging the transcendence that triggered it. At this point of the first signification, 
pointing out, we go no further than identifying “Witness” as entity. However, in testimony, 
when counsel established that “Witness crossed the road,” this is at the point of the second 
signification. 
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‘Predication,’ adding a definite character to entity 
The second signification is ‘predication.’ In this signification, the articulator still puts 
forward the entity itself as the assertion. However, in adding a predicate, the articulator has 
now narrowed the content of the assertion put forward in the first signification, by adding a 
definite character to it. Heidegger uses as example the assertion, ‘the hammer is too heavy.’ It 
is still a “pointing out” and, therefore, is founded on the first predication. However, when we 
give something a definite character, as in Heidegger’s second signification, we do not 
discover the entity as itself for the first time. But, when we give it this definite character, ‘our 
seeing gets restricted to it in the first instance, so that by the explicit restriction of our view, 
that which is already manifest may be made explicitly manifest in its definite character’ 
(emphasis in the original).
525
 So, we arrive at the truth by—in Heidegger’s words—‘dimming 
entities down’ to focus first on the subject (the hammer in his example) to which we can now 
determine the manifestation of the definite character (too heavy). 
‘Setting down the subject, setting down the predicate, and setting down the two together, are 
thoroughly “apophantical” in the strict sense of the word.’
526
 Apophantic judgments are 
sometimes seen as reliable ways of obtaining the truth, because they do not rely on subjective 
comparisons. That is, there is no attempt to compare putative true and false entities. The truth 
is seen to reside in the entities itself. Thus, Heidegger makes his point about resolving the 
problematic of truth (his emphasis) by avoiding subjectivity, which accompanies comparative 
assessment. In my case study, “Witness” as subject, and “crossed the road” as predicate adds 
definite character to the assertion. We now need to engage with the first and second 
significations by communicating what we see, which leads into the third signification. 
‘Communication,’ sharing with an ‘other’ the definite character of entity 
The third signification is assertion as communication. ‘Speaking forth, which is to say, 
communicating, means engaging with the first and second significations by pointing out to 
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someone what we see by giving the “what we see” a definite character also. The significant 
point of Heidegger’s description of this phenomenon is that assertion shares with the ‘Other’ 
with whom one is communicating the entity’s definite character. Sharing is the way in which 
one avoids subjectivity. It is to reach a truth that both will then have in common. However, 
what both now see in common comes from an existential understanding. It is an 
understanding before language, before the sentence. This existentiality suggests the fusion of 
horizons stemming from a shared history. In the same way Gadamer explains prejudice as a 
starting point from which the fused horizon of those in conversation moves and moulds into a 
viewpoint in common, so does Heidegger require that ‘any assertion, as a communication 
understood in this manner, must have been expressed.’
527
 He emphasizes sharing. ‘That 
which is “shared” is our being towards what has been pointed out—a Being in which we see 
it in common (Emphasis in the original).’
528
 Being towards is Heidegger’s way of explaining 
a particular foresight that guides Dasein towards authenticity of viewpoint. In fact, he asserts 
specifically that ‘Being-towards is Being-in-the-world, and that from out of this very world 
what has been pointed out gets encountered.’
529
  
This is where mediated testimony, through the adjacency pair method of presenting it, 
confounds the notion of a fused horizon and a shared history. 
Defence: He heard screams. What they suggested to him is – it-it – 
irrelevant…immaterial 
Judge: Yes 
Sharing to reach a truth which they now share in common is not what either counsel has in 
mind. Moreover, they are both at pains to ensure that the jury does not share in the truth: 
Defence: Anyway, he’s not allowed to say it. 












The rules of evidence prevent it. 
Judge: That’s right.  
Only in their unity do “Pointing out,” “Predication,” and “Communication” comprise the full 
structure of assertion as communication. 
To sum up, I have submitted that we are concerned with attitudes towards things in the world. 
These attitudes are primordial to, or more basic than, the sciences used to explain worldly 
manifestations. Science, aims for neutrality in its investigation, which in itself is an attitude. 
But, in our being-in-the-world, Dasein—or being-in-the world—has a pervasive mood that 
determines how we see things. It is beyond grammar. For Heidegger, and for Gadamer, there 
is no clear-cut split between subject and object.  
Heidegger emphasizes the need to understand the basic structure of discourse as an 
existentiale, and that the ‘existential foundation of language is discourse or talk.’
530
 
Moreover, discourse does not derive from grammar; grammar derives from talk. Therefore, if 
one wants to examine discourse as assertion, one cannot do this by ‘improving’ on that basic 
stock of significations that have been ‘handed down.’ One must start by searching out the 
basic forms in which anything understandable can be articulated. So, we start with 
significations, and we must not confine articulation ‘to entities within-the-world which we 
cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences.’
531
 In other 
words, Heidegger, too, is arguing that a standard account of language, which we express in 
sentences, is inadequate. Discourse is before language. It is ‘equiprimordial’ with 
understanding and with state-of-mind. That is to say, they are equally fundamental. 
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The key point I have made in this chapter is that the standard accounts of language do not 
explain adequately the nature of courtroom discourse in criminal trials before a jury. This 
means that one cannot understand how discourse truly represents the worldview of 
protagonists in any trial by analysing it from the formalist viewpoint of the grammarian. Yet, 
when one applies this viewpoint to adjacency pair interaction—which is governed by the 
chain maxim that is preoccupied with rules—this is what one does. The rules of evidence 
almost ensure this outcome. They encourage the reduction of testimony to its essential 
language, but discourage contemplation of the social relations of language with the world it 
purports to represent. Twining calls the process deconstruction. But, I suggest it is not. 
Because deconstruction requires that one recognize the inherent instability of the process that 
diverse receivers bring to determining the meaning of a text. The courts demand of discursive 
organization in criminal trials only that it reveals the what, when, and how of any action, but 
that it avoids apparent speculation on the why.  
Yet, without the “why,” there is no meaning in action. Gadamer clarifies that apparent 
enigma. There is no objective right view of world that exists outside the human linguistic 
world. And, the linguistic tradition that shapes that world is of its culture, which means that 
one culture will see the world in a way that differs from the way another culture will see it. 
Each culture’s view is limited to its particular horizon, but the knowledge of that world exists 
as an entity itself. So, to get to truth, which resides in that knowledge, each protagonist has to 
be willing to risk the certitude of their horizon’s authenticity to get to that truth, and, thereby, 
to get to an understanding of it. But, Gadamer asserts, the protagonists can only do that as 
partners in conversation. They willingly share—and risk—their horizons to find the truth. 
Only as partners in conversation, not as opponents in conflict, can they avoid the discursive 
manipulation that omits, distorts, and claims falsely. Only in genuine conversation can 
partners meet at that shared horizon. But, as I have discussed, the oral adversarial trial does 
not embrace genuine conversation, it suppresses it. 





When we search for the truth in the “why,” rather than stop our search at the “what, when, 
and how,” we then understand that a person exists in performance. So, in testimony we need 
the person as entity with a psychical attribute that gives them a transcendent presence only in 
performance of intentional acts. Thus, we need to see communicating as a means of pointing 
out that what we see has a definite character. This is sharing with an “other” through which, 
in genuine conversation, we can avoid subjectivity. Only then can we have a truth that both 
participants share—a substantive truth. Only then can we bring a “common” sense to bear. 
I began my discussion in this chapter by putting forward something of a strawman argument. 
Know the predispositions that a jury brings to decision making, and play to it. Manipulate 
discourse to persuade a jury, as a particular audience, that the case narratives counsel is 
building would convince a universal audience. As I revealed the fragility of the strawman, my 
focus has been on language; I argued that standard accounts of language do not explain 
adequately the nature of discourse. I included in my discussion a caution that perception of 
what a universal audience would accept as persuasive might well be a product of counsel’s 
own predisposed way of viewing the world. Against this own view of the world, one can self-
reflect that an argument is convincing when it is merely internally persuasive. That, Kant 
states, is sufficient for internal reflection, but not otherwise. The corollary is that counsel 
cannot presume a consensual jury view of the world. The jury is still a specific audience that 
potentially harbours conflicting values and perceptions of what community common sense 
ought to be. In Chapter Five, therefore, my focus is on the jury. I discuss the nature of 
collective consciousness and collective memory. I examine how they function within a jury 
that represents disparate cultures and sub-cultures. For counsel not to understand the nature of 
this function can lead to misdirection of advocacy discourse. 
  






CHAPTER FIVE: How wrong perceptions of common sense 
and community values can misdirect jury trial discourse 
Introduction 
The principal jury selection criterion is that the jury must be representative of the society 
from which it is empanelled. In a progressively more diverse society, this means bringing 
together twelve people whose cultural traditions possibly differ. Therefore, in Chapter Five, I 
focus on the nature of collective consciousness and collective memory, and how they most 
likely function in a jury comprising disparate cultures. I conclude that failure to account for 
these differences in the organization of courtroom discourse can lead to distortion of 
meaning. Or, to state it more compellingly, in the search for substantive truth, to lead to 
misunderstanding. 
I structure my discussion on how wrong perceptions can arise under five sub-headings 
1) Good and bad prejudices of narrative style lay reasoning. I examine the merits of logico-
scientific reasoning versus a good story. I use Jerome Bruner’s cognitive learning theory 
as the basis of my analysis of differences between legal and lay methods of reasoning. 
Legal reasoning, he would describe as logico-scientific; lay reasoning is of the nature of 
storytelling, or narrative. The importance of his theory is his claim that learning is an 
active process in which the reasoner forms new ideas by cognitively organizing past 
knowledge with current knowledge to derive meaning from them. Thus, he suggests, a lay 
reasoner judges the goodness of a story against criteria that differ from the criteria for 
assessing logical or scientific argument.
532
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“Story” and “narrative” are not necessarily the same. One can tell a story that does not 
contain the structured elements that constitute a narrative. The essential elements of a 
narrative comprise a beginning, in which the author sets the scene and introduces the key 
characters of the plot (the exposition). From within this situation the author (as narrator) 
will develop a conflict; and for the narrative to develop into a good story, the conflict will 
be one that entices the reader to want to know more. This leads to a third element, in 
which with action of rising intensity, the narrator leads the listener into a climax—the 
fourth necessary element of a narrative. The climax is the pivotal point of the narrative. 
The intensifying action comes to a head in one way or the other for the key protagonists. 
The climax is pivotal, but it is not the end of the story. The actions of the climax must 
have a consequence. So, in the next essential element of a narrative, action continues but 
less intense, as the narrator reveals these consequences. There will usually be a winner and 
a loser when the matter is resolved. In most instances (or, in a good story), this narrative 
will end with the hero of the plot prevailing. Finally, there will be a denouement in which 
all the dangling strings of the plot line will be brought together and, figuratively, tied into 
a neat bow that leaves the listener ( or reader, in context) sated. If there is a moral to the 
story, this is the point at which the narrator explicates it, either implicitly or, explicitly. 
A story, on the other hand does not necessarily have all those elements, as is the case in 
the Witness’s testimony in my case study. His story lacks the necessary intensifying action 
because the rules of evidence have rendered the narrating of some of those actions 
inadmissible. Moreover, his story ends when defence counsel says ‘no further questions,’ 
leaving so much of the plot unresolved. In addition, clearly, at that point there is not yet a 
denouement. Bruner’s theory has implications for considering the organization of witness 
testimony in jury trials. Furthermore, it invites scrutiny of the role of collective 
consciousness in forming past knowledge—prejudices or predispositions. 
2) The nature of collective consciousness and the power of collective memory. I discuss how 
collective memory accounts for our morality, and I consider the nature of collective 





memory as a social construct. I explain that French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs coined 
the term “collective memory” to represent knowledge of the past that an identity group 
shares. It is a social construction, not a universally objective phenomenon. As such, it is 
reinforced by the ‘collectivity’ that acknowledges it. Significantly, although collective 
memory is the source of common sense, the collectivity that embraces a common memory 
can be as small as an informal group through to a nation state. But, it is common only if 
that nation state is a single, culturally coherent society. 
3) Manipulating social values though commemoration. I explore this as a tale of two 
histories: history as collective memory, and as the work of historians. It is a competition 
for social relevance. That is, a conflict between, what Jacques le Goff labels ‘the 
unconquerable flow of time,’
 533
 which moulds the memory and forgetting experience of 
individuals and societies, and the objective discipline of history. It is the self-proclaimed 
duty of historians to preserve that discipline. But, le Goff acknowledges that the historian 
also is not immune to seduction by the unconquerable flow of time. This leads to my 
discussion of the role of commemoration as the tool of the state (using the term state 
generically) to preserve collective memory in the form that best preserves internal 
sovereignty. I do not equate witness testimony with these differentiated concepts of 
history, of course. Rather, discussion of the differences goes directly to the need to be 
aware of the influences on collective memory that is the base upon which community 
common sense stands. So, because community common sense is the desired attribute that 
jurors bring to their undisclosed deliberations, counsel need always to be mindful of them 
when organizing courtroom discourse. In the context of this particular discussion, an 
advocate needs to be heedful that the state also has a role in preserving collective memory 
according to its needs. And, as we have seen, the state might from time to time see its need 
as superior to the needs of discrete identity groups to preserve their own internal 
coherence. 
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An internally coherent collective memory is more likely in a single community with a 
common set of values. The notion of two histories competing for social relevance directs 
my discussion to the next sub-heading—and to a provocative question. 
4) Is the adversarial trial a relic of a now irrelevant past? I propose the argument that the 
trial narrative is a story of individuals, not a journal of collective responsibilities. This 
thought provokes the question whether it is reasonable therefore to expect a jury to 
embody deep-seated social values.  
I sum up these four sub-headed discussions together under a hortatory fifth subheading. 
5) The risk of misunderstanding community common sense as universal. I have already 
discussed the difference between persuasion and conviction, which means being aware of the 
audience which one addresses. But, as I reveal in this sub-section, the jury is not an audience 
comprising ordinary citizens bringing common sense based on undifferentiated community 
standards to its decision-making. It is an audience potentially bringing to its task twelve 
differing expectations. Or more. For example, an indigenous woman juror belongs to two 
groups at least, members of which might, in one way or another, feel discriminated against 
according to race, to gender, or to both. There are other potentials for perceived 
discriminations of course. Expectations might frequently be modified both in the reading of 
the text as it evolves in the courtroom, and, later, in eleven interlocking and overlapping 
conversations with fellow jurors. And, at the level of discourse, we do not satisfy this 
consideration merely by establishing whether their grasp of the English language is adequate 
to the task to which jury selection assigns them. 
In sum then, I explore how differing community standards arise, how they shape expectations 
of what justice ought to deliver, and why courtroom advocacy needs to be conscious of the 
differing expectations of justice that can exist undetected in the jury room.  
 





How community standards shape expectations of justice 
Before proceeding to this comprehensive analysis, I put forward two presumptions. First, the 
jury deliberates with the intention of reaching a unanimous decision. Second, it retires to 
consider its verdict in good faith. 
A presumption of the need for unanimous decisions 
In prescribed circumstances, in some jurisdictions, the court will have discretion to accept a 
majority decision. The presiding judge will have told the jury what those circumstances are. 
Nevertheless, we should presume that a good faith jury would have understood that as being a 
compromise position.
534
 Therefore, with the goal of unanimity in mind, counsel must 
convince each juror that any reasonable member of the selection universe of which they are a 
part would have the same goal.
535
   
In a 1996 judgment in the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. G (RM.), Cory J eloquently 
explained the traditional requirement of unanimity in jury decisions.  
There is a centuries-old tradition of juries reaching fair and courageous verdicts. That tradition has 
taken root and been so well and fearlessly maintained that it has flourished.... Our courts have very 
properly stressed the importance of jury verdicts and the deference that must be shown to those 
decisions. Today, as in the past, great reliance has been placed upon those decisions. That I think flows 




Earlier, and independently, the New South Wales Law Commission had determined that, ‘It 
is simply not valid to say that if a doubt is entertained by only one among 12, then it cannot 
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be a reasonable doubt. We think it inescapable that the existence of a dissenting voice casts a 
shadow of doubt over the validity of the verdict.’
537
In 1993, The High Court of Australia held in Cheatle,
538
 that ‘[t]he requirement of a
unanimous verdict ensures that the representative character and the collective nature of the 
jury are carried forward into any ultimate verdict.’
539
 It added, ‘to abrogate the requirement of
unanimity involves an abandonment of an essential feature of the institution of trial by 
jury.’
540
 Nevertheless, the High Court noted that ‘[t]here is no actual decision of the Court
establishing that s.80's guarantee of trial by jury carries with it an immunity from conviction 
except by the unanimous verdict of the jurors.
541
 However, the clear weight of authority
supports the conclusion that the requirement of unanimity is an essential feature of the 
institution of trial by jury adopted by s.80.’
542
It is the case that after Cheatle, some jurisdictions have turned to majority verdicts in criminal 
trials, but with restricting conditions on which the court may accept them—and at the 
discretion of the judge.
543








 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 'Report 48 (1986) - Criminal procedure: The jury in a criminal 
trial' (1986) 9.37. The Jury Act 1977 (NSW), s55F, does now allow majority verdicts in prescribed 
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 For example,  s46 of Juries Act 2000 (Vic) details the conditions under which a judge may accept a majority 
verdict: 
46. Failure to reach unanimous verdict in criminal trials
(1) In this section, majority verdict means-
(a) if, at the time of returning its verdict, the jury consists of 12
182 
        jurors-a verdict on which 11 of them agree; 
(b) if, at the time of returning its verdict, the jury consists of 11
jurors-a verdict on which 10 of them agree;
(c) if, at the time of returning its verdict, the jury consists of 10
jurors-a verdict on which 9 of them agree.
(2) If, after deliberating for at least 6 hours a jury in a criminal trial-
(a) is unable to agree on its verdict; or
(b) has not reached a unanimous verdict- 
the court may discharge the jury or, subject to subsections (3) and (4), take 
a majority verdict as the verdict of the jury. 
(3) A court must refuse to take a majority verdict if it considers that the
jury has not had a period of time for deliberation that the court thinks 
reasonable, having regard to the nature and complexity of the trial. 
(4) A verdict that the accused is guilty or not guilty of murder or treason or
an offence against section 71 or 72 of the 
Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 or an offence against a law 
of the Commonwealth must be unanimous. 
(5) If in a criminal trial-
(a) it is possible for a jury to return a verdict of not guilty of the
offence charged but guilty of another offence with which the accused
has not been charged; and
(b) the jury reaches a verdict (unanimously or by majority verdict) that
183 
verdicts, and saves money. A problem, however, is that jury secrecy ensures that the public 
cannot know why dissenting jurors did dissent. Nevertheless, my second presumption: is that 
jurors do not set out to obstruct justice; they act in good faith.  
The jury retires to consider its verdict in good faith 
We ought to presume that a jury retires to consider its verdict in good faith. It has heard 
witness testimony, listened to counsel build their respective cases, and taken notice of the 
judge’s directions on the law. However, even a jury negotiating in good faith to a mutual 
understanding can be wrong in law. Moreover, if all twelve jurors, bringing the vaunted but 
putative community common sense to bear, agree with Mr Bumble in Oliver Twist ‘the law is 
a [sic] ass,’ the judge’s directions might count for nothing, as the following famous case 
bears out.  
In 1649, in an era when the power of God weighed heavily on community common sense, 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Lilburne faced the court on a charge of treason.
544
 He argued that
the trial proceedings were illegal. The judge was adamant that they were not. 
[B]ut you must know that the law of England is the law of God.... It is the law that hath been 
maintained by our ancestors, by the tried rules of reason, and the prime laws of nature, for it does not 
        the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and 
(c) the jury is unable to agree on its verdict on the alternative offence
after a cumulative total of at least 6 hours deliberation on both
offences- 
a majority verdict on the alternative offence may be taken as the verdict of the jury. 
In Western Australia, S114 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) prescribes, “Subject to this 
section, the verdict of a jury must be the unanimous verdict of its members.” Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 
outline the exceptions, but each exception, stipulated that majority decisions, when applied, must be 
the decision of ten or more jurors. Majority verdicts are not accepted in murder trials. 
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 Thomas Green, Verdict according to conscience (The University of Chicago Press, 1985) 171 
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depend upon statutes, or written and declared words or lines.... Therefore I say again, the law of 
England is pure primitive reason.... A pure innocent hand does set forth a clear unspotted heart.... If you 
refuse to [hold up your hand] you do wilfully deprive yourself of the benefit of one of the main 
proceedings and customs of the laws of England.
545
Lilburne, however, declared that ‘his jurors’ were ‘judges both of law and fact.’
546
 The court
ridiculed his claim because it had no basis in common law; it tried to invoke God and custom. 
The jury took less than an hour to find Lilburne not guilty. The multitude outside the court 
cheered and lit celebratory bonfires. The community struck a medal bearing the names of the 
jurors. Its inscription read, ‘John Lilburne, saved by the power of the Lord and the integrity 
of his jury, who are judge of law as well as fact’.
547
 Was this a jury that did not consider its
verdict in good faith? Was their decision wilful defiance? Or was this a jury that gave voice 
to community common sense? This last is the attributed value of the jury that our justice 
system has entrenched.   
However, because the jury decision-making discussion is secret, one can only surmise that 
the jury has reached a verdict against the evidence—jury nullification. Thomas Green has 
suggested that, at the time of the Lilburne case, jurors had their own ideas of justice, which 
might well have reflected the values and standards of their community. He reasons that they 
did not see homicide in the binary manner that law saw it. They would want to take into 
account circumstances that went beyond the act, to examine such things as pre-existing 
relations between the perpetrator and the victim. The Crown would not condone this theory 
of meting out justice, but, nor could it prevent it.
548
 Therefore, one can argue that, as
representatives of their community, in its nullification, the Lilburne jury, through its 
independence, simply let the rulers know what the ruled thought. They were keeping the 
rulers in touch with the real world. They were deciding in good faith, but as representative of 
545
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the people, not of the Crown. Green writes, jury verdicts against the evidence—jury 
nullification—could be ‘merciful’ or based on assessment of facts found before trial. And, he 
notes, ‘simple merciful nullification, especially in close cases, was often sheltered from view 
and frequently protected by the jury’s duty to acquit where the evidence was uncertain.’
549
However, accepting these two presumptions, does not entitle us to accept also that jury 
decision making is value free. On the contrary, I submit that a jury selected from a culturally 
diverse community is likely to comprise a mix of values and standards of the disparate 
identity groups they each represent. This suggests that for courtroom advocates to think of a 
jury as comprising like-minded ordinary people is liable to lead to misdirected jury trial 
discourse, which I examine in the following sections. 
1 Good and bad prejudices of narrative style lay reasoning 
It is tempting to accept the lay reasoning of the jury as a common sense correction to the 
methodologically constrained use of reason in judicial decision-making. However, being free 
of methodological constraints does not mean that the narrative style of reasoning, which 
Jerome Bruner imputes to lay reasoning, is value free. It is not immune to predispositions and 
prejudices, which can be either good or bad. To determine which they are, we need to delve 
deeper into the nature of common sense reason and the prejudices or predispositions that help 
to shape it.  
Logico-scientific reasoning versus a good story 
Thomas Green’s suggestion that jurors of the Middle Ages were more willing to take account 
of circumstances surrounding a felony
550
 has its echoes today in Jerome Bruner’s analysis of
the differences between legal and lay modes of reasoning.
551
 Bruner argues that there are two
modes of thought, one is paradigmatic, or logico-scientific, the other is of the nature of 
narrative. A good story and a well-formed argument are different; one can use either to 
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convince another person. However, what they convince the other of is fundamentally 
different: ‘arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness.’
552
 Each is a
transformation of fact from exposition to a statement of implied causality. Bruner suggests 
we judge a story for its goodness as a story ‘by criteria that are of a different kind from those 
used to judge a logical argument as adequate or correct.’
553
 The paradigmatic or logico-
scientific argument ‘attempts to fulfil the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of 
description and explanation.’
554
 For example, in a newspaper story, we have the facts. Two
young boys die in unexplained circumstances in a house. The headline reads, “Two boys die. 
Police take mother into custody.” As Bruner might present that headline, “Two boys die, and 
then the police take the mother into custody.”  
In one sense, the statement ‘leads to a search for universal truth conditions; in the other, for 
the likely particular connections between the two events.’
555
 In this case, a well-formed
argument can support the logical proposition—a universal truth—that one event followed the 
other. However, as a narrative account, the word “then” operates differently. It leads to a 
search for likely causal relationships between the two events, in this case, the possibility of 
foul play. On the other hand, were we content to accept only the high level of truth of 
paradigmatic argumentation, “then” has no explanatory value at the lower level of the 
particular.
556
In my case study, when the witness testified that he heard screams and that the nature of the 
screams convinced him to cross the road, the logico-scientific essence of the message is that 
Witness heard screams, and then he crossed the road. Defence Counsel’s interjection at this 
point shows that he wanted to constrain testimony at this higher level of universal truth. He 
did not want Witness to move into narrative—into the particulars of a story. In this 
552
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courtroom, the reason is obvious. If Witness launches into storytelling, he becomes the author 
of the plot, which means he might drive the story in a direction that runs counter to Defence 
Counsel’s preferred ending. Therefore, Counsel will try to limit Witness to logico-scientific 
truth until—in cross-examination—he can direct the plot to his preferred ending through 
question and answer. That is, through the adjacency pair social interaction governed by the 
chain maxim, which Danet claims is preoccupied with rules.
557
Logico-scientific or paradigmatic reasoning relies solely on logic. And, Bruner asserts, 
‘[t]here is a heartlessness to logic: one goes where one’s premises and conclusions and 
observations take one, give or take some of the blindness that even logicians are prone to.’
558
So, if logic is heartless, and if  ‘blindness’ is the unconscious influence of predispositions—
and prejudices—that can infect even logical decision making, can lay reasoning of the jury 
compensate? Can we argue that lay reasoning is community common sense? 
If one were to embrace the Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice, which is Gadamer’s 
criticism of it, one would have to deny the value of community common sense, which the 
jury brings to the task of finding facts. Why should the justice system suppose that a jury—
selected as representative of the common sense of the universal citizen—has derived its 
common sense through critical thinking? How could peremptory challenge, or challenge for 
cause, screen the jury pool for its critical thinking acumen? It cannot. The most one could 
argue in favour of the jury over a judge sitting alone is that it spreads any risk of flawed 
critical thinking. And, as I have discussed earlier, spreading risk was a reputed reason for 
appointing the jury in the Middle Ages; it would diffuse the focus of God’s wrath, which 
judges feared if they should wrongly condemn an innocent person. 
Still, since the Enlightenment, and the secularisation of law that followed, the symbol of the 
jury as a protector of individual humans endures. Its justification, though, is forged in a 
romanticised past going back to the Magna Carta. But, Lord Auld asserts that there is nothing 
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in Magna Carta on which to base the trial by jury ‘as we know it today.’
559
 He supports
earlier speculative history that the rights, which the Magna Carta ‘may have indicated’, seem 
to have had ‘an earlier origin.’
560
 Moreover, he agrees with legal historians that a free
person’s right to lawful judgment by their ‘peers’ did not mean trial by jury.
561
 Charles
Plucknett, more decisively than Auld does, also dismisses that claim as romanticising by 
‘more patriotic British.’ It did not stem from any guarantee of rights, privileges, and liberties 
embodied in Magna Carta.
562
 In spite of these arguments, the romanticised version is the one
that survived transportation to Australia.  
Yet, if the need for story ‘is encoded in our genes,’
563
  and if this need drives lay reasoning,
as Bruner claims, then community common sense—the wellspring of lay reasoning—has its 
roots in collective consciousness. But, this also is the source of presuppositions, or 
prejudices, or pre-understandings as Gadamer calls them. To recognize them as pre-
understandings invites one to infer a more neutral meaning than if one were to see them as 
prejudices. In fact, Gadamer distinguishes what he calls legitimate prejudices from prejudices 
that, he states, critical reason has the ‘undeniable task’ to overcome.
564
 Both, Gadamer
claims, are conditions of understanding. Both have their roots in collective consciousness, 
which is a product of collective memory. And, collective memory is the source of community 
values. Collective memory is how we account for our morality. 
2 The nature of collective consciousness and the power of collective memory 
Collective memory is more pervasive in a culturally coherent society than it can be in a 
culturally diverse community. According to Geoffrey Hazard, ‘We account for our morals, 
unintentionally, by naming what we belong to.... Moral life is simpler if one is brought up in 
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a single community in which one’s moral language expresses a relatively coherent set of 
ideals, commitments and expectations.’
565
 Yet, collective memory is also the wellspring of
the community common sense, which the jury purportedly brings to its task as finder of fact. 
But, if cultural diversity is drying up this spring, we need to question whether community 
common sense still can represent deep-seated social values. On the other hand, community 
common sense in a culturally diverse community might merely represent a negotiated 
composite of sometimes competing present-day social standards, which pass for values.  
Why community standards can differ from social values 
I have discussed earlier Alasdair MacIntyre’s assertion that many of us are not educated into 
a coherent way of thinking and judging, but into one constructed out of an amalgam of social 
and cultural fragments inherited from different traditions from which our culture was 
originally derived.
566
 Thus, in a multicultural society, culturally derived differences in
perceptions of justice and morality might be ‘disguised by a rhetoric of consensus.
567
 That
rhetoric of consensus is fragile, and changing circumstances can shatter it, especially when 
moral panic is enlivened. Therefore, whether or not one accepts Will Kymlicka's view that 
many who advocate a multicultural curriculum are trying to reverse the historical exclusion 
of some groups, 
568
one ought to acknowledge that, when talking about culture in the context
of the jury, the concept of identity group from which collective consciousness emanates, 
comprises complex and fluid concerns.  
Collective consciousness lies quiescent in us—subliminal—until an event, or new set of 
circumstances, propels it above the liminal threshold to influence our reactions to the 
triggering event, or to the changed set of circumstances. Collective consciousness is a product 
of collective memory. Yet, in the Durkheim sense, collective memory is manipulable, as I 
will expound later in this chapter. 
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French sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs, strongly influenced by Durkheim, introduced the 
term collective memory to denote ‘knowledge of the past that is shared, mutually 
acknowledged, and reinforced by a collectivity. These range from small informal groups, to 
formal organisations, to nation states and global communities.’
569
 He believes one sees the 
world through categories that are social constructions rather than through categories that are 
universally objective. One can see that a collectivity differs from a group in that it does not 
require, nor comprise, regular and consistent interaction between members. Relevantly, he 
asserts that present day interests help shape the way we understand the past.
570
 That is why 
community standards can differ from social values.  
The term Society connotes an inclusive community in which social values represent the sum 
of all human conditions and activity; it is an ordered community in the sense that customs and 
organisations reflect inherited values.
571
 The values might change over time, but only 
incrementally. However, I submit that social values, unlike community standards, exist in a 
conjectural society; one untrammelled by moral panic and perceived threats to personal 
security. Moreover, when moral panic strikes, and fear of threats to personal security are 
abroad, social values give way to community prejudices, which often assume the status of 
standards. When that happens, the community defines itself by its geography, not by 
consensual social values. It demands that the sources of community panic and personal 
security fears be rooted out. Some minorities who up until this time had been part of that 
ordered sum of human conditions might become outsiders. If in the process of rooting out the 
cause of the community panic those newly labelled outsiders suffer, that is merely collateral 
damage, incurred in pursuit of the greater good. Changing circumstances or shifting public 
perceptions might result in a minority group that the community considers worthy of 
protection at one point in time, becoming a minority group to fear or revile at another point in 
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time. Moral panic can inflame the fear. On the other hand, the state might foster fears because 
it perceives a need to cultivate national unity against a sovereign threat. The threat might be 
real or imagined, and the objects of fear and condemnation might change, but the basic 
instincts that drive these emotions do not.  
Collective memory as a social construct   
Collective memory is a social construct, not ‘some mystical group mind.’ This means, as 
Halbwachs reminds us, that, whilst ‘the collective memory endures and draws strength from 
its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember.’
572
 
If the rhetoric of consensus is merely a thin veneer masking competing identity group values 
and standards, a juror who is truly independent of the influence of others will be hard to find. 
It is the milieu of the group that influences how they remember. Therefore, Halbwachs 
asserts, in any society there are as many collective memories as there are groups and 
institutions. They include more than ethnic or racial minorities. For example, they include 
social classes, declared and ascriptive groups, as well as families, trade unions, corporations, 
religion, and military. 
Amy Gutmann defines ascriptive identity groups as those ‘organized around characteristics 
that are largely beyond a person’s choice; for example, race, gender, class, physical handicap, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and nationality.’
573
 The characteristic of the ascriptive 
group may be involuntary, but the decision whether or not to join is voluntary. Belonging to a 
group that members distinguish by a particular characteristic is clearly different to the 
majority assigning a particular characteristic to persons, and declaring them to belong to a 
particular group defined by that same characteristic. That is a declared group. One can choose 
whether to join an ascriptive group; but, for membership of the other, one does not have a 
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choice. One entails freedom of association, under which one may subsume all minority 
groups. But, it is others who assign the characteristics that set apart declared groups. 
Free association is adequate to explain how ascriptive groups form. However, it is inadequate 
to explain fully the nature of group identity formed from the influence of the collective 
narrative. It overlooks, too, the importance of collective memory in advancing that narrative. 
Without the continuity that melds the past with the present, one’s personal narrative would 
disintegrate into a series of discrete images of a present that is—putting it idiomatically—
here today and gone tomorrow. That is to say, without one’s life narrative, living is a series of 
jarring experiences one enjoys or endures in the moment, but which contribute nothing to the 
development of one’s reason for being. In other words, offering a life without purpose other 
than to survive. If Society—meaning The People—were the major influence on collective 
memory, disparate groups with competing, or at least distracting, allegiances might disrupt 
the internal sovereignty to which nation states aspire and which they guard zealously when 
they have achieved it. This means guarding social values with the same zeal.  
We need to understand how entrenched social values are, and how primed is society’s 
propensity to abandon them in times of moral panic. Gutmann quotes a member of the 
National Association for the Deaf (NAD) who, responding (using sign language) to a 
television interviewer’s question whether he would want a cochlear implant, said, ‘If I were 
able to hear and speak, I wouldn’t be deaf anymore. That means my identity would be gone, 
and I’d be a completely different person, and I don’t want that.’
574
 On the other hand, the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games official guide for assistants acknowledged that Paralympians 
were members of an ascriptive group of people with disabilities. But, it went beyond that 
self-evident description of people with a common characteristic choosing to form a group. 
They have ‘unique personalities and ways of thinking.’ It adds, ‘some physically disabled are 
isolated, unsocial and introspective. They can be stubborn and controlling...defensive and 




especially when they are called crippled of paralysed.’
575
 In other words, that official guide
assigned the members to an overarching group of people with characteristics that can be a 
threat to social equanimity. The authors of it, in the manner of a jury, had applied their 
meaning to the designation “people with disabilities.” 
More controversially, did the perceived behaviour characteristics of people with disabilities 
reflect the cultural preconceptions of the community in which the Games took place? If it did, 
given that the Guide was to inform assistants who were residents of that community, it might 
be reasonable to frame the guide to accord with those known preconceptions. In other words, 
pragmatically, is it better to accord with the preconceptions rather than to use the Guide as a 
tool to overturn them? Social engineering is a long-term project. The circumstance and the 
alternative ways of dealing with it are analogous to the questions confronting courtroom 
advocates seeking to persuade, rather than to convince their audience. This is the point at 
which pragmatism and social justice can clash. 
Clearly, the young man who chose to belong to NAD, and athletes with disabilities who 
chose to join the Paralympics team were exercising their perceived right to freedom of 
association. Like the young man who was deaf, the athletes did not choose disability. The 
question is whether belonging to a ‘group’ that others defined as ‘disabled’ contributed to 
their self-identity. Or, was it a special interest group through which—in Olympic 
competition—they sought to assert themselves as equal members of the mainstream 
community. And, in their group membership, did they seek to accomplish the collateral goal 
of helping to banish the stereotypes, which the guide to assistants embraced as representing 
the collectivity? The difference between an ascriptive group and a special interest group is 
that an ascriptive group is enduring, and therefore a source of a collective memory. A special 
interest group exists only for as long as the special interest remains relevant. In the case of the 
575
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Paralympians, the special interest probably was the 2008 Beijing Paralympics. But, the 
assignment of them to a declared group, with characteristics that are potentially unsocial 
remains after the Games are over. If the opinion that people with disabilities can be unsocial 
were to become a universal perception within the community, this could materially affect 
how a jury perceives them if they were to appear in a trial either as an accused, a plaintiff, or 
as a witness. Moreover, if counsel were to see them that way, would they unfairly challenge 
them as potential jurors at empanelment. That is, would counsel try to “unstack” the jury, as 
that former lawyer, to whom I referred earlier, claimed he was doing?  
Amy Gutmann writes that identity groups act in ways that both aid and impede democracies 
in enacting and expressing the basic principles of democratic justice, which she identifies as 
civic equality, liberty, and opportunity. She adds, ‘[t]he benign neglect of identity groups by 
political scientists and the hypercriticism of popular commentators are not terribly helpful in 
understanding or assessing their role in democratic societies.’
576
 I submit that benign neglect 
is a product of a complacent majority when free from threats to personal security, and free 
from moral panic. Hypercriticism is the tool of commentators in mainstream media when fear 
and moral outrage are abroad.  
Halbwachs favours the ‘group’ as the pre-eminent influence on the formation of collective 
memory in society. However, unlike Durkheim, from whom he draws inspiration, he does not 
speak of ‘Society’ (with a capital S). His is, as Lewis Coser remarks, a much more cautious 
approach to explaining why collective memory needs ‘the support of a group delimited in 
space and time.’
577
 If Society—the  People—were  the major influence on collective memory, 
then disparate groups—with competing, or distracting, allegiances—might be a threat to 
internal sovereignty. A nation state might seek to guard internal sovereignty through 
commemoration of significant moments in its history. However, taken together, state-
sanctioned commemorations also influence social values as I explain in the next section. 
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3. Manipulating social values through commemoration 
If, as Halbwachs claims, the social mechanism that prevents collective memory from 
atrophying is commemoration, then the state best secures internal sovereignty by ordaining, 
or at least overtly encouraging, commemoration that serves that purpose. He maintains that, 
given we ‘can grasp only the present,’ we need ‘participation in commemorative meetings 
with group members of the current generation’ to recreate through imaginative re-enactment 
a past that would otherwise ‘disappear in the haze of time.’
578
  
A tale of two histories competing for relevance 
Barbara Misztal follows a similar theme in her discussion of Durkheim’s understanding of 
social memory in early societies.
579
 Although he did not explicitly make use of the idea of 
collective memory, Durkheim did emphasize the importance of commemorative rituals, and 
religious rites, in enshrining the notion of shared morality and social cohesion. Misztal writes, 
‘Seeing the myth of origin as one of the most powerful means of establishing a community’s 
unity also assumes the existence of connections between collective memory and institutions 
guaranteeing collective beliefs and identity.’
580
 She asserts that his ideas of the role of law 
and memory in sustaining organic solidarity are relevant today in understanding social 
processes in today’s society. 
In early Anglo-Australian society, religion—with its rituals and rites—fulfilled the role of 
affirming beliefs and values. Misztal writes that in an undifferentiated society, 
Religion provides an all-embracing structure of beliefs, impresses on individuals a sense of the 
sacredness of something outside of them, and institutes a common destiny and identity not only with 
contemporaries but also with past and future generations. Sacred symbols and celebrations of past 
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events help the recall of great events of the past that hold the community together, and, in turn, these 
ties to the past are cultivated by means of periodic commemoration rites.
581
 
However, a problem arises when society becomes too different, and divorced from the 
conditions that had given rise to these traditions in the past. It will no longer ‘find within 
itself the elements necessary to reconstruct, consolidate, and repair these traditions.’
582
 Group
narrative does provide the means by which we attempt to understand the present by recalling 
the past. However, using the present to understand the past may lead to redefining the nature 
of the group identity and, in fact, in turning the group narrative into a kind of palimpsest. By 
overlaying one text onto another, we blur the truth, the consequence of which is two histories 
competing for relevance.   
On the other hand, Barbara Misztal asserts that those who endorse “forgetting” as a condition 
for justice invoke liberals like Rawls who argue, “Social amnesia is...a foundation of society 
because it allows society to start afresh without inherited resentments.”
583
 But, as she notes,
this means that ‘the writing of a historical narrative necessarily involves the elimination of 
certain elements.’
584
 I will elaborate, and return to her specific example, in the next section. It
illustrates an important truth for courtroom advocates in an increasingly diverse cultural 
community that the past does not cease to exist, because the state decrees it should die. Nor 
do inherent values cease to exist because the state considers them outmoded. 
Jacques le Goff has drawn awareness to the idea that there are two histories, one consisting of 
collective memory, the other of the work of historians. He explains: 
Memory is the raw material of history. Whether mental, oral, or written, it is the living source from 
which historians draw. Because its workings are usually unconscious, it is in reality more dangerously 
subject to manipulation by time and by societies given to reflection than the discipline of history itself. 
581
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Moreover, the discipline of history nourishes memory in turn, and enters into the great dialectical 
process of memory and forgetting experienced by individuals and societies. The historian must be there 
to render an account of these memories and of what is forgotten, to transform them into something that 
can be conceived, to make them knowable. To privilege memory excessively is to sink into the 
unconquerable flow of time.
585
Later, he injects a doubt: ‘But is the historian himself immune to an illness that proceeds, if 
not from the past, at least from the present, or perhaps from an unconscious image of a 
dreamt-of future?’
586
 In each instance—as historian or as layperson—collective memory
plays its part. Even an unconscious image of a dreamt-of future must originate from...where? 
A sort of consciousness big bang? From an unconscious recollection that ‘mythic, deformed 
and anachronistic collective memory’ also has shaped?
 587
  Why should we expect legal or
legislative ‘historians’—especially those who lean too heavily on precedent or ideology—to 
be immune to this ‘illness’? These are not merely questions for philosophers. In the diverse 
cultural reality that is the jurisdiction of the justice system today, they are questions, the 
answers to which determine how, and in what circumstances, justice does prevail. The 
answers give rise to a larger question. In what mode of adversarial trial is justice more likely 
to prevail: trial before Jury? Or a trial before judge sitting alone?  
There is a still larger question, which I raise, not to answer with unwarranted certitude in this 
thesis, but as a field of further inquiry. In an increasingly culturally diverse society: is the 
adversarial trial a relic from a now irrelevant past? Is Society demanding more of the 
adversarial trial by jury than it can deliver? In the next section, I discuss these, and other, 
issues, which are germane to this question.  
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4. Is the adversarial trial a relic of a now irrelevant past?  
Narratives constructed through legal proceedings are chronicles of individuals, not of 
‘historical trajectories, larger social and cultural forces, and collective responsibilities.’
588
 
What is more, Savelsberg and King argue that a trial will focus on the defendant, relegating 
the victim to the function of a ‘tool’ to facilitate the delivery of justice.
589
 They advance the 
notion that ‘Law may affect collective memory indirectly as it regulates the production of, 
access to, and dissemination of information about the past.’
590
 In raw terms, one can couch 
this argument as distinguishing between preferred carriers of the collective memory—the 
state, (as I will explain, they use Germany as their example), or ‘disparate groups,’ as in the 
United States.
591
 When the state appoints itself carrier of collective memory; that is, when it 
institutionalizes collective memory, the state coercively influences what individuals 
remember. What they remember influences what they accept as proper. What they accept as 
proper influences their attitudes and behaviour towards those who belong to an outside group.  
With the Holocaust as their archetype, in which Jews were incontrovertibly the victims, 
Savelsberg and King reason that the focus of judicial deliberation is the perpetrators. 
Therefore, they argue, the trial does not present an opportunity for the judiciary to advance 
the victim group’s narrative. However, considered at a level of abstraction beyond the 
heinous particularity of the Holocaust, defendants have life narratives as impelling as the 
narratives that impel plaintiffs. In other words, if, as a member of a group, a defendant acts 
from the stimulus of the group’s collective memory, it is not enough to punish the individual 
simply to deter others, to protect society, or to assuage the anguish of the victim. The next 
necessary step is to understand the nature of the stimulus. If that stimulus derives from past 
real or perceived injustices, enforced isolation, or social disenfranchisement, the legislature is 
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the effective forum in which to act to change the nature, or redirect the force, of the stimulus 
in the interests of all. 
In the trials of the Holocaust perpetrators, a now informed and shocked world judged that 
next step unnecessary because the facts were incontrovertible. The perpetrators were guilty. 
The only issue that captured the attention of the world was the need to ensure that punishment 
fit the crime. But that is not the only issue; the other is to ensure such a crime never recurs. 
One must go beyond the vile uniqueness of the Holocaust to understand why more generally 
that extra step is necessary. Generally, to focus on the victims’ narrative without also 
considering what propelled the defendants, would be to create the risk of bringing about the 
very consequence against which the trial and punishment of perpetrators claims to guard. 
At this point, I offer two salutary expressions of why this other step is important—one is 
parochial, the other global.  
First, Introducing first year law students to the functions of the court, the Law School Dean 
invited a justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia to talk to the students. When the 
judge invited questions, a young student asked, how does it feel to have the ‘scum of the 
earth’ parade before you every day? Fielding this provocative question with equable poise, 
the Supreme Court Justice told of a case over which he had presided. A young Aboriginal 
boy had brutalised and murdered an elderly woman in her home. The Court had no 
reasonable option than to punish him according to the law for the abhorrent crime.  
Although he had no reservations about performing his judicial duty, the judge nevertheless 
felt despair and sadness that the life itself of the young boy had been so brutal and 
dehumanising that its consequence was almost inevitable. Although he did not make it 
explicitly, his implicit point was that confining our focus to the trial and punishment of the 
offender to satisfy the community’s legitimate demand for law and order means that the 
collective narrative of the majority community is missing an important element: the reality of 
a minority group shaped by despair and social isolation. Perhaps, too, it is missing an 
200 
important truth: putative ‘scum of the earth’ are not born as such. In a sense, the trial and 
punishment becomes a commemorative event. We recall the history; follow the historic 
precedent, and, each time history repeats, the morally panicked people seek increasingly 
draconian punishment to deal with it. But, in the process, we risk public demonization of the 
minority to which the accused belongs. 
Second, Barbara Misztal provides an example on a global scale, moving outside the 
discipline of law to do so. She cites Ingmar Bergman’s film The Serpent’s Egg (1977) as a 
‘fairly historically accurate’ view of life in post-World War I, pre-Nazi, Germany. Brutal 
inflation was crushing the people and the world had ostracized Germany. The people were 
desperate, and Nazism opportunistically presented itself as the saviour. It also offered up a 
minority group as scapegoat. Misztal emphatically asserts we do not have to condone the 
outcome of this situation to acknowledge it, but ‘[i]n understanding...the wounds suffered by 
abusers (or those they lead), one can sometimes gain a perspective or sense of meaning about 
the cruel actions of abusers, sadist, tyrants, and despots.’
592
The message from the Supreme Court Judge’s account of the case that had come before him, 
and from Misztal’s resort to filmic fiction to make her point is compelling. In both instances, 
had society understood the stimuli, and acted to mitigate them when they first presented 
themselves, horror and tragedy in both situations—one parochial, the other global, but no less 
human—might have been avoided. 
Savelsberg and King argue that regulating access to, and use of, available information is 
typically justified by appealing to a concern for the dignity of individuals or vulnerable 
groups. They cite Germany’s Criminal Code (as it was when Mistzal wrote), which prohibits 
the distribution of symbols of groups that the state has decreed are unconstitutional. The 
Code also forbids the production, exhibition, and dissemination of writings that incited racial 
hatred to persons under the age of eighteen. In addition, the law allows for prosecution, 
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without petition from the victim, of any person who insults or slanders another person who 
suffered persecution during the Nazi regime, or against a deceased person who died because 
of acts perpetrated by the Nazis.
593
In Australia, the wish to regulate access to information about past misguided separations 
policy for Aboriginal children could have been argued as a desire to preserve the inner peace 
of a cohesive society. On the other hand, people could have argued, and many did argue 
vigorously, that it was a misguided attempt to preserve a false version of Australia’s history. 
In other words, it was politically inspired. The government of the day, the argument held, 
wished to avoid attributing blame to a current generation of voters for actions for which they 
had no direct responsibility.  
Whatever the motivation, in each situation—in Germany or in Australia—the aim was to 
shape collective memory to have it accord with the image that the ruling elite preferred. 
Blustein quotes F R Ankersmit, “testimony and commemoration have become the much 
preferred matrices in our relationship to the past.” He adds, ‘neither is conducive to creative 
politics that require identification with a nation and a robust sense of a shared, national past. 
Testimony personalizes or privatizes the past, embodying a privileged and intimate 
connection between the witness and an historical reality, whereas commemoration transforms 
memory into empty rituals or objects devoid of historical significance and incapable of 
galvanizing collective action.’
594
I return for a moment to Halbwachs’ idea that since we can only grasp the present, we use it 
to reconstruct our version of the past, which we can do only through commemorative rituals. 
If it is truly the case that the ‘beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the present shape the 
various views of the past,’
595
 then all of us must lead inauthentic lives. This would mean we
endure our lives with ceaseless apprehension as we await the next, but unforeseeable, event 
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that will impose a jarring reconstruction of the life narrative on which we rely as a guide for 
present and future functioning. 
Changing circumstances or shifting public perceptions might result in a minority group that 
the community considered worthy of protection at one point in time, becoming a minority 
group to fear or revile at another point in time. The fears might be real or merely perceived. 
Moral panic can inflame them. Or, the state might nurture fears because it perceives a need to 
foster national unity against a sovereign threat—real or imagined. The objects of fear and 
condemnation might change, but the basic instincts that drive these emotions do not. If the 
rhetoric of consensus is merely a thin veneer masking competing identity group values and 
standards, then a juror who is truly independent of the influence of others will be hard to find.  
Is it reasonable to expect a jury to embody deep-seated social values? 
Earlier, I discussed Alisdair MacIntyre’s contention that we are a blend of our past social and 
cultural fragments
596
and I posed the question whether we bring the expectations that stem 
from our cultural way of being to any new experience. If we do, then those expectations must 
exert an enormous force on our interpretation of any text. Timothy Ashworth contends that, 
faced with the task of interpreting such a text, those expectations ‘shape the kind of questions 
that we ask, and, in a sense, determine what we are able to discover.’
597
 He quotes Gadamer: 
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a 
whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only 
because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. Working out 
this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the 
meaning, is understanding what is there.
598
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One might argue that the courtroom discourse is not a text in the sense of being a 
‘permanently fixed expression of life.’
599
 It is not a sequence of ‘written marks’ that are to be 
changed back into meaning through the interpreter.
600
 Yet, within the spirit of Gadamer’s 
analogy, it is a text, if one understands the discourse as text becoming one partner in a 
hermeneutical conversation, which speaks only through the jury as interpreter.  
I submit that it is appropriate to use Gadamer’s analogy to liken the hermeneutical 
conversation to ‘a real conversation in that it is the common object that unites the two 
partners, the text, and the interpreter.’
601
 In his judgment, it is perfectly legitimate to speak of 
a hermeneutical conversation, because, ‘[just] as the translator makes mutual understanding 
in the conversation possible only by becoming involved in the subject under discussion so in 
relation to a text it is indispensable that the interpreter involve himself with its meaning.’
602
 
This means the interpreter’s own thoughts have gone into determining meaning.  
The difference between the language of a text and the language of the interpreter, or the gulf that 
separates the translator from the original, is not merely a secondary question. On the contrary, the fact 
is that the problems of linguistic expression are already problems of understanding. All understanding 
is interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language, which would allow the 
object to come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own language.
603
  
This brings us to the nub of the problem as Gadamer sees it, and—by extension—brings us to 
the dilemma of the jury reaching an understanding. That is, the need to put one’s own 
prejudices and preunderstanding at risk in conversation to reach an understanding. 
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Prejudices as a condition of understanding, or transient community prejudices masquerading as 
standards? 
Gadamer draws on the Enlightenment theory that there are two kinds of prejudice; one 
derives from ‘over-hastiness’ the other from ‘authority.’ According to this theory, ‘over-
hastiness’—or impulsiveness—brings errors of judgment because one applies one’s own 
reason. ‘Authority’ results in one not using one’s own reason at all.
604
 Gadamer suggests that
a person assumes a position of authority, not through ‘blind obedience to a command,’ but 
with recognition of the knowledge of the other. That is to say, ‘he has a wider view of things 
or is better informed… because he has superior knowledge.’
605
 Their judgment, therefore,
takes precedence. 
In the type of understanding that Gadamer puts forward, the Enlightenment invoked the 
methodologically disciplined use of reason to avoid the error of overhastiness, which is the 
product of one’s own reason. On the other hand, ‘authority’ is responsible for not using one’s 
own reason. Gadamer challenges the Enlightenment exhortation to fight the ‘false 
prepossession in favour of what is old, in favour of authorities.’
606
 In fact, he suggests that
those who argue against those prejudices that favour authorities could overlook some that 
might be true. ‘If the prestige of authority takes the place of one’s own judgment, then 
authority is in fact a source of prejudices. But this does not exclude the possibility that it can 
be a source of truth, and this is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all 
authority.’
607
Anthony Daniels, writing under the pseudonym “Theodore Dalrymple,” puts forward an 
argument to counter the ‘cruel effect of not instilling right prejudices’. He draws on his 
experience as a doctor in a women’s prison, where he encountered the plight of ‘girls who 
come from the pitiable homes they were in the process of reproducing.’ He explains: 
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Emerging from a loveless environment – in which hostility, not just to people, but to the world in 
general, is always more marked than tenderness – the girls seek to assuage their need for love by 





Is it right—is it kind or decent, let alone realistic or sensible—to expect a girl who describes in the 
following fashion her decision to have a child to generate moral principles for herself? 
“ 'Cos I wanted children – and I wasn’t – you know – doing anything else really – I wasn’t 
working and – so it wasn’t – nothing just – nothing getting in the way really – so – I was, like 
lost – I didn’t know what to do with myself, 'Cos I was just working and thinking, this is 
pointless – I’m not enjoying this, or I’m not enjoying what I’m doing at the moment”
609 
Daniels (Dalrymple) describes her as a girl in need of a right prejudice. ‘To overturn a 
prejudice is not to destroy prejudice as such. It is rather to inculcate another prejudice. The 
prejudice that it is wrong to bear a child out of wedlock has been replaced by the prejudice 
that there is nothing wrong with it at all.’
610
 This, he argues, is a prejudice against prejudice.  
Many years earlier, Gadamer had reached the same conclusion. ‘What is necessary is a 
fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there 
are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being.’
611
 
In fact, individual prejudices, more than individual judgments, are the historical reality of 
man’s finite, historical mode of being. He asserts that history does not belong to us; we 
belong to history.  
Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves 
in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a 
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distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuit of 
historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the 
historical reality of his being.’ 
612
  
Counsel in a trial before jury do not have to do justice to ‘man’s finite historical mode of 
being,’ nor do they have to find a universal truth. They must work with what they have—the 
particular audience with which the jury selection process has presented them. They can worry 
no further about whether their audience is a statistically valid sample of its universe.
613
Nevertheless, counsel must act as if the particular audience is universal and marshal their 
arguments to appear to be master of that universe. However, that mastery might not lead to 
revealing substantive truth. It is on this point that the focus on ensuring that a jury adequately 
represents the community from which it is drawn can lead us astray from the search for 
substantive truth.  
5 The risk of misunderstanding community common sense as universal 
The universal truth of which Gadamer,
614
 and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
615
 write is not a
synonym for the lay reasoning of the community, which the jury purportedly represents. Nor 
is the universal audience of which they write synonymous with the statistical universe from 
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which the jury is drawn. The statistical universe that is the source of the jury comprises 
individuals, whose prejudices, not judgments, constitute their self-evident historical reality. 
One can idealize community common sense as a kind of universal common sense, which has 
a historical context in that it is beyond immediate experience. But, this only tenuously 
accords with the real audience that courtroom counsel must persuade. The universal audience 
is an imagined audience—that the arguer constructs—comprising all rational human beings. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca seem to recognize this shortcoming.  
Indeed, if arguments are not compulsive, if they are not necessarily convincing but only possessed of a 
certain force, which may moreover vary with the audience, is it not by their effect that we can judge 
this force? This would make the study of argumentation one of the objects of experimental psychology, 
where varied arguments would be tested on varied audiences which are sufficiently well known for it to 
be possible to draw fairly general conclusions from these experiments.
616
 
Thus, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca redirect their study to the constructed audience of the 
arguer, where they can examine the methods of proof of ‘advertisers in newspapers, 
politicians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings, judges in decisions, and philosophers in 
treatises’ to construct a theory of argumentation.
617
 
However, Richard Lempert does not see the jury as the solution to judicial ambivalence about 
competing social values.
618
 He argues that if social science wants to wield influence, to do 
something ‘worthwhile’, in finding ‘the solution to a real-world problem...a sense of 
accomplishment in being cited by the Court is misplaced, for most social science research is 
only cited in the footnotes, and these footnotes are seldom, essential to court opinions.’
619
 He 
suggests that, worse, ‘they may have been added by law clerks long after the decisions they 
support in fact were reached, and the Court’s reading of the social science is frequently 
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imperfect if not downright wrong.’
620
 He advocates targeting the legislature and legislative
committees. This is ‘less common than it should be if influencing the law is the goal.’
621
 He
claims that, ‘generally speaking’ the legislature is ‘better equipped’ than courts to use 
research intelligently. 
They have professional staffs, some members of which may have graduate social science training, and 
they are better situated than courts to make systematic studies of issues. Legislatures have the 
additional advantages of setting their own agendas, which not only can make social science relevant 
but may also be influenced by social science research in the first place.
622
But, the legislature does not hold a cure for judicial ambivalence on social values. A problem 
with ‘own agendas’ as a working philosophy is that they might not be value free. They can be 
influenced unduly by the power of constituents—voters—on whom members of the 
legislature rely to remain in office.  
A debate in the Western Australia Parliament about a Bill to change the Juries Act shows that 
voter reaction to legislation was important in the minds of those debating the Bill. The 
Attorney General had introduced the Bill to alter the Juries Act to reduce the number of 
permissible peremptory challenges to prospective jurors during the empanelling process. He 
had drafted the Bill after considering research, which the Law Reform Commission of 
Western Australia had carried out. The parliamentary debate , conducted mostly by former 
lawyers—which might have contributed to the problem—centred largely on personal 
anecdote, and intuitive judgments based on their experiences.  
The Attorney General found peremptory challenges unsettling because of the potential 
damage they could cause to the self-esteem of those who were challenged. The Shadow 
Attorney General retorted that, therefore, the proposed change was merely a ‘whim’. He also 












peremptory challenges. It was an unnecessary drive, he said, because, ‘the peremptory 
challenge takes less than thirty seconds: ‘counsel says “challenge” and the person does a U-
turn and goes back into the balance of the pool sitting at the rear of the court. A peremptory 
challenge does not hold up any time in the court.’
623
  
The Attorney General praised the Law Reform Commission for its work. Nevertheless, he 
tempered his praise:  
I detect there is sometimes a tendency for the general public, through the media, to consider that if a 
body outside Parliament—even one commissioned by the Parliament—comes up with an answer, it 
must be the perfect answer, and any variance from that recommendation represents some kind of 
wrong-headed ideology, obstinacy or a failure to see truth and reason. I caution some care about that 
kind of concept.... If the Law Reform Commission made a recommendation that was latterly instituted 
by government and it turned out to be not practically functioning terribly well, I can guarantee that 
people would not be complaining to the Law Reform Commission.
624
 
His slight praise, with which he does not quite damn, highlights the agenda-setting priorities 
of the legislature. His summing up is dogmatic.  
We all want to enjoy a properly functioning criminal justice system, but, at the same time, statistics 
clearly show that a huge swathe of us want nothing to do with it. We complain vociferously if things 
turn out in a fashion and produce outcomes that we do not think, based on the little knowledge we have 
of them, are right. But we also have a predilection to divorce ourselves completely from it. What this 
legislation tries to do is put through the Parliament a set of rules about jury duty that hopefully will 
change something of a mindset and impress on people that excuses must be real and narrowly defined; 
the reason being that this is terribly important and everyone must be a part of it to make it work.
625
 
Social research in the interests of truth in justice was not in consideration in this context. The 
focus was the fair distribution of jury service. Clearly, the gulf between the art of the possible 
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that constrains the legislature and the sometimes-abstruse domain of the social scientist 
exists. Social research in the interest of justice was not on this agenda. From this standpoint, 
legal practice is, as the term suggests, practical. Therefore, we have two principles in 
potential conflict. There is the principle of individual human rights, which the institution of 
the jury supposedly symbolizes. And, there is the principle of formal justice, which requires 
that ‘beings in the same category should be treated in the same way.’
626
Rules of formal justice and the problem of precedent as quasi-logical argument 
The rules of formal justice require consistency without recourse to expediency or to the idea 
of might as right. There is no consideration of where the power resides. This is rational 
decision making, with appeal to a universal audience. The rule of justice requires that the 
final arbiter of justice give identical treatment to people and circumstances of the same kind. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe this as deriving from the ‘principle of inertia,’ which 
explains ‘the importance that is given to precedent.’
627
 Thus, in The New Rhetoric, they say,
‘[t]he rule of justice furnishes the foundation which makes it possible to pass from earlier 
cases to future cases. It makes it possible to present the use of precedent in the form of quasi-
logical argument.’
628
 Which means that precedent, when presented as stare decisis (let the
decision stand) becomes more than merely quasi logical. Judicial history has implied it is 
truly logical. 
However, when a judge alone uses precedent as a quasi-logical argument or as an “implicit 
rule” to support formal justice rules, it brings into question how the judge processes 
precedent. Is there a moral consequence in following past judicial opinions without 
considering whether the judge arrived at it by ‘sound or defective’ reasoning?
629
 Or, if that
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decision was arrived at by applying the rational reasoning of a universal audience, has the 
inherent character of a universal audience changed since that decision? The precedent (using 
the word in its sense as guide rather than the stare decisis literal meaning of “let the decision 
stand”) is only the carrier of the narrative that judges must interpret before deciding how to 
continue it. For a conscientious judge, this is an onerous task because the ritual force of 
institutionalized law is coercive. It offers the institutional excuse. 
The coercive power of the institutional excuse. 
David Luban calls the propensity of role agents to shelter behind the morality of the 
institution, the ‘institutional excuse;’
630
 it justifies the role agent performing the requirements
of their role to the end that the institution determines. So, the motivation to act transmutes 
into a mantra—‘my station and its duties’—which relieves the role agent of any 
responsibility for their act. The institutional excuse has its roots in Luban’s ‘theory of 
justification.’ It proposes a series of justificatory levels, each of which justifies its existence 
and function by appealing to the demands of the level (or link) above it. It works as follows: 
Link one - Institutions:  justified by demonstrating its moral goodness; 
Link two - Roles:  justified by appealing to the structure of the institution; 
Link three - Obligations:  justified because they are essential to the role; 
Link four - Role Acts:   justified because the obligations require it. 
So long as the role agent at any level is convinced that the institution is morally good, they 
can justify their role act by appealing to the level above them. The weakness in the 
institutional excuse lies in the justificatory independence of each level in the hierarchy. It 
does not matter to the role agent at that level whether there is a weak or strong moral 
justification for the level above it. All that ‘my station and its duties’ requires is that the role 
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act crosses a minimum threshold of justification to warrant performing it. Therefore, all the 
role agent needs to do to invoke the institutional excuse is to accept that their institutional 
roles are morally desirable. They have then shifted responsibility for their role acts to the 
institution.
631
 In hard cases, judges might face the need to contort themselves intellectually to
distinguish facts from precedential cases if they wish to continue the legal narrative in the 
most satisfactory way. They must do this without damaging the twin bastions of judicial 
convention: precedent and stare decisis. Sometimes they must contort the facts to conform to 
judicial orthodoxy to avoid charges of judicial adventurism.  
Ronald Dworkin, who champions the idea of ‘law as narrative,’ sees the judge’s role being to 
advance the story that the legislature or other judges have begun. He rejects the opinion that 
judges should decide cases wholly independent of morality, and asserts that the judge has a 
moral obligation to sharpen the fuzzy boundaries, and close the gaps, that strictly positivist 
law leaves in its wake.
632
 The inference one can draw from Dworkin’s proposition is that we
carry out our reconstruction of the past through language woven into narrative, which, in the 
judicial process, manifests itself in stare decisis. However, as I interpret Dworkin, he is 
arguing that judicial precedent has to be more than a sort of marking template that judges use 
to compare or distinguish the evidentiary facts of the case before them. So, one also can infer 
from Dworkin’s reading that a judge sitting alone ought to view precedent as an element of 
the judicial narrative that stimulates thoughtful deliberation, and does not stifle it. Moreover, 
it must not diminish the worth of the individual. 
The rules of justice can decree broadly the criteria against which to assess categorisation. 
However, they cannot dictate if, or when, two specific people are in the same category and in 
identical circumstances. This is the province of argumentation. Hence,
 
it raises the further 
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question of whether the jury is an essential safeguard against arbitrary application of the rules 
of stare decisis. 
The jury as shield against the coercive power of bureaucracy 
The jury is a safeguard against arbitrary decision making by the bureaucratic state. That is its 
justificatory mantra. But, this is appeal to a particular audience, from which the jury derives. 
And, as the Lilburne case shows—perhaps to an extreme extent—this can appeal to self-
interest. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca acknowledge that the particular audience is self-
interested. This means the audience carries prejudices. However, they argue that the presence 
of a universal audience within it mitigates their effect. The rhetor must use it to win 
adherence to their thesis. Tindale points out that “effective” rhetoric ‘is often seen to have 
license (or to take license) to exploit such traits.’
633
 However, he also points out that
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca resist this. ‘While the success of their rhetoric is the ability to 
gain the adherence of an audience, they do not sacrifice reasonableness to effectiveness.’
634
What Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca propose is that, in appealing to the particular audience 
to accept the proffered thesis, the rhetor ‘presupposes the partial identification of beings by 
putting them in a category and applying a treatment foreseen by members of that category.’
635
The aim is to present to the particular audience what is unquestionably reasonable, as the 
audience members would see it according to their values. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca use 
an example from Demosthenes, On the Treaty with Alexander, to illustrate: 
Would they claim, perhaps, that a treaty which is unfavourable to our city is binding, and yet refuse to 
recognize it if it gives us any guarantees? Do you find this just? What? If a clause of the treaty is 
favourable to our enemies but unfavourable to us, they insist that it is valid; but if, on the contrary, they 
633
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find in it a clause which is just and advantageous for us and disadvantageous to them, they think they 
must oppose it vigorously.’
636 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca contend the rationality of this is so evident that, ‘since they 
are parties to an agreement, their behaviour to each other should not be different.’ By putting 
to the audience an incontrovertible fact from a rational universal audience, the deep-seated 
values underpin the community of the particular audience; the rhetor allies the thesis to that 
fact, and wins them over to the rhetor’s preferred thesis. However, the universal audience that 
underpins the particular audience will change over time as attitudes about what is reasonable 
change. But, as Tindale points out, the degree of change will depend on the communities in 
question and ‘the ways in which they come to agree with or challenge the views of others.’
637
We should use the term communities in its widest sense, which means seeing cultural 
diversity within a single jury universe, as well as acknowledging differing viewpoints of 
diverse identify groups, whether ascribed or assigned.  
The jury represents a particular audience defined by its values and standards. So, what counts 
as reason—community common sense—has ‘a bedrock of attitudes, opinions, and beliefs that 
are stable and widely accepted.’
638
 Christopher Tindale draws on Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca to depict demonstration as rational, and dependent on mathematical reasoning, which 
works from self-evident and immutable truths. Reasonable is ‘the domain of the holistic 
inquirer, who draws on experience and dialogue with others.’
 639
 Here, then, he diverges from
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca—who do not find emotion necessary to their discussion of 
argumentation—to suggest that, whereas the rational person finds support in ‘logos’, the 
reasonable person ‘supplements this with pathos and ethos.’
640
 In this context, ‘logos’ means
reason and judgment. What is important is that, in applying these elements of values 
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elements, the ‘human reasoner’ transforms the logos that the rational person espouses. He 
asserts, ‘[u]nlike the “rational  person” in whom reason is separated from other human 
faculties, the reasonable person judges reason as only one component within the project of 
human development, as something that is instantiated in real audiences. They, actual 
reasoners in real audiences, are the source of the principles of good argumentation (emphasis 
in the original).
641
However, Tindale raises the concern that reason underlies itself and is ‘its own justification in 
some form or another.’
642
 He adds, that ‘[t]he arguer, audience, and argument itself exist in
relation to a situation that is defined by them and defines them.’
643
 So, should this constitute
authority for identifying the characteristics of a universal audience that reside in a particular 
audience? Should an observer judge the audience reasonable or unreasonable according to 
this uncertain authority? Is the universal audience in this case nothing more than ‘a product of 
the arguer?’
644
 In other words, does the arguer merely construct a universal audience that is
the ‘imagined community’ of all rational beings?
645
 In fact, Tindale contends, it is possible—
or perhaps he could say, reasonable—to infer that all rhetorical audiences are constructed 
‘whether universal or particular.’
646
If both universal audiences and particular audiences are constructs of the arguer, then the 
distinction comes down to arguer choice whether the discourse focuses on the real or the 
preferable, on facts or values. Tindale argues that, ‘[i]n addressing the real, a 
speaker…considers the men and women in the audience not in terms of their nationality or 
religion, for example, but as rational human beings. Discourse focused on values can never 
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interpretation, one can suggest that counsel construct a universal audience, using their own 
notion of reasonableness. What is more, as I have discussed earlier, counsel in the courtroom 
might arrive at their notion of reasonableness intuitively. 
Conclusion  
In a significant way, argumentation to persuade differs from the notion of conversation, the 
goal of which is to reach an understanding. As I have shown earlier, Gadamer talks of 
‘partners’ in conversation, not ‘participants.’
648
 Furthermore, he argues that prejudice is not 
an impediment if the partners, although they start from their respective prejudiced 
standpoints, converse cooperatively with the aim of arriving at an understanding that informs 
them both.
649
 However, my case study shows that counsel are not partners in conversation. 
They are courtroom adversaries. They are participants in oral combat, each playing to 
persuade the jury to accept their argument. Also, we have seen that for a person—our juror—
to rise to the level of the universal, they must sacrifice their particularity. Gadamer would 
submit that Truth already resides in the conversation. A conversation in partnership merely 
reveals it. But adversarial discourse operates to advance one prejudiced standpoint at the 
sacrifice of the other. Thus, it inhibits ascent to the universality to which the juror ought to 
aspire. Those who seek to win their jury audience need to understand these influences. 
To imagine (for that is all the rhetor can do) a universal audience common to diverse 
communities—a universal audience that reflects their agreements on values and standards—is 
difficult. Tindale suggests that a rhetor can do no more than construct a universal audience 
that makes possible a ‘common insight’
650
 into what characteristics of reasonableness the 
diverse communities share. I suggest that is a reach beyond grasp for courtroom advocates in 
a theatre in which the conceptual principles of argumentation confront concrete reality. In the 
circumstances, the goal of the advocates—counsel—will be persuasion, not conviction. The 
motivating force is pragmatism, easy to misjudge as common sense. The justice value at risk 
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is substantive truth. But, if the state and its people value the symbolic presence of the jury, as 
I have discussed in Chapter One, then increasingly courtroom advocates will need to tailor 
their courtroom discourse to an audience that can never be truly universal. Rather, they will 
be attempting to persuade a particular audience comprising disparate prejudices and 
predispositions. It is an audience with a need for stories, which are not tightly constrained by 
rules that aim to move evidence from story into a presumed value-free rational core.  
To sum up the thrust of Chapter Five in one sentence, I have proposed a need to draw on 
social disciplines beyond law if the justice system is to understand better the nature of 
community common sense in an age of a new social consciousness. This summing up 
captures the essence of Law and Literature foundation member James Boyd White’s opinion 
that ‘theory as a product of reflection’ should take its meaning from the original Greek word 
‘theorin,’ which means ‘to review a situation and try to learn something from it.’
651
  
This has been my focus in Chapter Five—engaging social theory to review our understanding 
of community common sense. Now, theory as a product of reflections provides my link to 
Chapter Six in which I sharpen my focus particularly to Law and Literature theory to harness 
better the power of courtroom discourse in jury trials. I do not try to elevate literature to a 
higher plane of cultural performance. I do embrace White’s express wish to encourage a 
transformation of law to ‘a compositional art, as a set of activities by which minds use 




                                                 
651
 Gaakeer, above n 45,10 
652
 White, above n 25, 17 
218 
CHAPTER SIX: What courtroom advocates can learn 
from embracing legal and literary theory
Introduction 
I closed Chapter Five with James Boyd White’s observation that he was not trying to elevate 
literature to a higher plane of cultural performance. But, he did wish to encourage a 
transformation of law to ‘a compositional art, as a set of activities by which minds use 
language to make meaning and establish relations with others.’
653
 In this chapter, I focus on
that dictum and explore especially how understanding the nexus between law and literature 
can help those who operate within the adversary trial system to make meaning through 
discursive advocacy. I emphasise that my focus is the potential for discursive distortion of 
meaning in an adversarial trial before a jury, not in a trial before judge sitting alone. 
In helping to understand how distortion of meaning can occur, and what insights one needs to 
counteract that potential—whether calculated or accidental—my emphasis in this chapter is 
on law and literature. But, it is not literary analysis nor discourse analysis; and this is an 
important qualification. Earlier, I cited James Boyd White from Justice as Translation, in 
which he expressed his view that, simply comparing law with literature can evoke the 
depressing thought that law ‘can be made to seem a dead, bureaucratic, over conceptualised, 
unfeeling language...’.
.654
 Any personal sampling of the performance of courtroom advocacy
will reward the researcher with compelling evidence that—at least in so far as its use by 
courtroom advocates—the language of law need not be dead or unfeeling. That, of course, is 
why it can distort meaning. On the other hand, it can mould meaning to conform to 
understanding in what I have referred to as this new age of social consciousness. Therefore, I 
653
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need a description of “literature” that sits more comfortably within the milieu of advocacy to 
an audience of laypersons. 
A literary dictionary defines literature as ‘that body of works which —for whatever reason 
(my emphasis)—deserves to be preserved as part of the current reproduction of meanings 
within a given culture (unlike yesterday's newspaper, which belongs in the disposable 
category of ephemera).’
655
 This definition is wide enough to include non-fictional works in 
philosophy, history, biography, criticism, science, and politics. On the other hand, if one 
considers only genre Point of Sale (P.O.S) signage in a bookshop—those that do still sell 
books comprising printed word on paper—one is likely to see such  signs as “Popular 
Fiction;” “Non-fiction” (and subsidiary category signs); and, in a small section to one side of 
the main people traffic aisles, “Literature.” There one will find a diverse assortment of works 
that are creative, imaginative, fictional, or (definitely) non-practical. Sometimes, within this 
P.O.S categorization, there will be a smaller sub-section labelled “classics.” Publication date 
(longevity) seems to be the main determinant of what constitutes a classic. Even Harry Potter 
does not yet seem to have threatened this criterion. 
Whatever definition one prefers, the common criterion against which to evaluate the work is 
that it deserves to be preserved. Who decides? For what reason? In my discussion, which 
follows in this chapter, I do not follow the myriad leads to a perceived definitive statement of 
what literature is. Many of those leads tend towards “ought” statements rather than “is.” 
Instead, I stay with a broad definition of literature as a body of written works, as my footnote 
references shows.
656
  But even that definition merely defines a universe; it consciously avoids 
constraints like “Law as Literature.” Yet, one might counter with the question, but have you 
not been discussing law as literature especially in Chapters Three and Four? Yes, but not 
hogtied by formalistic constraints, as I will now explain. 
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I believe that taking the narrower view of literature is why some legal theorists see 
difficulties with law as literature. William Lewis,
657
 for instance reasons, ‘The possibilities of 
achieving White’s conception of a more open, more humane, more communal, more 
rhetorical law are limited by the generic constraints of official judicial discourse and by the 
ideological constraints shaping the composition and interpretation of judicial opinion.’
658
 
Lewis decides from this that the ‘law-as-literature project is ‘insufficient to the goals it seeks’ 
because ‘trials are available for public display only within well-defined generic bounds.... 
The political result is that trials are likely to reinforce the legitimacy of the law and to 
conceive the nature of a particular case within relatively narrow ideological constraints, and 
that in a way to reinforce the dominant structures of power and authority’.
659
  
Although ‘celebrating’ White’s fundamental recognition that language shapes perception and 
directs action, and that texts create communities, Lewis believes that White claims too much 
when he asserts that those who control our languages have the greatest power of all. Lewis’ 
concern is that ‘he [White] does not account for the resistance to change that is built into 
social form and the social practice of legal discourse.’
660
 But, he does share with White the 
belief ‘that it is vital to insist upon the activity of language and its social embeddedness, 
especially within the legal community which so often attempts to establish and reinforce its 
authority by maintaining the illusion of transparent representation.’
661
 What makes him 
sceptical about the efficacy of law as literature is the ‘as yet unanswered question [of] how to 
maintain the romantic vision basic to the art of building communities (from which the 
meaningfulness of both narrative and law derive), and, at the same time, recognize the 
oppressiveness of authority, the reality of inequality, and the existence of dissensus and 
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incommensurability.’ That, he argues is law’s essential tragedy: ‘the constitution of 
community that is law’s greatest strength and also its fatal flaw.’
662
Thus, Lewis, although sharing White’s view that language and texts create communities, 
rejects the idea of law as literature. He views its efficacy against a romantic vision of the ‘art’ 
of building communities. On the other hand, though, Lewis’s ‘romantic vision’ suggests 
impractical idealism, and his ‘art’ suggests beautiful or thought provoking works. This, I 
submit, is because he speaks of law as literature, whereas White discusses law as narrative. A 
narrative is a descriptive story, which better portrays the practical act of building 
communities than does speaking of literature as a romantic vision. This romantic vision, I 
believe, is the converse of White’s viewpoint. He does not argue that judges and lawyers 
need to be well versed in the plot lines of extrinsically validated written texts as literature. He 
suggests only that they draw from the theory of creating literature—defined widely—to 
appreciate the significance and centrality of narrative in applying law.  
Yes, a supplementary question might demand, but doesn’t the only slightly looser “Law and 
Literature” hogtie you just as effectively? I answer that question now. 
Richard Posner in Law and Literature
663
 emphasises the differences between law and
literature, which are ‘rooted in different social functions.’
664
 Nailing his colours to the mast,
Posner launches into his discussion of the commonalities and intersections of law and 
literature from the position that ‘[l]aw is a system of social controls as well as a body of texts, 
and its operation is illuminated by the social sciences and judged by ethical criteria. 
Literature is an art, and the best methods for interpreting and evaluating it are aesthetic.’
665
As pragmatist—and, perhaps not surprisingly, as advocate of the association of law with 
economic rationalism—he looks to validate the respective roles of law and literature 
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according to practical consequences. This might explain why he discusses the novel 
predominantly as a ‘substitute for history and social science,’
666
 which is at odds with
White’s view that the importance of literature is that it, raises the significance and centrality 
of the idea of law as narrative.  
For instance, Posner dismisses A Passage to India
667
 as a useful tool for judicial
interpretation. He accepts, without a need to justify his selection, that EM Forster’s novel is 
literature. Correctly, I think, he identifies the trial of Dr Aziz on a charge of assault as the 
pivotal point of the novel. Perceptively, he draws from Forster’s description of the trial the 
‘sense of the unbridgeable gap between Western rationality and Eastern mysticism’,
668
 and
the inexorability of a passage to independence. I suggest that his interpretation, as astute as it 
is, does not go far enough. Posner acknowledges that some commentators believe that A 
Passage to India illustrates the power of narrative to influence attitudes and outcomes. 
However, he cautions, ‘the numerous factual errors...suggest the perils of using novels as a 
substitute for history and social science even for journalism (My emphasis)’.
669
 Had Posner
reviewed A Passage from India from the same standpoint as that from which White views 
literature, he might have come to a different conclusion. It is the value of literature as an 
enriching aid—not as a ‘substitute’—to understanding that the rational pragmatist misses.  
The ending to Forster’s novel acknowledges the power of customary prejudice to thwart the 
desire of culturally constrained individuals to form unsanctioned personal friendships.  
“Clear out, you fellows, double quick, I say...if it’s fifty or five hundred years we shall 
be rid of you, yes, we shall drive every blasted Englishman into the sea... and 
then...you and I shall be friends.” 
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“Why can’t we be friends now?” said the other... “It’s what I want. It’s…what you 
want.” 
But the horses didn’t want it – they swerved apart; the earth didn’t want it, sending 
up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail, the 
palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest house, that came into view as they issued 
from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn’t want it, they said, in their hundred 
voices, “no, not yet,” and the sky said, “No, not there.”
670
 
The conversation between  the two friends—the English schoolteacher and the Indian 
doctor—also  stands as metaphor for the inherent, but often unacknowledged, truth that all 
law is ultimately personal. When we establish law’s processes as a custom of society, 
(institutionalise it), we might mask that reality, but we cannot deny its truth. In the process, 
we risk also establishing prejudices as custom. That last passage in Forster’s novel is a 
poignant metaphor. Its imagery motivates a viewing of law as narrative to help bring law 
down from the conceptual plateau of impersonal law—which, when taken at its endpoint is 
an illusion—to the valley of human vulnerabilities. This is where law works at a very 
personal level to shape the identities of persons as human beings.  
So, I end this introduction to Chapter Six with an apt grace note—EM Forster’s epigraph to 
another of his works, Howards End—“Only connect.” And, I begin the first section of my 
comprehensive discussion with that same epigraph. 
The curious ambiguity of common sense: why the jury needs to hear 
stories 
‘Only connect.’ E.M. Forster 
I explained in Chapter Five how wrong perceptions of common sense and community values 
can lead to misdirected organization of jury trial discourse. It might not be deliberate 
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misdirection, but it can be just as damaging. I have suggested that to understand better the 
nature of common sense and its relationship to community values, we need a cross-discipline 
approach to theory to augment theories of law. Historically, Harold Berman contends, ‘a 
social theory of law’ was concerned with ‘the extent to which the Western legal tradition has 
always been dependent on…belief in the existence of a body of law beyond the law of the 
highest political authority.’
671
 It was once called divine law, then natural law, and, more 
recently, human rights.
672
 However, there is a view within the judiciary that Law’s own 
experience so enriches legal practice that it has no need for theory.
673
 I challenge that view. It 
leads to searching for solutions to problems in pragmatism, which might dispel a problem, 
but not necessarily resolve it. 
The pragmatic driver of courtroom advocacy is persuasion to adhere to counsel’s preferred 
narrative of the case. And the preferred narrative of the case is that which steers clear of 
perceived ambiguities of substantive truth—the output of the consciousness of witnesses—in 
favour of the rational certainty of legal truth, which is the mediated output of rules of 
evidence. Substantive truth bows to legal truth, in pursuit of which courtroom discourse is 
organized. Legal truth implicitly founds on the premise of equality, in that the rational 
certainty of legal truth treats all parties alike; they are legal persons ‘free and equal subjects 
of the law’s address’, with an equal capacity for free will.
674
 The pertinent question, though, 
is whether this means merely that they are free in the sense that this equality strips them of all 
their idiosyncratic characteristics. In Mabo (No 1) (1988) Wilson J (later, Sir Ronald Wilson) 
said that formal equality before the law does not always achieve effective and genuine 
equality. He added that the extension of formal equality in law to a disadvantaged group 
might have the effect of entrenching inequality in fact.
675
 Wilson J was addressing his 
comments to the imbalances that affect Aboriginal people. Viewed more widely, his 
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comment invites the question whether the language of the law tends to create an all-
embracing class of objectified ‘legal persons’, which denies cultural realities and social 
inequalities. 
Some will argue that to suggest the need to accommodate idiosyncratic characteristics 
confuses the real world ‘is’ with a head-in-the-clouds dream world ‘ought.’ Dennis Patterson, 
for instance, lauds legal pragmatism of a narrative conception of legal discourse. He opines, 
‘pragmatism’s merit lies [in] the recognition that our collective energies are better spent 
working within the limits of the possible rather than attempting to transcend the infinite’.
676
 
He asserts that, ‘[t]he success or failure of our conceptual schemes must be judged not 
relative to “the world” or “reality” (moral or otherwise), but with respect to the degree to 
which problems are solved (or dissolved)’
 677 
  
Making a problem disappear is not the same as resolving it. To embrace pragmatism reflects 
a preference for the bureaucratised culture with which White takes issue.
678
 The 
inextricability of social rights and political legitimacy is a case in point. When individual 
human rights are at stake, the role of law ought not only to be to seek ‘efficacious’ solutions, 
but to seek solutions that are rooted in justice and morality. As Patterson uses the word, 
efficacious is a synonym for pragmatic.
679
  
Serena Parekh presents a contrasting view to ‘contemporary justification of human rights 
[that] either look for an objective foundation or simply assert the pragmatic importance of 
human rights as their justification.’ She asserts that ‘in times of moral crisis, conscience is a 
better safeguard against human rights violation than moral norms alone.’
680
 She offers her 
view as alternative to that of Hannah Arendt, who argues that ‘the realms of morality and 
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political judgment are strictly separated...because the standard of morality is the integrity of 
the self, while the purpose of politics is the world.’ This means that politics has to think 
beyond ‘the harmony of the self.
681
 However, Parekh argues that ‘[t]hough conscience is
concerned with a unified self that may be at odds with the world, it was formed not through a 
purely subjective or introspective experience, but by taking the world into account. The self is 
a unity but remains linked to plurality.’
682
Parekh’s notion of the self as unity but as still part of plurality—or the collective—underlies 
my discussion in Chapter Five of courtroom advocates’ need to understand the nature of 
community common sense. Not to understand the shades of meaning of substantive truth that 
reside in the testimony of witnesses, and in the consciousness of jurors, is to misunderstand 
the nature of community common sense that is the purported heart of jury relevance. 
Former New Zealand High Court judge, EW Thomas claims that judicial scepticism of theory 
stems from a belief that ‘legal practice [is] sufficiently rich to make theory redundant.’ He 
adds, ‘While it is acknowledged that theory can provide an ancillary role in limited areas of 
practical skills, those skills remain transcendent’
683
 He lays much of the blame for this
reaction on the arcane language theorists use, as well as on the relevance and remoteness of 
much of the legal theory they espouse. He argues that scepticism of theory generally is 
misplaced and dangerous.’
684
James Boyd White adds another dimension to that viewpoint. He believes theorists should 
express their theories in plain English, which avoids mystifying abstractions, and judges 
should ‘integrate’ at least some of these legal concepts into their reasoning. 
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Former Australian High Court Judge, Michael Kirby makes the point that creatively 
departing from precedent requires a judge to exercise ‘skill, ingenuity and courage.’
685
 But 
Kirby’s warning carries in it a deference to precedent, which might merely be judicial 
deference to a concord that, because it has withstood the test of time, precedent is an 
elemental truth. Yet, this deference might itself only be judicial pragmatism. That is, it is 
safer to rely on the idiom, “better the devil you know” than the devil you don’t know, which 
waits in an appeal to a higher court.  
Laurence Goldman
686
 seems to endorse White’s caution about the seductive allure of concept 
and its cognates.
687
 Goldman observes that pre-literate society did not debate a concept 
according to some developed linguistic register. Nor did they reify concepts into specific 
legal terminology, as literate society does. They simply expressed them in normal, everyday 
language. He is dismissive of those who ‘theorise in splendid isolation’ about whether or not 
a society has a particular legal ‘concept.’ The relevant question is what the society does with 
the ‘concept’; who does it, in what context, and with what effects.
688
  
Though tacit, there is an underlying theme in the views I have cited here. That is, the need for 
simplicity in reciting the narrative of the case. In earlier chapters, I have discussed broadly 
the importance of social theories as supplement to legal theory in the organisation of 
courtroom discourse. The overarching theme of my study is the potential for discursive 
distortion of meaning in a trial before a jury. Furthermore, I have stressed that a standard 
model of language is not adequate to illuminate meaning in courtroom discourse. Therefore, 
in the rest of this chapter, I probe beyond the constraining paradigm of the sufficient richness 
of legal practice to argue that courtroom advocates can learn from literature why there is a 
need to organize courtroom discourse to account for the differing social realities across 
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cultures. In short, why in adversarial trials before juries there is a need for stories. So, I begin 
the next section by telling a story. My story—a fragment of real life—shows why the way we 
perceive community common sense can be ambiguous. It leads us into discussing how 
literature can highlight this ambiguity in a non-threatening way and guide us to a resolution 
of it.  
A morality tale 
It was about 10 o’clock in the morning. I was standing with another senior executive and a 
group of fellow employees in a fourth-floor office of a major bank in the central city. We 
were watching a real life-drama playing out on a narrow ledge of a building, which was 
awaiting demolition, across the road.  
A young woman sat on the ledge with her feet dangling over the edge staring into the street 
below. Every now and then, she would raise a brown paper bag to her face and seemingly 
sniff its contents, oblivious to the entreaties of those inside a nearby window. At times, she 
would lean forward perilously as if contemplating the next ultimate move. On the roof of the 
building, a team of police officers was searching for anchor points for abseiling equipment; 
the plan was for two of them to abseil down the face of the building—one on either side of 
the young woman—and grasp her before she became aware of their presence. 
Suddenly, the tense silence in our office was shattered: ‘Jump you stupid bitch, you’re no use 
to anyone.’ Incredibly, the source of this insensitive outburst was my fellow executive. 
Almost instantaneously, my Personal Assistant who was standing alongside me clutched my 
arm and pulled me into the corridor saying that she needed to speak to me urgently. When we 
were outside, she explained that she knew I was about to explode, and she felt she should 
stop me. Her reason: I could not change the attitude of my fellow executive, and I would only 
create an unseemly confrontation in front of staff, for no useful outcome. Bowing to her 
pragmatically astute judgment, I remained silent and watched whilst the police officers 
successfully executed their rescue plan.  





This human drama did not make the nightly television news services; it would have been 
different had the young woman jumped or fallen to her death. But, she survived—for  the 
moment at least—and, therefore, was not news; just a drug addict squatting in the shell of a 
deserted city building with street kids and homeless people, and according to one confidently 
proclaimed judgment at least, of no use to society. Nothing to see here. 
Viewed microcosmically, the incident was a vignette of communitarian repudiation of 
individual human rights that perceives the self as ‘an antecedently individuated subject,’
689
 
and an affirmation of a moral authority under which ‘we cannot conceive of our personhood 
without reference to our role as citizens, and as participants in a common life.’
690
 To my 
erstwhile colleague, this young woman had debased her role of citizen by violating the 
behavioural norms of society. His retribution was to invoke the moral authority of ‘his’ 
community to pronounce her worthless, thereby surrendering to his moral panic, or what in 
criminal legal theory one would call, moralisation. Extrapolating to the community at large, 
his morally panicked reaction emblematises a wish to remove a problem when it threatens the 
‘common life’, or the security of individuated ‘personhood’, rather than to understand and 
resolve it. What is more, my pusillanimous silence was a wordless synecdoche for the 
conscience paralysis that pervades the community when individual or group behaviour 
threatens the collective equanimity. Level headed analysis of the cause is likely to give way 
to a pitiless urge to remove the behaviour for the greater good. In this way, moral panic can 
create isolated, feared, or disvalued minority groups.  
At its rational core, which is the focal point of rules of evidence, the incident described 
objectively is a female sitting on a ledge high up on a building, threatening to jump, or 
risking falling, to her death. Two police officers abseil down from the roof directly above, 
and grasp her.  
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At the rational core, at the probative level, that is as much as a jury needs to hear from an 
objective witness standing in the office from which I viewed the incident, to decide that the 
woman had broken more than one law. She is a lawbreaker, who police officers have now 
arrested. That for our observers is where the story ends. “All right, everybody, back to work.” 
Common sense prevails. But, add the actions of the three characters of the sub-plot of my 
narrative, who were watching from their shared vantage point across the road, and the 
incident takes on a social dimension.  
The businessman opts for the pragmatic solution. ‘Jump you stupid bitch.’ Had she jumped, 
the problem is resolved. No need to “transcend the infinite” by wasting community resources 
on finding out why. The woman is a disvalued member of a minority group of drug addicts, 
which the community fears or despises. She has gone; the greater good is served.” Common 
sense carries the day. 
To those choosing to “transcend the infinite,” she is a victim of a pitiless society, which has 
failed to recognise her emotional needs, driving her to seek solace in her addiction. She is not 
guilty; we—society—are to blame. But. As Hannah Arendt explains, “when the collective 
does nothing to right an injustice, we can subsequently wring our hands and say ‘we are all 
guilty,’ but, she points out, ‘when we are all guilty no one is.”
691
. Pragmatic! All right,
nothing we can do. Everybody back to work” Common sense wins out. 
But, whose common sense? In which solution lies community common sense? For which 
would the community strike a medal bearing the names of the jurors, as they did for John 
Lilburne’s jurors? 
Using story to conflate truth and usefulnes. 
For democracy to be truly just, would demand that there is ‘a single best conception of 
justice, which can serve as the reference point for defining a non-arbitrary standard of 
691
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 Richard Arneson suggests that there is no guarantee that fully 
reasonable persons will be able to select that reference point. He reasons ‘...that the fact that 
several conceptions of justice are equally acceptable for all we can know is fully compatible 
with there being a plethora of popular and decisively unreasonable views concerning the 
requirements of justice, any of which might command a majority of votes in a democracy.’
693
 
Thus, any vote of a representative sample chosen democratically might well represent 
community common sense. That, however, does not necessarily make the vote the morally 
best outcome. What is more, John Berger gives us pause to be sceptical of common sense. 
 
Common sense is part of the home-made ideology of those who have been deprived of fundamental 
learning, of those who have been kept ignorant. This ideology is compounded from different sources: 
items that have survived from religion, items of empirical knowledge, items of protective scepticism, 
items culled for comfort from the superficial learning that is supplied. But the point is that common 
sense can never teach itself, can never advance beyond its own limits, for as soon as the lack of 
fundamental learning has been made good, all items become questionable and the whole function of 
common sense is destroyed. Common sense can only exist as a category insofar as it can be 




He adds that common sense is static, belonging to the ideology of those who are socially 
passive, ‘never understanding what or who has made their situation as it is.’
695
 Berger’s view 
is, perhaps, jaundiced and elitist. Yet, the state has so institutionalised community common 
sense as the raison d’être of the jury system that it presumes twelve jurors will neutralise 
conflicting ideologies and prejudices, and arrive at a value-free best outcome.  
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But, Arneson argues, even direct democracy can be unjust. Thus, he supports an 
instrumentalist approach that favours granting legislative decision-making power to those 
most capable of securing the ‘best outcome.’ whether or not the decision-making power is 
democratically determined. He draws on Bertolt Brecht’s ‘propagandist play’, The Caucasian 
Chalk Circle,
696
 which, Arneson claims, aims to justify the morally unjustifiable—Stalinism. 
Brecht has ‘the singer’ (in effect a solo from the Greek Chorus) close the play with a verse 
containing the line: ‘That what there is shall belong to those that are good for it... ’.
697
  
Arneson uses this line to support his interpretation of Brecht’s plot as justifying removing 
disputed valley land from its owner, who is using it inefficiently, and giving it instead to 
someone who can use it more productively, something that resonates with Arneson’s 
instrumentalism.  
The climactic action of the play—the action that gives the play its name—supports his 
assertion. To decide which of two women should have the child whose custody they are 
disputing, Brecht’s morally dissolute judge reprises Solomon’s test and uses a variant of it—
the Caucasian chalk circle test—to decide that the young boy should stay with the servant 
who truly loves and cares for him, rather than with the boy’s grander, but self-centred, 
biological mother. The Singer ends the play:  
 
  Take note of the ancient song   
That what there is shall belong to those that are good for it, thus... 
  The children to the maternal, that they may thrive; 
The carriages to good drivers, that they may drive well; 
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That sounds like a parable of community common sense. But, the interpretative process is not 
straightforward. To ally this parable to community common sense, one can choose from two 
alternative viewpoints. The first is a communist morality tale that secularises, and presents an 
anti-Christian interpretation by portraying Christ as the drunken, venal judge Azdak. The 
second is to analyse the plot no further than the triumph of Christian morality in awarding 
custody of the child to the truly caring one of the two woman claimants.  
This raises the question whether, when determining a best outcome, we bring to the task 
preconceived expectations from our cultural and social life narrative that ‘shape the kind of 
questions that we ask, and, in a sense, determine what we are able to discover.’
699
 Arneson’s 
choice of The Caucasian Chalk Circle to support his instrumentalist preference exemplifies 
the process by which a role agent’s expectations, derived from preconceptions, are central to 
consideration of the law-morality divide and to one of its potentially invidious consequences: 
role morality. What David Luban calls, the ‘institutional excuse’ grounded in his ‘theory of 
justification,’ as I discussed in Chapter Five. 
Arneson accepts the ‘political legitimacy’ of the principle Brecht espouses because it 
conforms to his instrumentalist preference for political power to reside in those who can use 
it ‘according to the standards of best results.’
700
 Unfortunately, he then leaves it ‘an open 
question’ what is the moral standard for determining which of a range of possible results is 
best, which leaves him free to talk about moral outcomes in utilitarian terms, although he 
does not use that term. However, he does contend that, ‘[n]o one has an ascriptive right to a 
share of political power...it is wrong to hold that each member of a modern society just by 
being born has a right to an equal say in political power and influence.’
701
 His desired 
outcome is one that best promotes the common good over the long run, which is an outcome 
with a decided utilitarian bent. J.S Mill makes the same point: 
                                                 
699
 Ashworth, above n 489, introduction, xx 
700




Everybody has a right to feel insulted by being made a nobody, and stamped of no account at all. No 
one but a fool, and only a fool of a particular description, feels offended by the acknowledgment that 




To subscribe to this viewpoint is to give substance to a claim that the justice system does not 
need the jury. Alternatively, if the state feels it needs merely to justify its legitimacy, the jury 
need be no more than symbolic—a modern day Greek Chorus. Even if, in the less-than-one-





 the people have expressed their will. It does not matter if an appeal court
overturns the finding. The people can fulminate, but still feel that the process works, because 
the formless ‘they’ have had their say.
705
The Greek Chorus analogy is apt. With all its artfulness, it is a metaphor for contemporary 
social and political practice, in which—no less than in the intrigue of ancient Greek 
tragedy—it is a useful tool for those who wish to give the impression of hearing, but who are 
not really listening. The role of the Greek chorus, which grew out of the tragic dramas of the 
ancient Greek theatre, was to help the audience follow what was happening on stage by 
explaining the story, suggesting how an ideal audience might react, and communicating the 
unspoken fears, hopes, and other secrets of the characters. Over the centuries, the role 
evolved into a commentary on the moral of the story, which meant separating the chorus from 
the dramatic action. However, in neither period could the chorus change the narrative to 
achieve a denouement that differed from that which the author had prescribed.  
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Determining the value of an idea by its success in action 
Implicit in the justice system’s commitment to the jury is a sense that it is a safeguard against 
any public perception of value judgments of a trial judge sitting alone. Or, what might seem 
like arbitrary judgments, even when the judge purports to ground their judgment in the 
principle of best outcome. However, seldom is a best outcome criterion value-free. 
Furthermore, if a role-agent invokes a theory to support their preferred outcome—whether 
grounded in the ‘institutional excuse’
706
 or their unconsciously embedded predispositions—
they are begging the question. To relieve the moral indecision that a conflicting opinion on 
what constitutes a best outcome may cause, the role agent needs to think of a theory as real 
and tangible if it is to be authoritative. That is, it must become the rule that provides the 
institutional excuse to perform the task. On the other hand, reification of a rule that has 
supplanted justification—even if properly validated—is a bedevilled act. It leads to the 
question, what are the practical consequences when moral truth transmutes into ideology. 
How does ideology shape and constrain the ideologue’s sense of obligation to all persons that 
is inherent in the conception of democracy for all. How can a rule be ‘true’ if, as Hart 
discusses, it is vulnerable to the vagaries of open-textured language? How can a judge’s 
common sense application of precedent be ‘true’ if common sense comes down to, as Hart 
contends, ‘striking a reasonable balance between the social claims which arise in various 
unanticipatable forms?
707
 When a trial judge sitting alone seeks to strike a balance between 
what the law states, and the social claims of the majority, best outcome is a product of 
judicial discretion. However, in a trial before jury, do jurors too seek to strike a balance 
between what the law states (as the judge directs), and the social—majoritarian—common 
sense they profess to represent? But, if we are uncertain about what common sense 
comprises, we are ill prepared to assess the truth of the common sense of others. Richard 
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Gregory aptly captures this uncertainty in his observation that philosophers ‘frequently’ 
question ‘common sense with a curious ambiguity.’
708
 
The instrumentalist approach is a variant of pragmatism, requiring, as philosopher John 
Dewey holds, that truth of an idea lies in its usefulness, that is, ‘thinking is an activity which, 
at its best, is directed toward resolving problems rather than creating abstract metaphysical 
systems.’
709
 In practical terms, this seems to mean using ideas only to resolve a problem to 
relieve the unbearable weight of trying to understand it. It merely determines the value of an 
idea by its success in action, which does not require the cognitive effort of determining 
whether a theory is true. It argues that removing the problem is sufficient in itself, without 
applying the cognitive effort to address or even acknowledge underlying issues. Little wonder 
that philosophers question common sense with curious ambiguity.
  
Where does community common sense lie on the legal positivism—natural law 
continuum? 
In human rights, is a Greek chorus role for the jury adequate to the task of ensuring justice? 
Hard-line positivists would assert, yes—especially those who think that decision makers in 
the judicial system who appeal to moral principles are ‘trespassing on the roles of priests, 
statesmen and moralisers, and violating their responsibilities to decide cases according to 
what the law is, not what it should be.’
710
 Furthermore, if the answer is yes, then one might 
infer that the role of the jury ought to be symbolic only. Natural lawyers, on the other hand, 
will argue that the social history of law cannot ignore the common law tradition, which began 
with a belief in a law beyond that which politicians make. It began with Divine Law. Divine 
Law became Natural Law. Today, we more secularly recognise it as human rights.  
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Hard-line legal positivism and transcendent natural law lie at either end of a continuum of 
legal theories. In between, we confront conflicting, extrapolative, and tangential theory 
viewpoints that complicate search for truth and certainty in law. This means the justice 
system ought to work to an inclusive understanding of the collective narrative that inspires 
minority identity groups. It means a shared understanding of the nature, and rights 
entitlements of identity groups to aid in the organization, rules, and procedures of criminal 
trial courtroom discourse. Otherwise, the jury is merely a symbolic Greek Chorus.  
Yet, Valerie Hans’s research reveals that her respondents would prefer ‘overwhelmingly’ to 
face a jury rather than judge alone if facing a criminal charge.
711 
Conversely, in a radio 
interview (The Law Report, Radio National Tuesday, 4 September 2007), then WA District 
Court judge, Justice Valerie French said that if she were guilty of a crime she would prefer a 
trial by jury. If she were innocent, she would prefer a trial by judge alone, because judges are 
more likely to focus on the real issues. Her comment is but another way of saying what 
Justice Thomas proposed: we judges know the law; we deal with reality, not with emotion. 
But, what if the judge fails to see that what they take as the reality is really the metaphor? In 
the next section, I examine the potential of law and Literature theory as an aid to analysing 
courtroom discourse. This means understanding the relationship of Law’s language of 
narrative to the language of literature. 
Law and literature as an aid to analysing courtroom discourse 
Law and literature is a field much ploughed, and seeded with competing theories. Yet, no 
single theory has found a universal receptive market for its produce. William Lewis
712
puts 
forward resistance to change as an obstacle. Perhaps this is because it is difficult for change 
to blossom in the shadow of legal formalism. Legal formalism is the resort of those seeking 
certainty in law. The theory holds that when the state constructs the rules, judges apply them 
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to the facts without regard to public policy or competing moral theories. Formalism is the 
domain of legal positivism and the viewpoint that a judicial decision that is correct according 
to the law is just. It is just—the theory holds—not only for the beneficiary of the ruling, but 
also for the unwilling benefactor. It is just, and it is certain according to HLA Hart.
713
 He
asserts that, ‘If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which 
multitudes of individuals could understand, without further direction, as requiring from them 
certain conduct when occasion arose, nothing we now recognise as law could exist.’
714
Richard Posner is another who is sceptical about the value of literary theory to the practice of 
law, but for a different reason. He maintains that the influence of literature on law is 
primarily on style.
715
 His formalist views are at odds with the opinions of founding law and
literature proponent, James Boyd White, who is dissatisfied with the ‘bureaucratised culture 
[that] reduces human actors to very narrow roles, human speakers to very thin speech.’
716
But, thin speech is exactly what the rationalist wants. 
One can best describe the difference between bureaucratic thin speech, and inter-personal 
thick speech through relationships. Avishai Margalit explains that, thick relations are those 
that we have with family and friends, lovers and neighbours, our tribe and our nation—and 
they are all dependent on shared memories.
717
 But, we also have ‘thin’ relations with total
strangers, people with whom we have nothing in common except our common humanity. He 
explains, ‘thin relations rely on some aspects of being human, such as being a woman or 
being sick,’
718
 which differs from our thick relationships to our ‘near and dear.’ He suggests
that when the self-as-individual transforms ‘I’ to an element of a collective entity, the ‘true’ 
individual ‘self-resides as an element a ‘single’ social whole—the majoritarian collective 
713
 Hart, above n 140 
714
 Ibid 124 
715
 Posner, above n 332, 5 
716
 White, above n 25, 20 
717
 Avisha Margalit, The ethics of memory (Harvard University Press, 2004) 
718
 Ibid 7  





group.719 He asserts that when state resources destroy, or discourage a ‘thick’ relationship 
with the ‘near and dear’ of a personal identity group, influences that clash with the objectives 
of the state have less force. This is the province of thin bureaucratic speech that White claims 
reduces human actors to very narrow roles. A role for which—in that view—resort to 
storytelling is a distraction. 
Eschewing the story in search of the rational core 
I have noted Laurie Kadoch’s observation that storytelling is the most effective tool of 
persuasion at trial. At the same time, however, she also suggests that rules of evidence and 
numinous symbolism combine to guide the trial narrative away from storytelling to get to its 
rational core. This, she suggests, is because the Anglo-American trial seeks to achieve a 
Rationalist Model ‘characterized by rectitude.’
 720
Thin speech, which eschews the notion of 
‘thick’ relationships with any personal identity group, gets to the rational core. To relate that 
to my illustrative case study example of Witness wanting to explain why he crossed the road, 
one can frame it as an admonition from the judge, along the lines of ‘tell the court that you 
crossed the road; don’t tell it what you were thinking as you did so.’ Perfunctory, and 
probative according to the rules of evidence. And, unhelpful to developing the story Witness 
wanted to tell. 
Literature as an aid to testifying free of Bureaucratic strangulation 
Because he is dissatisfied with bureaucratized culture, James Boyd White turns to literature to 
identify a process through which people have the opportunity to tell their stories free of 
bureaucratic strangulation. He wants to reveal the ‘cultural inheritance that is analogous to 
what we call the law.
721
 That is, ‘that set of resources of speech and thought that is in function 
like the body of cases, statutes, and other precedents that define a lawyer’s situation by 
offering him certain occasions upon which, and certain material with which to speak (and by 
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 What he seeks in reading literature as law, and law as literature, is a 
less assertive, more open and tentative approach; to find ‘voices of our own that will more 




Understanding the relationship of the language of law and the language of literature 
As I have explained, White sees a mutual relationship between language and identity. And, 
when he asserts that who we are helps to remake language, he stresses that we do it both as 
individuals and as a collective entity, because we construct language socially. Language 
defines the community to which we belong. ‘Our language is (White’s emphasis) the set of 
shared expectations and common terms that enable us to think of ourselves as a “we”—and 
that language too can be transformed.’
724
 This is especially relevant to law, which, because of 
its preeminent position, has the power to institutionalize the collective narrative that binds a 
community. ‘As an ethical or political matter, then, the structure of the legal process entails 
remarkable possibilities—little enough realised in the event—for thinking about and 
achieving that simultaneous affirmation of self and recognition of other that many...think is 
the essential ethical task of a discoursing and differing humanity.
725
 
In the preamble to The Legal Imagination, and later, in Justice as Translation
726
, White notes 
that simply comparing law with literature can evoke the depressing thought that law ‘can be 
made to seem a dead, bureaucratic, over conceptualised, unfeeling language...’ He then asks 
rhetorically ‘What does it mean to devote your life to speaking such a language, in such 
forms, and with such voices?’
727
 He wants to achieve something more than unfeeling 
language. He wants to encourage a transformation of law to ‘a compositional art, as a set of 
activities by which minds use language to make meaning and establish relations with 
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 that is, to create a new reality. For White, understanding the relationship of the 
language of Law and the language of literature is a necessary step to a better appreciation of 
law’s role in society.  
Jeanne Gaakeer too poses a question rhetorically: ‘is law a mere system of rules or is it a 
culture of argument that addresses the questions of value and community?’
729
 If it is the 
latter, then the role of literature, as a medium through which questions of value and 
community are raised, is to remind lawyers and judges that interpretation is not passive; it 
demands their active participation in the process, which means being conscious of their own 
roles in grasping meaning. Antoine de Saint Exupery expresses it poetically. ‘When you write 
to Man, you freight a ship. But few such ships reach port. They founder in mid-course. Few 
are the phrases that go echoing through history. Much, perchance, I may have signified, but 
little have I grasped.’
730
 
James Boyd White contends that ‘[t]he work of the lawyer in general, and the judge in 
specific, is...literary’.
731
 He stresses that ‘central to the enterprise of law is the idea of 
translating the stories of clients, parties in a lawsuit, into the language of law, and where the 
judge is concerned, of translating these stories into a new reality for the parties involved.’
732
 
Here lies both opportunity and risk. White proposes that “law as literature” is important as a 
vehicle to raise the significance and centrality of the idea of law as narrative. He believes that 
language and identity operate reciprocally. In some respects, language makes identity; in 
other respects who we are remakes our language, and influences how we use it. Language, he 
points out, is the set of shared expectations through which we think of ourselves as ‘we,’ or 
‘us.’
733
 The correlative next step—and risk, I believe—is to view a group that does not share 
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our view of language as our expectations as ‘not-us’—but as an ‘other’—which ‘we’ should 
view with suspicion at best, repulsion at worst.  
Richard Posner argues that legal and literary interpretation have nothing useful (his emphasis) 
in common.
734
 He rejects Dworkin’s notion of the judge contributing to a judicial chain
novel, because, the chain novel analogy places no constraints on the ‘authors’ of chapters 
subsequent to the first. ‘Each author can in the first sentence of his chapter kill off all the 
existing characters and start anew,’
735
 even if this would not be ‘cricket.’
736
 He submits that
the answer lies in training judges in economics, as I have discussed earlier. Yet such is the 
power of literature, and the use of metaphor, which enriches it, that Posner, resorts to 
‘cricket’ as a metaphor for fairness to make his point meaningfully. One can infer that he did 
so because he was writing to a specific cross-Atlantic audience who, on the British side, 
embrace the game of cricket as a cultural institution. 
The metaphorisation of reality in courtroom discourse  
Gadamer maintains it requires “partners” in conversation to reach an understanding of 
meaning, not just “participants.” It requires an alliance in search of a mutual object. Again, I 
seek illustration of the difference in metaphor. Antoine de Saint Exupery expresses it this 
way:  
But it was then I understood how different is that alliance linking two together from mere good-
comradeship, and sharing in common. All of them, I told myself, accost each other using a half-fledged 
language, which though it hardly signifies professes to convey. Wherefore you see them busy plying 
their scales and measuring tapes. All have logic on their side, but too much logic; they are but right and 
therefore mistaken. They make dummies of each other for their shooting practice.
737
 
Both Gadamer the philosopher, and de Saint Exupery, the contemplative writer, illustrate the 
point that the Rationalist Model of adjudicating eschews, namely, that storytelling is the best 
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way to persuade an audience. Laurie Kadoch is more emphatic, claiming that some go so far 
as to proclaim that, ‘“[w]ithout story, all delivery in the world is meaningless” because as 
[e]volutionary anthropologists tell us . . . our need for story is encoded in our genes.”’
738
 This 
might be so, but it is the Rationalist Model that guides the formation of adversarial discourse.  
In The Legal Imagination,
739
 James Boyd White contends that the work of lawyers is literary. 
But, he sees a distinction between the mind that tells the story, and the mind that gives 
reasons; ‘one finds its meaning in representations of events as they occur in time, in imagined 
experience; the other, in systematic or theoretical explanations, in the exposition of 
conceptual order or structure. One is given to narrative, the other to analysis.’
740
  
This suggests that the work of a lawyer in analysing the actual experiences of people, as they 
recount them, to form a story that demonstrates the legal truth, differs from the work of the 
jury. As we have seen, the courtroom advocate is given to narrative. Their task is to mediate 
the raw facts of witness testimony, then mould the mediated remainder into a believable 
narrative of those facts that will persuade the jury of the truth of those facts. In this process, 
the jury applies the law as given to facts as found. But, those mediated facts as found become 
the legal—not necessarily substantive—truth. This is because a story that persuades has to 
cross a lower threshold of substantiveness than a story that convinces. So, to what extent does 
the “imagined experience” of the storyteller differ from the persuasive narrative that the 
courtroom advocate moulds from the mediated remainder of witness testimony? As I 
suggested in my introduction, not as much as one might think. For example, both the 
imagined experience of the storyteller, and the systematic explanation of the reasoning mind, 
use metaphorisation, not just for style, but also for substance. And, as David Punter writes, 
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In literature, one expects, and indeed looks for, metaphor as a means of adding poetry to 
perhaps an otherwise prosaic account of an action. A metaphor used beyond style in legal or 
political discourse has an unstated intent to manipulate meaning to a preferred end. 
According to Punter, within the metaphor lurk ‘latent’ and ‘manifest meanings’,
742
 a kind of 
‘sleight of hand by means of which meanings can be smuggled into apparently innocent 
discourse.’
743
 ‘[W]e expect...to discover... [it] stands in for something else’ (Emphasis in the 
original).
744
 Thus, metaphor can obfuscate. It can reduce a complex contention of doubtful 
veracity to a powerful image that does not have to withstand the glare of objective, 
deconstructing scrutiny. And, when metaphor becomes the reality, it can change the way 
people see their collective responsibility.  
Gaakeer stresses the active role of interpreting. ‘Since interpretation is always an act, the 
outcome of any process of interpretation is never given beforehand, neither in literature, nor 
in law. We work out meaning, we do not find it ready-made; we make, rather than find 
law.’
745
 That we make, rather than find, law is a broad claim. I submit that what we can state 
reasonably is that we do not find meaning ‘readymade,’ so we find it difficult to apply 
readymade law to something about which the justice system is hesitant enough in indictable 
criminal trials to choose to find meaning by applying community common sense through the 
jury. This means that we cannot force meaning into a procrustean bed of readymade accounts 
of language. We have to remake the bedstead, not just change the bed linen, which is an apt 
allegory with which to discuss the power of metaphor to enrich or to distort meaning. 
Harnessing the compelling manipulative power of metaphor 
Novelist James A Michener moves into Litterateur mode in his novel Legacy
746
 to show how
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create a different reality. Michener’s fictional narrator is Major Norman Starr, who is to 
appear before a congressional committee to answer questions about his alleged part in the 
Iran contra deal and its spin-off scandals. The political scandal was real; it occurred in the 
second term of the US President Ronald Reagan’s Administration. In the novel, the fictional 
Starr spends a tense weekend contemplating whether he should join a long list of other 
‘heroes’, including Oliver North, in ‘pleading the 5
th
’ or whether he should do what he knows
is morally right, and deal honestly with whatever the committee throws at him, whether or 
not that results in gaol time. While he grapples with the moral dilemma, he thinks back on the 
long line of his high achieving American forebears, including one who, novelist Michener 
imagines was present at the 1787 convention that decided the wording of the proposed US 
Constitution. At this point in his novel, Michener tantalises us by seeming to slip from 
novelist to historian. He records, or speculates on—it is up to the reader to decide which—
how the framers tortured the English language to yield words that would satisfy slave owners 
without adulterating the noble cause of the Constitution.   
A potential stumbling block
747
 in the discussion was the conflict of views between North and
South about how to deal with the issue of slaves. The South wanted to include them in the 
count in deciding the number of representatives it should have in the congress, but did not 
want slaves included when determining tax collections. Moreover, they wanted to enshrine in 
the document the North’s responsibility to return any escaped slave to their rightful owner in 
the South. However, when they reached a compromise and started to write the document, 
they baulked at using the word ‘slave’ in a constitution that also enshrined the nobility of 
freedom. They overcame their squeamishness about defiling the document with such ignoble 
thoughts by resorting to a piece of eloquent circumlocution. Instead of slaves imported from 
747
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246 
Africa, the South now had ‘such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper 
to admit.’ Nor did it appear seemly to ask that the North should return fugitive slaves to 
bondage. The delegates resolved this dilemma not so much by circumlocution as by 
obfuscation. ‘No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged 
from such Service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the Party to whom such 
Labour or Service may be due.’
748
 The document did not define slaves out of existence by
spuriously equating their worth with that of all other citizens, because they were, after all, 
valuable property, not citizens. However, the metaphor within the document did seem to 
define slaves out of moral consciousness. Michener’s narrator reflects, ‘...it was the best that 
could be worked out in 1787, and would preserve the nation until 1861, when a civil war 
would rectify the matter—in blood.’
749
The manipulative power of metaphor a double-edged sword 
In the preceding section, had I not wanted to persuade the reader to view the choice of 
language as egregious, I could have used an emotively neutral word instead of describing the 
act as having “tortured” the English language. I might have said the framers chose alternative 
words that would satisfy the needs and rights of landowner-employers of labour. That would 
be the bureaucratic way, eschewing emotive words likely to inflame without adding probative 
value. But, as David Punter might challenge me, I had designs on the reader’s emotions. Just 
as Witness did in my case study when he wanted to tell the jury that the man confronting him 
wanted to punch, “your fucking head off your fucking maggot shoulders,”  rather than to tell 
them more sensitively that the man was “yelling loudly.” That was the triumph of 
bureaucratic restraint over discursive exactitude, but each choice was proposed to the court in 
a claimed pursuit of justice. 
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Richard Posner ascribes to those who see literature as an aid to interpreting law as narrative, a 
brutal intention to overthrow the cold facts of history and social science in favour of fiction. 
However, I contend that claim is the recourse of the pragmatist, who seeks to validate 
decision-making by its consequences, as if ‘consequences’ itself is value-free. On the other 
hand, as I have shown earlier, often those who declare that a consequence is satisfactory are 
acting instinctively to remove a problem, but without resolving it. In that sense, it works. 
However, by its nature, instinctive thinking is unreasoned, providing a fecund pasture to 
transform prejudice into reality—expressed through the compelling manipulative power of 
metaphor as much in law as in literature.  
Conversely, Jeanne Gaakeer perceives a different risk. She believes some commentators, 
especially law and economics adherents, who claim to eschew metaphor, may fail to 
recognise that what they think is reality is in fact metaphor. ‘Language becomes the neutral 
vehicle for the communication of information in which “facts” are entities that can be 
transmitted by means of words; those encoded thoughts that are our perceptions of these very 
same facts.’ She adds,  
It is precisely this adequatio rei et intellectus
750
 that Law and Literature opposes in its view that 
literature most often shows us that what we thought was reality was “in fact” illusion, and that 
literature in showing us alternative realities can thus warn lawyers against attributing too much 
importance to what they think are facts, yet are no more than mere products of our points of view. The 
idea, in short, that literature teaches us to leave behind the mimetic theory of law and economics, and 





 “The intellect (of the knower) must be adequate to the thing (known).” In other words, if our perception of 
the plane of reality on which we are interpreting is muddied by our preconceptions, we are searching for 
meaning in metaphor, not in reality. 
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Thus, metaphor can disguise, using a powerful image to avoid discomfiting scrutiny, as 
James Michener shows in his novel, Legacy. But, we cannot ignore metaphor, or pretend it 
does not have a place in legislative or judicial discourse. It does, and pragmatist denial will 
not remove the influence—some might argue, risk—to which this literary device exposes us.  
 
As I have demonstrated, when lifted from its original context, metaphor can become the 
reality. It is now open to further metaphorisation through which mutual suspicion of the 
other’s motives become entrenched. Through metaphor, one can manipulate discourse 
perversely to serve the ends of pragmatists and narrativists (to coin a word) alike. Metaphor’s 
perversity is evident in the manner in which English law pressed it into service to remove a 
moral irritant, and thus deny the rights of the original inhabitants of Australia. Yet, two 




Metaphor for allusion, and metaphor as illusion. 
In this section, I move beyond the use of metaphor for allusion to study in its place metaphor 
as illusion. Michael Meehan gives as example of a barely relevant application of  metaphor  
as allusion in French J using Coleridge’s Kubla Khan to present Perth’s own pleasure dome, 
the Burswood Resort Complex situated not on ‘Alph the sacred river’ but on the foreshore of 
the Swan.
753
 Meehan dismisses this kind of allusion as ‘mere decoration’, which adds no 
‘essential social, legal and lexicographical information.’ Authoritative literary texts, he 
contends, should offer a ‘powerful metaphor, to evidence, the strength and tenacity of 
community feeling on a certain issue, or to assist in establishing, on the basis of long-
standing literary evidence, standards of reasonable behaviour and reasonable legal 
expectations.’
754
 It must avoid taking refuge in ‘style,’ and instead draw from literature to 
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gain a deeper understanding of the collective memory that validates for group members their 
own collective consciousness. Common to both is metaphor—alive and dead.  
Alive is how most like to think of, and use, metaphor. After all, where is the gain to one’s 
preferred viewpoint in using a metaphor to make a point if the hearers or readers do not 
recognize and applaud the user for its creative aptness, for its style? For example, the person 
who first described a less-than-scholarly person as ‘not the sharpest tool in the shed’ did so 
for effect. They wished to add power to their assessment of intellectual inadequacy in the 
object of their derision. Had they branded that person a “dunce,” the applause would not have 
been forthcoming. That metaphor died long ago.
755
 If we wish to examine the live metaphor
in action, we should use as the exploratory mother lode the utterances of court advocates and 
their courtroom judges who have the last word and, therefore, the better chance of finishing 
the trial with a metaphoric bon mot.  
Most of us use metaphors in daily speech. Whether, or how well, they work will depend upon 
what predispositions the reader brings to their processing of the text. Throughout this 
document, I will use metaphors, more often than not without intent because our normal, 
everyday, language is littered with dead or dormant metaphors. I will use them because, 
unless I go over the text with a fine-tooth comb, it is inevitable that some will have slipped in 
and will remain. One did slip in just then, but I allowed it to remain. Instead of talking about 
going over the text with a fine-tooth comb, I might have written in bureaucratic style about 
undertaking a thorough search of the document in which I examine every detail. In everyday 
conversation, in my culture, the fine-tooth comb metaphor works. It is a dead metaphor 
because it supplants in conversational speech the reality in whose place it formerly stood as 
literary allusion. On the other hand, where the connection between the metaphor and the 
subject is unclear, the metaphor is only dormant. However, “dead” and “dormant” also are 
755
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metaphors. So, already it is clear that our language is a burial field of dead metaphors through 
which we trip regularly with gay abandon.  
The difference between dead and dormant might seem insignificant. A problem occurs, 
though, when language users subject dead metaphors to further metaphorisation. In the 
preceding paragraph, I have used ‘gay abandon’ to signify ‘light-hearted and carefree’, which 
is how the Oxford English Dictionary, as recently as its ninth edition (1995), defines the 
phrase. And, it still crops up in its earlier form in the speech and writing of those of a certain 
age, (which itself is a metaphor).
756
 The OED now opines, ‘the word “gay” cannot be readily
used today in these older senses without arousing a sense of double entendre, despite 
concerted attempts by some to keep them alive.’
757
The Internet abounds with references to gay, rarely, in recent usage, with its earlier meaning 
unchanged. Language users have metaphorised it to embrace the modern meaning ascribed to 
the word gay. Abandon as a noun, however, is where the potential for mischief still lies. In 
one example on the web, under the heading “living life with gay abandon,” the text starts, 
“Love bums, not bombs.”
 758
 The article described a celebratory parade of members of LGBTI
(lesbian gay bisexual transgender intersex) community. They were celebrating a court 
decision, which decriminalised homosexuality, the consequence of which was that members 
no longer needed to hide their identity behind masks when parading. They could abandon 
them with impunity. However, those with a jaundiced view might as readily equate abandon 
with license, and measure that unfavourably against a right. In any event, gay is a dead 
metaphor. It means a male homosexual. Such is the power of metaphorisation of this 
metaphor that it has become the reality. So, it is pertinent to end this section with the 
observation that because much of what we take as reality is dead metaphor, we need literature 
756
 In its early use, “of a certain age” was used as a polite, but ironic reference to women—usually just beyond 
the  so-called menopause years—to avoid assigning to them an age number that might offend. Now, gender 
equality decrees that men can be of a certain age too. 
757




to remind us that a dead metaphor can wound as perniciously as, and more subtly than, a live 
metaphor can.  
In the new reality of a culturally diverse society, the criminal law court creates the potential 
for identity group stereotyping and for reflex responses to them. And, that is also why any 
theory of law without an accompanying social theory cannot account for the consequences of 
this new reality.’
759
Drawing from literature to live with a new reality 
 “Why is it that there are times in history when it’s all right to hate Jews or Americans or blacks or 
gypsies. There’s always a group deserving of contempt in every generation. You’re even suspect if you 
don’t hate them. I was taught to hate communists when I was growing up. I never sighted one, but I 
hated the sons of bitches. I hated blacks when I was growing up because it was a religious belief in my 
part of the world to consider them inferior to whites.” 
760
  
In that passage of dialogue from Pat Conroy’s novel, The Prince of Tides, Tom Wingo, an 
English teacher and football coach, is providing background memories of his family’s life in 
South Carolina to New York psychiatrist Susan Lowenstein. She is treating Tom’s 
schizophrenic and suicidal twin sister Savannah. Doctor Lowenstein is Jewish. The 
backgrounding sessions gradually transmute into therapy for Tom. He tries to explain his 
family’s history of prejudice against Jews, against people who did not belong in the South, 
against the elevation of the status of woman above the level of men’s property, and against 
niggers. Although now emancipated from the isolation of the social group of shrimpers that 
nurtured these prejudices, they still lurk in the lacuna of his consciousness. He cannot form 
lasting relationships beyond the bonds of love for his sister and his now dead brother. He 
covers his insufficiency with mordant, cynical humour—no matter how dire the 
circumstances in which he gives vent to it. His sister expresses her hopelessness in cries for 
help manifested in successive wrist slashings.  
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Lowenstein mocks Tom Wingo’s southern heritage. 
Does your family hate Jews? 
My family hates everyone. It’s nothing personal 
Did your family use the word nigger when you were growing up? 
Of course, Doctor 
But there must have been some educated enlightened people who refused to use that 
odious word 
They weren’t Wingoes. Except my mother. She claimed that only poor white trash 
used that word. She prided herself on saying Negro with a long “o.” she thought that 
put her high in the ranks of humanitarians. 
Do you use the word nigger now? 
I only use that word when I’m around condescending Yankees like you. Then, Doctor, 
I can’t stop myself from using the word. Nigger. Nigger. Nigger. Nigger. Nigger. 
Nigger. 
I don’t allow that word to be used in this office….What religion did your family 
practice? 
Catholic, for godsakes. Roman Catholic. 
Why did you say “for godsakes”? There’s nothing wrong with being a Catholic. 
You have no idea how weird it is to be raised a Catholic in the Deep South. 
I might have some idea. You have no idea what it is to be raised Jewish anywhere in 
the world. 
I’ve read Philip Roth.
761
And so, clearly, has the author—the imaginer—also read Roth, who vicariously has now also 
become a metaphor. 
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Illustrative of the power of using literary fiction as paradigm, is Philip Roth’s use of irony in 
his novel Operation Shylock, to make the point of the stereotypical Jew. The jacket notes 
describe the novel in part as a ‘meditation on identity, and a confession.’
 762
 By positing a
‘Philip Roth’ imposter as a sort of agent provocateur, Roth seems mischievously to challenge 
some of the internal conflicts that afflict him as a loyal Jew, echoing Mill’s lament that 
volition can become habit. Roth’s character, Kamil challenges a claim he imputes to Woody 
Allen that Jews are not capable of violence. He recites to the ‘real’ Philip Roth, ‘Tell us 
another one, Woody. The first bone they break in defence – to put it charitably; the second in 
winning; the third gives them pleasure; and the fourth is already a reflex..’
763
 Roth entwines 
fact and fiction to make a moral point. Literary fiction allows him to invoke anti-Semitism to 
dramatize Mill’s charge against all ‘men’ that behaviour remains after the original motive has 
vanished. That, for a Jew, is a provocative act. He escapes the condemnation that would have 
been his had he raised it solely as a moral issue. Through fiction, he shows how prejudice can 
become the new reality. 
What is more, in using his own identity group to make the point, Roth illustrates Mill’s 
charge against all “men” more potently than the original could do. Because of Roth’s 
prominence as a novelist, and as an observer of society, he can set Mill’s charge in the 
context of the Middle East where nations from beyond that region have behaved reflexively 
for the greater part of the twentieth century, and all of the twenty- first century to date, to 
resolve regional cultural differences. In a different region, and  impelled by different stimuli, 
Steven Galloway’s  novel The Cellist of Sarajevo
764
 makes a similar point about how easy it 
is to succumb to reflex actions.  
It is illustrative that in his novel, The Prince of Tides, Conroy should gesture to another 
novelist for support of his claim to understand another stereotyped race. Similarly, 
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although—or perhaps because—he has written a work of fiction, Conroy has conveyed the 
sense of narrative that both carries and shapes real-life personal and collective social history. 
‘It’s been interesting to come to New York, Lowenstein, and to be hated because I am 
a white southerner. It’s rather bracing and refreshing, but odd. It makes me 
understand your paranoia.”
765
The uncomfortable jolt of a shift in linguistic register 
I introduced the passage from The Prince of Tides, without advance notice that I was about to 
change register as an example of what I mean by culturally based expectations. This is not the 
institutionalized way of changing register in formal (or bureaucratic) writing. The 
surrounding text invites contemplative reading; the unheralded quote from a novel jolts the 
reader into a different landscape, which requires an unanticipated need to make a decision. 
Intuitively—reject the quote (with some impatience) as a gratuitous intrusion. Reflectively—
study the intrusive quote. And so too, by analogy, the witness, in my case study, absorbed in 
a contemplative walk with the family dog on a quiet Sunday morning, is jolted into a 
different register, his new reality and an intuitive response—cross the road. Reflective 
consideration—upon introspective adjustment to the new reality—physically threatening; 
stay on this near side of the road. 
I did not smuggle in this literary petard to blow away judicial orthodoxy. I am not 
championing law-as-literature. To do that would be, as James Boyd White notes, to make law 
seem a dead, bureaucratic, over conceptualised, unfeeling language. I am arguing from 
White’s standpoint for literature as offering in analogy stories—narratives—as a particular 
case. White wants to encourage a transformation of law through language to unveil meaning, 
as it exists in the ‘real’ reality of the valley of human vulnerabilities. Literary analogy can 
express an idea in a provocative, but non-didactic, way as a means of initiating a willingness 
to step away from orthodoxy to consider alternative ways of understanding group identity, 
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and the real nature of community common sense. I do not proffer law-as-literature to usurp 
history and social science. I proffer law and literature as an aid to understanding, and 
embracing, the ameliorating power of literary theory to translate stories to create a new 
reality. I suggest that rational pragmatists overlook this power. And, as Pat Conroy and Philip 
Roth have done, I use literature to draw attention to the danger that often prejudice becomes 
that new reality. 
Kristin Kalsem challenges the views of those who dismiss literature as a device through 
which those in the law can add style, but not any substantive truth, to their utterances.
766
 In 
the nineteenth-century, the legal system rendered women subservient to, and dependent on, 
their husbands. The legal fiction of coverture, ostensibly gave women protection through 
marriage. In practice, it stripped them of multiple rights, and denied them redress through 
law. The legal system, in fact, drove women to write ‘outside’ the law to have their voices 
heard, through pamphlets and, especially, through the novel form. Through the lens of 
feminist legal theory, Kalsem reveals the value of interdisciplinary study of law and 
literature. She cites Judith Resnik’s pertinent observation,
767
 “I bring literature to law students 
to show them what lawyers cannot yet imagine: stories that law has yet to invent, rights yet to 
be seen, and how to cope with problems seen but that stymie us by their pain.”
768
 
We see circumstances as we are predisposed to see them. Sometimes, society conditions us 
not to see to them at all. Albert Camus long ago captured the essence of this societal 
conditioning with his account of a person condemned to die beneath the blade of the 
guillotine. 
 
[F]rom the moment the death sentence is pronounced, the condemned man becomes part of an 
imperturbable mechanism. He spends several weeks within the cogs and gears of a machine that 
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controls his every gesture, ultimately delivering him to the hands that will lay him out on the last 
device of all. The luggage is no longer subjected to the operations of chance, the hazards that dominate 
the existence of a living being, but to the mechanical laws that permit him to foresee in the minutest 





This is a potent metaphor for the objectified persons of abstract legal discourse. Following 
the secularisation of law, God is no longer available to judge the morality of the 
imperturbable mechanism of bureaucratic efficacy. So, as the Crown did in the Middle Ages, 
the justice system enlists the common sense of a jury as a symbolic gesture to ‘the people’ in 
order to fortify its legitimacy as an agent of the state.  
Life imitates art 
Conroy published The Prince of Tides in 1986  Set in the time of the Korean War of the early 
1950s, his fictional work reflects the fear and generational hatred that spawned McCarthyism 
and rampant—often-violent—opposition to equal rights for African Americans, especially the 
opposition to integrated schooling in the South. Almost a decade later—January 1995, 
Michael Westerman of Guthrie, Kentucky was to give life to Conroy’s fiction and, in the 
process, give currency to Oscar Wilde’s assertion—more than a century earlier—that life 
imitates art  ‘far more than Art imitates Life,’
770 
 
Michele Zak cites New Yorker magazine writer, Tony Horwitz’s account of the death of 
Michael Westerman, a 19-year-old from Guthrie KY, who a black teenager shot and killed 
for flying a Confederate flag from his pickup.
 771
 A friend of Westerman claimed that he flew 
the flag to anger ‘blacks.’ The subsequent trial and media reporting of it rekindled the flames 
of racial hatred in rural Kentucky. Zak analyses Horwitz’s report from a critical theory 
perspective. According to Westerman’s sister, he flew the Confederate flag as a symbol of 
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rebellion, not as an affront to African Americans. In fact, the flag as symbol had what Zak 
calls a ‘fuzzy source’. The County’s high school sporting teams used the flag as their symbol; 
moreover, the youth who shot Westerman was unaware of the social significance of the flag; 
"I thought it was just the 'Dukes of Hazzard'
772
 sign," he said. Only later did he discover the 
reason for black hostility to the flag.  
Read on the surface, this is the story of a young testosterone-driven white male living the 
fantasy of the young, handsome ‘good ‘ole boys’ of a popular television series, gunned down 
by a young black male who does not like white Americans. However, only by going below 
that surface to reveal a deeper meaning can one hope to understand the actions of each of the 
antagonists in this tragedy. Each is a member of a minority group; each group feels isolated 
from the majority, misrepresented, and therefore despised. It is a true story that mirrors the 
feelings of the fictional Tom Wingo in Pat Conroy’s novel:  
Compare the fictional Wingo’s self-analysis with how sociologist John Shelton Reed 
described this population of people who had adopted the Confederate flag as a symbol of 
white pride. This is a population that ‘has really lost it in the space of a generation,’ not only 
have they suffered material losses, but also ‘the deepest grievances are cultural. They feel 
they don’t get any respect, that their culture doesn’t get any respect, and that their ancestors 
are being dissed (sic).’
773
 
Michele Zak reveals the entwined narratives of Westerman and his African American 
assailant in a description of the manner in which confederate veterans reacted to Westerman’s 
death. Her irony is harsh. 
An exhibit in a museum owned by the Sons of Confederate Veterans in Franklin, Tennessee, has the 
Confederate flag from Westerman's coffin on exhibit, along with a photograph of Westerman with a 
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caption that identifies him as the "Confederate Martyr" who had "succumbed to his wounds" after 
being "accosted by a carload of black youths who made racist remarks concerning this flag....  A 
"Confederate Martyr," not a teenage good 'ole boy driving a flashy truck brandishing a symbol of 
contemporary race hatreds. A "Confederate Martyr" who "succumbed to his wounds" - language drawn 
from the obituaries of war heroes, not from news reports of a teenage good 'ole boy who died in the 
front seat of his truck as the victim of a drive-by shooting. A "Confederate Martyr" whose martyrdom 
must have occurred as a result of his bravely exposing himself to . . . racial injustice?
774
 
Her irony is also blatant. One hundred years before, Mark Twain was no more subtle. Perhaps 
he did not have to be; he lived and wrote in a different reality, as HLA Hart reminds us. 
Huckleberry Finn, when asked if the explosion of a steamboat boiler had hurt anyone, replied, ‘No’m: 
killed a nigger.’ Aunt Sally’s comment ‘Well it’s lucky, because sometimes people do get hurt’ sums 
up a whole morality which has often prevailed among men.
775
 
Elsewhere, I have cited Geoffrey Hazard’s claim that the community to which people belong 
moulds their understanding of what, for them, is morally right. Zak, perhaps, overlooks the 
point that what drives members of groups that feel themselves isolated is the collective 
memory of the group to which they belong. To denigrate the actions of members, no matter 
how apparently bizarre, without a reasoned analysis of the narrative text that stimulates the 
action is not helpful. This presents the challenge for the judiciary. It must explore the 
meanings of the symbols that inform judicial narrative to determine along which plot line the 
path to justice lies  
Jeanne Gaakeer raises the possibility that in reaching for a judgment, lawyers and judges are 
institutionalised into accepting law as ‘a mere system of rules’ rather than as a ‘culture of 
argument that addresses the questions of value and community.’
776
 To see law as a mere 
system of rules is to accept the nexus of law with economics, a legal positivist viewpoint.
777
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Gaakeer, on the other hand, advances the proposition of the role of literature as a medium 
through which questions of value and community are raised. Robert Cover has argued that 
legal meanings are in fact ‘heavily underwritten by extrinsic narratives, by contexts of 
popular or traditional discourse which supply—as do prejudices—“history and destiny, 
beginning and end, explanation and purpose.”’
778
 Predispositions and prejudice might 
determine how any one of us reads either the fictional Wingo or the real-life Westerman 
narrative. If we look for the sub-textual meaning in each of them, what justifies us measuring 
the worth of The Prince of Tides only against aesthetic criteria, which are usually reserved for 
art, whilst using social science and ethical criteria for use only in interpreting the judicial 
texts such as the narrative that moves the story of Michael Westerman and his African 
American assailant? 
Conclusion  
The significance of literature is its capacity to encourage awareness that the discourse of 
courtroom advocacy and adjudication is not as value-free as the institutionalizing of the 
language of law would imply. Richard Rorty laments, ‘I confess…that I tremble at the 
thought of Barthian readings in law schools…I suspect that civilization reposes on a lot 
people who take the normal practices of the discipline with full “realistic” seriousness. 
However, I should like to think that a pragmatist’s understanding of  knowledge and 
community would be, in the end, compatible with normal inquiry—the practitioners of such 
inquiry reserving their irony for after-hours.’
779
 
Richard Rorty, described in the June 2003 edition of Believer magazine as America’s most 
influential, controversial and widely read living philosopher expanded his views on 
pragmatism in an interview with the bimonthly literature, arts and culture magazine, 
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Pragmatism is like Romanticism in its doubts about Platonic, universal Truth and Reason. What 
differentiates it, on my account, from Romanticism is that the Romantics tended to exalt something 
called Passion, or the Imagination, or Authenticity, or Depth, which becomes what Habermas called an 
“other to reason”—that is, something that claims to have an authority trumping that of reason. 
Pragmatists don’t believe that we have any faculty that has such a priori authority, and, in general, 
don’t want to ask the question of what has innate authority or legitimacy. Our view is that you can 
forget whether an ideal is authentic or legitimate or universal or deep, and just ask whether it’s useful 
for solving the problems of the day. What unites Plato and the bad kind of Romantic is the notion of 
your ideas having authority because of some privileged source, while the pragmatists say, “the hell 
with what the source is, let’s look at the consequences.” 
He went on to explain his claim that people find pragmatism distasteful because it has no 
ability to empower. 
Yeah, it’s basically negative and therapeutic. It doesn’t have a great, big, powerful, constructive 
message. You can’t go away inspired by the need to do something or other. You read the pragmatists 
and all you know is: not Descartes, not Kant, not Plato. It’s like aspirin. You can’t use aspirin to give 
yourself power, you take it to get rid of headaches. In that way, pragmatism is a philosophical therapy. 
It helps you stop asking the unhelpful questions.
 780
 
As Rorty’s expressed hope emphasises it is not enough to be interested only in the legal and 
social theories that underpin judicial processes. Furthermore, his lament invites provocative 
questions.
 
Is there a need to descend from airy universe of abstract theory to the concreteness 
of human vulnerabilities? Does the justice system, as agent for the state, feel vulnerable to 
community perceptions of judges’ imaginings of social reality? Can a symbolic jury 
presence—a presence in less than one percent of all cases that pass through the criminal court 
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system—assuage the state’s feeling that its justice legitimacy is vulnerable? Or, has modern 
society, comprising diverse identity groups, rendered the jury a modern day Greek chorus?  
In this chapter, I  have examined some aspects of legal and social theory that are relevant to 
what, as I have discussed earlier, some perceive as the need for a judge sitting alone to 
achieve a balance between social claims, and what the law commands. Others, as I also have 
considered, deny any obligation other than to administer the law. The correlative question is 
whether community common sense is but a jury’s way of balancing a social claim against the 
law’s bureaucratic need for certainty based on legal truth, as the judge has explained it to 
them. If that is what the jury does, it is no longer merely a modern day Greek Chorus. 
Moreover, if that is what we—society—expect the jury to be, the rules of evidence must be 
more amenable to storytelling. It will demand a different approach to comprehending the new  
social consciousness, which today’s juries must represent. This is the topic of Chapter Seven. 
  





Chapter Seven:  Comprehending a new social 
consciousness: does Australia still need the jury?  
Preamble 
I introduced my thesis with a view that in an increasingly diverse society, there is a need to 
adapt the discourse of the adversarial criminal trial before jury. Throughout the discussion, 
which followed, I explained how the courtroom discourse took on a different dimension in 
trial before jury from a trial before a judge sitting alone. I examined at length how the 
perception of the jury as the expression of community common sense changed as the 
geographic intimacy of the community it represented dissolved. 
The discussion, which precedes this final chapter, however, has thrown up an alternative to 
adaptation of discourse. Inexorably, it has raised the question whether in this age of a new 
social consciousness the jury is still relevant. For the state, cost, as well as truth in justice, is a 
consideration. And, it adds poignancy to Richard Rorty’s comments on pragmatism. If the 
state can convince its people that truth in justice can prevail without recourse to the jury trial, 
pragmatism as an aspirin “against asking unhelpful questions,” has appeal. 
My thesis has examined this now highly relevant, yet still fraught problem in new ways. I 
believe it contributes to developing a better understanding of the opportunities and risks of 
adopting an approach to the worth of a jury based on outcomes, rather than giving undue 
privilege to sources based on precedent. This is the conclusion to which my discussion in 
Chapter Seven—this final chapter—leads.  
Introduction  
When I was reviewing my analysis of the case study in Chapter Two, I realised that I 
constantly referred to Witness’s answer to the question why he crossed the road. He was 
going to, what screams had led him to presume, was the site of a person in danger. It seemed 
to be a reasonable question. On the face of it, it was just an attempt to tell the jury how the 





witness found himself at the centre of an assault. He was not part of its development, just an 
accidental late arrival to it. But, at trial, the prosecutor— impelled by a defence counsel 
objection—was telling the witness “what this court is interested in is what you saw and what 
you heard.” The court did not want to know what he was thinking. It was not until much later 
after the trial, when I had access to the transcript of the voir dire discussions that I found that 
the question, which had seemed nothing more than a device to establish the context for what 
would follow, was loaded with discursive weight.  
Throughout my thesis, I have frequently returned to this short exchange, often only 
intuitively in the first instance. Yet, in each instance, this short exchange seemed to embody 
the essence of what was in my consciousness about the nature, and relevance of the jury trial. 
Although, that essence was still inchoate. But then, after reviewing the six chapters that 
constitute my thesis to this point, I realised that I have been analysing something different 
from my stated aim with which I began this exploration. I started out exploring what I saw as 
the potential for distortion of meaning in the organization of courtroom discourse. I wanted to 
move beyond language to discourse, and to Counsel’s strategic and tactical organization of it 
to appeal to the common sense of the jury. Each of the adversarial counsel wanted to 
persuade jurors to prefer their thesis as they had embodied it in their construction of their 
narrative of the case. My focus was the discursive process as a stimulus-response mechanism. 
But, in that process, I was also uncovering something else. 
I was not seeing it because I had trapped myself in a paradigm of late nineteenth to early 
twentieth century psychology. The essence of that paradigm is the axiom: provide the 
stimulus and one can predict the response. The corollary: identify the response, and one can 
presume the stimulus. That, though, is a brain-centred analysis. I now realise that if I want to 
understand what constitutes the community common sense that the justice system prizes as an 
attribute of jury decision making, I must look beyond the mechanistic stimulus response 
action of the brain. Community common sense resides in consciousness; it is not a 
mechanistic response to a triggering stimulus. More precisely, it exists in collective 





consciousness. This is where we must begin if we are to answer the question whether modern 
society still needs the jury. 
Community common sense resides in consciousness 
The nature of consciousness 
Early twentieth century scientific psychology insisted upon recognition of a clear distinction 
between, ‘the inherently private, subjective, “first-person” world of human mental life and 
the publicly observable, objective “third-person” world of physiological events and processes 
in the body and brain.’
781
 Thus, we have, “He heard screams. What they suggested to him 
is…irrelevant… he’s not allowed to say it.” This is the science of behaviour. It is purely 
objective, which, in the view of behaviourists, natural science should be. ‘It should “never 
use the terms consciousness, mental states, mind, content, introspectively verifiable, imagery, 




In this view, consciousness equates with belief in the supernatural, non-physical exposition, 
that is, with the spiritual. And the spiritual is a superstitious clutching at a supernatural being 
to "explain away,” not explain, those essences of human behaviour that a physiological 
stimulus-response mechanism of the brain cannot explain. Modern research challenges that 
view. It has broken through the wall of a constraining paradigm to reveal the new site of 
investigation, the relationship between mind and the brain. The problem is that early 
twentieth century scientific psychology still influences the formulation of rules the justice 
system uses to decide what witness testimony is admissible. This approach of "old" science is 
analogous to "old" secular law, which, after the Enlightenment, decreed the irrelevance of 
God. In the courtroom, persuading twelve jurors is the practical imperative. Consciousness 
does not belong. Consciousness is for the philosopher to contemplate. 
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In a trial before jury, counsel are at pains to construct their narrative of the case, and, in doing 
so, they support Kadoch’s claim that, delivery without story is meaningless. That counsel 
intuitively sense the need for story also adds weight to her assertion that ‘our need for story is 
encoded in our genes.’
783
 Yet, in my case study, the witness, by deciding to involve himself 
in the incident, is no longer an uninvolved observer; he has become a participant. For the 
recounting of the incident to become a ‘good story,’ the audience would want to know why 
he thought he should involve himself in a potentially dangerous situation. The story has 
moved to another landscape.  
However, the rules of evidence operate to deconstruct the story a witness wants to tell so that 
it conforms to the Rationalist Model of evidence.
784
 But, in the courtroom, the story, for 
which the rules of evidence seem to invite a deconstructive approach, is fashioned out of 
testimony from which some facts are abridged, others excluded. Thus, deconstruction cannot 
ever be a useful or justifiable tool when one is considering the organization of discourse in an 
adversarial trial contained by rules of evidence and criminal court procedure. It is a tool for 
literary analysis. But, as I have emphasised throughout, my thesis is not literary analysis, nor 
is it discourse analysis. Yet, in spite of the constraints that the rules of evidence impose, 
counsel talk confidently about the narrative of the case, seemingly secure in their own 
certitude that they understand in a formal sense what it takes to make a good story.  
Bruner does not subscribe to such certitude. He argues that one reason we know so little 
about what makes a good story is that, unlike theoretical arguments, which ‘are simply 
conclusive or inconclusive,’ narrative builds on ‘concern for the human condition.’
785
 This 
means the story must build two ‘landscapes’ at the same time. ‘One is the landscape of 
action, where the constituents are the arguments of action: agent, intention or goal, situation, 
instrument, something corresponding to a “story grammar.”’
786
 Simply put, a story grammar 
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is the system of rules that are consistently present in narrative texts. For example, we need to 
know: 
 when and where the story happened; 
 who the story is about; 
 what happened; 
 what triggered the event that involved the important characters; 
 how the important characters responded to the triggering event; 
 what was the consequence of their response; and, 
 how the story ends. 
 
This is the point at which, in a criminal trial before a jury, the rules of evidence declare 
witness testimony should end. However, Bruner goes on to identify that other, second 
landscape. This is the landscape of consciousness: ‘what those involved in the action know, 
think, or feel, or do not know, think or feel.’
787
 However, what my case study reveals is that, 
for those who pursue the rationalist model, the second landscape is unnecessary.  
Witness: Initially, all I heard were the screams. And it were the screams 
that suggested to me that I needed to see… 
Defence: He heard screams. What they suggested to him is—it –it—
irrelevant…. Anyway, he’s not allowed to say it. 
In Bruner’s theory, though, the nature of the screams, and what they suggested, is relevant. 
He asserts the two landscapes are ‘essential and distinct.’
788
 He makes an important point 
that, in the sense of story construction, ‘psychic reality’ dominates, and ‘any reality beyond 
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the awareness of those involved in the story is put there by the author’.
789
 This moves 
knowledge of the world beyond the psychic realities of the protagonists into ‘the realm of the 
implicit,’ which means ‘matters of supposition…or…of presupposition (Bruner’s 
emphasis).’
790
 In the example below from my case study, the judge in another case—
incredulously (whether feigned or real is not evident from the transcript)—questions the 
argument of the prosecutor. 
Judge: Well, I mean, you go back to paragraph 3: Even over the noise of 
the bikes I could still hear the woman screaming, ‘Somebody, please 
help me’. 
Prosecutor: Mm. 
Judge: I mean seriously… The jury can’t follow that and work out what 
was happening? (My emphases) 
Playing out the Wittgensteinian game to a scoreless draw 
The foregoing exchange between judge and prosecutor illustrates a paradox of the rules of 
evidence. In this instance, the witness on the stand can explain explicitly what he was 
thinking. That was his psychic reality. But, the rules will not allow him to do that. Instead, the 
judge’s ruling is that the jurors, who are hearing mediated testimony because of truncations 
and exclusions, are left to suppose or presuppose what the witness was thinking. Hence, 
‘what was happening’ is not now the psychic reality that exists in the consciousness of 
Witness. It is now implicit knowledge ‘put there’ by someone other than a protagonist of the 
action. Courtroom advocates—counsel—put it there. For example, recall later in cross-
examination counsel for the defence asking Witness, ‘and because you knew of him, you—
putting it bluntly, you didn't want to tangle with him, is that right?’ On the face of it, that 
is a logically inconsistent question to put to the witness. Counsel earlier had argued 
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vehemently, and successfully, that the court should not allow the witness to tell the jury why 
he crossed the road. Now he is telling the jury that, in his opinion, the witness was fearful of 
the accused, yet illogically he gives him the opening with that question to explain why, in 
spite of his fear, he crossed the road. It is illogical because, had I as witness been more astute, 
He might have answered, “yes, I was fearful, but the nature of the screams was such that I felt 
a woman’s life was in danger and, therefore, I had no alternative than to cross the road to see 
if he could help.” Because of counsel’s question, the court would have been obliged to accept 
my answer. And, that testimony, had I given it, would have added a more persuasive element 
to the story than the answer I did in fact give, which, because I framed it as a question to 
counsel inviting him to agree that he too would not want to tangle with the accused, brought 
the line of questioning to a close. But, it still left the jury to draw its own conclusion. That 
Wittgenstein-style game, therefore, ended in a scoreless draw, added nothing of probative 
value, and simply wasted the court’s time. 
The flaw in the stimulus response model: the jury does not share the consciousness 
of protagonists 
We saw in Chapter Four how Heidegger’s insight points us to the flaw in the stimulus 
response model. He dismisses the notion of a serious and scientifically minded philosophy of 
life that adequately explains what it is to ‘be.’
791
 That approach, he suggests, posits “life” as 
an unproblematic given, ‘as a kind of unreified being.’
792 
To put that into the context of the 
protagonists in our courtroom narrative of the case, and in the context of the jurors counsel 
are trying to persuade, we see those persons as real and tangible subjects (and objects). We 
have no need to raise them abstractly to a level at which we seek to understand them as a 
whole. 
Because, to understand them as a whole we would need to talk about consciousness, the 
‘soul’ or the ‘spirit’ of the person in the pre-secular conception of Law. But, to understand the 
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person’s ‘life as a whole,’ we need to consider the ‘psychical elements and atoms’ of that life 
if we are to ‘piece the life of the soul together,’ as Heidegger expresses it.
793
  
To demand of the person testifying that they “tell the court what you did, not what you 
thought” is to reduce behaviour to a physiological response to a stimulus, which is to 
constrain it to a mechanistic brain function. This contradicts the very common sense of 
community that is the purported value of the jury. Common sense resides in the 
consciousness. Community common sense resides in the collective consciousness of the 
identity group to which the protagonist belongs. And, as I explained in Chapter Five, 
collective consciousness derives from collective memory. So, if the jury is to bring common 
sense to its decisions, it has to be able to share the consciousness of the protagonists in the 
narrative of the case. 
Edward Kelly, researcher in psycholinguistics and cognitive science, writes that although 
memory is increasingly recognized as central to all human cognitive and perceptual 
functions, we still understand little about ‘where and in what forms our past experience is 
stored and by what means it is brought to bear upon the present.’
794
 Following ten years 
working full time in parapsychology, Kelly reinforces in medical and scientific terms what 
Gadamer had reasoned philosophically in the twentieth century—that  ‘scientific 
consciousness’ envelops itself in an aura of presumed wholeness. That it is ‘already 
completely formed and already possesses ‘the right, unlearnable, and inimitable tact.”
 795
 In 
this context, I infer ‘tact’ to mean insight. Kelly makes the point that there has been 
significant progress in understanding “learning” and “memory”—what he calls “habit 
memory”—in simple creatures to explain the ‘automatic adjustments of organisms to their 
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environment.’ But, he claims, they fall a long way short of explaining satisfactorily ‘the most 
important characteristics of the human memory system, including in particular our supplies of 
general knowledge (semantic memory) and our ability to recall voluntarily and explicitly our 
own past experience (autobiographical or episodic memory).
796
 In the last century Gadamer 
argued that we need to ‘rescue the phenomenon of memory’ from its consignment to the 
status of a mere psychological faculty. In the twenty-first century, Kelly, from a scientific 
standpoint, makes a similar observation.  
Science must always seek an appropriate balance between liberalism and conservatism in the admission 
of new observations, and it tends naturally and appropriately toward conservatism, amplified in 
proportion to the depth to which the new observations appear to conflict with expectations based on 
current understanding. Contrary to the popular mythology of science, however, such judgments often 
fall short of its professed ideals of dispassionate and open-minded evaluation of evidence. Real science 
is saturated, like all other human endeavours with human failings.
797
 
Kelly believes, ‘especially in recent times, opposition to new scientific ideas comes 
principally from other scientists, and often on less than satisfactory grounds.’
798
 This 
reaffirms Thomas Kuhn’s concern that those who cling too fervently to the power of ‘normal’ 
science impede progress. Kuhn  cautions against slavishly binding oneself to a view of 
normal science as deriving from finished scientific achievements ‘as these were recorded in 
the classics and... in the textbooks’, in other words, that science is settled. For example, the 
science paradigm—or normal science, as Kuhn later preferred to call it—is  grounded in 
orthodoxy, which sets boundaries for what science is to observe; what kinds of questions it is 
supposed to ask; how it is to structure those questions; and how it is to interpret the results of 
those investigations. In other words, when one assumes that the science is settled, all that one 
may now do is emulate experiments that science regards as exemplary to, as it were, 
remeasure the phenomena that were the object of the exemplary experiments. This is normal 
science, which, by its nature, limits the range of acceptable scientific programs. It is orthodox 
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and doctrinaire. It is also a travesty of the appositeness of history to the present. Kuhn 
contends that drawing from ‘finished science achievements’ as recorded, first in the classics 
and later in textbooks, both of which are ‘persuasive and pedagogic’ is ‘no more likely to fit 
the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist 
brochure or a language text.’
799
 We saw, too that Barthes claims that the narration of past 
events ‘generally’ has the endorsement of historical “science.” And, he emphasizes, normal 
historical “science” deems the elucidation of that history ought to be bound to the ‘unbending 
standard of the “real” [and, therefore] “rational.”’
800
 
Revealing the real reality. 
Where does the ‘real’ reality lie? It lies in consciousness. But, we cannot interrogate 
consciousness—the wellspring of putative community common sense—using a stimulus-
response, scientific physiological approach. Yet the rules of evidence seem premised on a 
principle that providing unmediated testimony to the jury requires courtroom discourse to do 
just that. But, that is to suppose that bureaucratic, unfeeling language of law will stimulate a 
response rich with meaning. Testimony stripped of the ‘love, hatred, and all purely irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation’
801
 might be scientifically rational. But, I 
have argued, it cannot inspire a common sense layperson response. 
Interrogating testimony that a witness offers as fact from the standpoint of the interrogator’s 
way of being is a challenge for judicial finders of fact. The interrogator will bring their pre-
understanding or prejudice to the transaction. Where does the real reality lie? Should we 
bother to ask? 
How should they know that in a language which describes but fails to grasp, two truths may be at 
variance; that I can speak without contradicting myself of “the forest” or “the domain” though my 
forest extends over several domains without, perhaps, covering the whole of any one of them; and, 
conversely, my domain includes several forests though, perhaps, none of them is wholly contained in 
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it? And that these truths do not naysay each other. If my generals, however, hymn the domains, they 




Literature, like this work by Antoine de Saint Exupery, suggests that yes, we do need to ask. 
This is a challenge for judicial decision-makers. The risk lies in the fact that, by the time they 
do confront the life narrative of the object of their decision-making, influences such as media, 
other institutions, and the legislature might have transformed, glossed, or misrepresented the 
meaning of that narrative. The decision makers might be analysing the metaphor, not the 
reality. They might end up beheading the wrong poet. 
Courtroom rhetoric and the illusion of self-evident facts. 
Earlier, I discussed Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s acknowledgement that their theory of 
argumentation does not work if it requires that one must reduce every proof to the self-
evident. Instead, they relate it to rhetoric or the skill of discourse that enables a writer or 
speaker to inform, and persuade a specific audience. Classically, rhetoric is the art of 
influencing a particular audience to think and act in a specific way. Critics will sometimes 
use the term to describe motivational speeches of politicians. It suggests that, although 
plausible, the information the speech imparts is not reducible to the self-evident. Harshly, 
rhetoric suggests that, in this situation, truth might just be an unpremeditated result of the 
persuasive endeavour. In this view, rhetoric is the tool of the storyteller, but not of the 
scientist. However, Bruner asserts that scientists too rely on stories to fill in the gaps in their 
knowledge, ‘[b]ut their salvation is to wash the stories away’ when they can substitute causes 
for them. This means, that even though the scientist might have used “imagination” (or 
intuition); they have used it paradigmatically, not in the same imaginative way as the poet or 
novelist. Rather, they have used paradigmatic imagination ‘to see possible formal 
connections before one is able to prove them in any formal way.’
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 But eventually, prove 
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them they must. In contrast, the Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca theory does not require that 
the proposition one argues identify with the self-evident.  
Courtroom facts are not absolute. 
Why did the witness cross the road? As the old chicken faux-joke has it, to get to the other 
side. That is all the court needs to know to satisfy the probative limit that rules of evidence 
set. We then cut to a new scene in which the witness is on that other side of the road. In 
cinematographic terms, it is almost a jump cut; we have elided any depiction of the 
protagonist in the action (for that is what Witness has now become) contemplating whether to 
approach or avoid. And the interrogator—counsel for the prosecution— asks, “what 
happened.”  But, “for legal reasons,” he adds that Witness should not tell the jury everything 
that happened. So, if we reduce that passage of action to what the court decides is its 
probative essence, we are left with, “I heard screams, I crossed the road, a man approached 
me, he did not look toward a woman who was lying on the ground. Neither he nor I spoke to 
the woman. The man and I conversed briefly. I walked away.”  
We have satisfied the requirements of a stimulus-response account of the chain of events. 
But, we have not invested the account of the event with sufficient meaning to satisfy the 
needs of a storyteller. Moreover, the decision to elide certain facts is discretionary. The judge 
decides what they will admit as probative. That is the decision by which counsel must abide. 
But, the judge too brings cultural or ideological presuppositions, or prejudices to her or his 
decision on what inferences jurors might draw from testimony. Thus, we have another tier of 
mediation between what resides in the consciousness of witnesses, and what the rules of 
evidence and of procedure allow to enter the consciousness of jurors. I express it that way to 
make a point that, as I have discussed in Chapter One, facts in the courtroom are not absolute, 
despite the arguments of invariantists for the one “true” fact that does not depend on context.  
“Apply the law to the facts” is a judicial recitation to jurors as they retire to consider their 
verdict. However, it is in consciousness that the jurors find their facts and, if they are to bring 





their community common sense to the identification, the facts they find will be contextual. In 
the illustrative case study, the context might be geographic; it might be temporal—time-
based—a quiet Sunday morning in a normally peaceful, family-orientated suburb. It might be 
cultural; would the witness have reacted differently in a suburb populated by culturally 
different people in whom they pre-suppose a less acceptable standard of behaviour. The judge 
cannot know. The judge can only surmise that jurors operate to the same cultural code in their 
deliberations as she or he would.  
I have argued that the new reality is a community of diverse cultural origins. The values and 
predispositions are not common, as they were in the Middle Ages community that spawned 
the symbol. Then, geography limited the influx of new ideas. Thus, so-called common law in 
the Middle Ages was local, rather than common. Now, in a community no longer constrained 
by the shackles of place, can the jury be anything more than a symbol of community 
involvement in the justice system? If the answer to the question is no, can we discount its 
value as a legitimating device for the justice system for that reason alone? Alternatively, does 
the community value the jury as a synecdoche of the state and its legitimacy? If it does, the 
jury is a symbol that takes on the mantle of myth—as Barthes defines the term—that is, as 
culture’s way of thinking about something, a way of conceptualizing or understanding it.  
We have seen that it is too easy to misunderstand the ancient myth of the jury as the bulwark 
of democracy as having existed always to safeguard the rights of the individual. History tells 
us otherwise. Certainly, the Crown in the Middle Ages wanted a representative jury, but it 
wanted to define representativeness in its own image. And, the dilemma of definition still 
troubles the justice system today. The reality is that through the Middle Ages, the Crown 
manipulated the justice system and the jury system that serviced it to fulfil its needs during 
successive eras of changing social conditions. As conditions changed through the epochs, so 
did the jury’s representative nature. But always it was tailored to suit contemporary needs of 
the Crown. We are still doing that, as attempts to reform the jury selection process attest. 





However, as we saw with the hallowed principle of “beyond reasonable doubt,” we should be 
wary of investing the myth with more substance than it deserves.  
Conclusion 
Is Jury trial the community’s sacrosanct right?  
If one purpose of the representative jury is to guard against an arbitrary verdict of guilty, 
another is to ensure that a judge sitting alone does not arbitrarily acquit a guilty accused. 
Therefore, the philosophical question is whether the right to jury trial belongs primarily to the 
community or to the accused. The community regards its involvement in the jury system as 
its right. According to Valerie Hans, its preference for jury trial over that by judge alone is 
universal, and apparently increasing. The jury is the community’s representative in the 
system to see that justice is done. Justice will be done to the community’s satisfaction only if 
verdicts and sentences reflect its values, or, expressing it more cynically, if they reflect the 
prevailing standards that pass for values. If that is what it is, then, as we progressively 
demythologise our society, would ridding the justice system of the jury be another weakening 
of the cohering bonds that give community its meaning? On the other hand, there is today no 
single community, with its simpler moral life, common ideals, commitment, and expectations 
stemming from the same inherited values.
804
  That would be an ideal community; but it is 
conjectural. Today’s jury does not comprise individuals from a single culture. It represents 
diverse cultures and sub-cultures, each of whom will extract their own social meaning from 
courtroom discourse. In that case, the jury as a putative link in the cohering bonds of the 
community has lost its relevance. Should the jury trial still be the community’s sacrosanct 
right? That is the conversation the state must have with its people. 
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Appendix one:  Voir Dire argument on application of s 31A  of   
Evidence Act 1906 (WA) 
 
Judge:    Yes.  All right. [Defence], how long is the argument likely to take? 
Defence:    Well, your Honour, I must say I was - before I answered it I was 
waiting for - to hear from the crown as - expecting that there’d be 
some 31A application.  And although we got, quite recently late last 
week (indistinct) sitting (sic) out how the crown was proposing to run 
its case, which included referring to - references to the accused being 
in custody and references to alcohol and drugs and so on. 
And I must say I didn’t have any quarrel with what was proposed by 
my learned prosecutor.  But what I was, I must say, half expecting 
was that there’d be some indication of an application under section 31 
to lead some material if not under the heading of propensity then 
under relationship.  But - - - 
Judge: But it seems the State’s not approaching it that way, [Defence].  It 
seems to me - - - 
Defence:    Well - - - 
Judge:    - - - from the way I read the letter, they’re simply relying on the 
common law relationship position, which is very different again 
from the 31A position. 
Defence:    Well, they didn’t spell that out, with respect, your Honour - - - 





Judge:    That’s how I read it, though. 
Defence:   - - - in the letter.  And - - - 
Judge:    Yes.  Because I would have expected an application the same as you 
otherwise. 
Defence:    Yes.  I was anticipating that with a statement that’s 104 pages long 
that deals not only with the five counts that are spread over 15 years, 
of five individual events that - one in 1997 and the last one 
beginning of 2012.  The 104-page statement of the witness, the - 
shall we say, the second statement, refers to a vast number of other 
incidents, arguments, physicality between she and the accused.  And 
I can’t say that I ever remotely expected them to (indistinct) simply 
going to say, “We can lead every single paragraph of that without 
any adjudication by the court” 
I mean, it’s far too wide and it’s far too prejudicial.  The very matters 
that are set out in 31A(2) in relation to probative value and the risk of 
an unfair trial, in my submission, are so apparent - I’m not saying that 
that necessarily means that the crown would lose the entire 
argument.  What I’m saying is that there has to be an argument. 
Judge:   Yes. 
Defence:    This material has to be considered in terms of, first of all, its 
probative value and, second, whether it’s outweighed effectively by 
its prejudicial value, the exercise of the discretion that’s really set out 
in subsection (2). 
Judge:    Well, that’s really the - well, that’s - - - 





Defence:    (2)(b) 
Judge:    Well, that’s really the - it seems to me what you’re articulating is 
really the common law position.  I’ll just check with [Prosecutor]. 
[Prosecutor], what is the position?  I mean, how do you propose to 
lead, as I understood it, relationship evidence?  There’s no 31A 
application before the court. 
Prosecutor:    No.  It is exactly as your Honour has said, on the basis of the common 
law position in relation - - - 
Judge:   Which is whether the probative value outweighs the prejudice. 
Prosecutor:    That would be the principle applying, yes. 
Judge:   Well, there are then a number of matters in that statement that I would 
have expected you to anticipate would be the subject of argument, 
whether his periods of custody, whether he’s a member of a bikie 
organisation, whether that has any probative value in the context of 
this case. There are a number of matters I would have anticipated that 
you would have considered. 
Prosecutor:    We have considered them, your Honour, in advance of an anticipated 
argument.  The position we’ve adopted though is that this evidence on 
the face of it, the State says, is admissible because of the common law 
relationship position.  And we don’t wish to waste the court’s 
time - - - 





Judge:    Well, where, for example, [Prosecutor], does she say that she feared 
Mr Mercanti because he’d been a member of an outlaw motorcycle 
gang?  Where in her statement does she actually say that. 
Prosecutor:    She doesn’t. 
Judge:    Nowhere. 
Prosecutor:    No, your Honour.  But the State says for some of the evidence, it 
simply forms part of the inescapable narrative.  For example, taking 
your Honour’s point about the motorcycle club, as I’ll be referring to 
it - - - 
Judge:    Yes. 
Prosecutor:    - - - some incidents happened at a clubhouse. 
Judge:    Yes. 
Prosecutor:    She first meets him - - - 
Judge:    Why does it have to be spelled out that it’s a bikie clubhouse. I mean, 
I’m just - I don’t know whether - what [Defence’s] position is on that. 
But it seemed to me it’s a couple that have a volatile relationship. 
That’s the allegation, which is not unusual. And this case could be run 
without reference to many matters that are on the face of it - the 
prejudice outweighs the probative. 
Prosecutor:    Your Honour, the State says rather than a volatile relationship, what 
this relationship is characterised by is intimidation, brutality, 
victimisation, loss of self-esteem.  It’s not two parties going at each 
other, if I can put it that way - -  





Judge:    Yes. 
Prosecutor:    - - - on equal terms.  There’s the love, there’s the helplessness, 
there’s the loyalty.  There’s all those aspects of it which are going to 
be significantly probative in terms of the offences charged, because it 
properly explains, for example, the complainant’s reaction to those 
offences, why perhaps she didn’t leave him at the time.  It explains 
the motivation for the commission of some of those offences.  The 
jealousy aspect of it is accepted.  So it’s all inextricably interlinked. 
This story - sorry; this trial will be about the relationship between 
these two parties.  And the State’s position is the jury needs to 
consider all the evidence of that relationship and not consider it in a 
vacuum, otherwise the incidents themselves the subject of charges 
will not be comprehensible. 
Judge:    I’ve understood the relationship argument.  But the extent of it, a lot 
will depend upon, I think, submissions from either side. 
I mean, what are you objecting to, [Defence]?  Have you made it clear 
to the State what it is? 
Defence:   Well, your Honour, I think the authorities spell out that it’s not up to 
us to lay down the objections.  It’s up to the prosecution to indicate 
what it wants to lead.  And it’s just not good enough for it to say, 
“There’s 104 pages plus some extra - additional proofing.  We want 
to lead all of them”.  I mean, one of the things that we got in the 
additional proofing, the last paragraph refers to an incident involving 
the discharge of a firearm and we’d never heard of it before.  We only 
got notice of that late last week. 





 The prosecution seems to be saying it wants to lead that in addition to 
every other page of the statement.  In my submission, it has to spell 
out what it wants to lead.  It’s not good enough simply to say, “Well, 
we want to show that she was overborne by the accused, or she was 
frightened of the accused”.  I mean, she can say those things.  And it 
may be that they’re - it may well be that they’re illustrated or at least 
there’s an attempt through the evidence to illustrate it from the 
evidence pertaining to the counts themselves. 
I’m not suggesting that nothing apart from those five dates should - 
can possibly be led in this case.  But we want to know what the limits 
are, your Honour.  We can’t possibly - - - 
Judge:    I understand that.  What [Prosecutor] is saying - what the State is 
saying is, “We want to lead the entirety of Ms Kingdon’s deposition.” 
Under the Criminal Procedure Act, section 96(3)(d)
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, there’s an 
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 Section 96(3) (d) reads: 
 (3) Within the prescribed period before the trial date for a charge in 
an indictment, the accused must lodge and serve the 
 following  
… 
(d) written notice of any objection by the accused to — 
(i) any document that the prosecutor intends to 
adduce at the trial; or 
(ii) any evidence to be given by a witness whom the 
prosecutor intends to call at the trial, and the grounds for the 
objection. 





obligation on the defence to give written notice of any objection by 
the accused to any document that the prosecutor intends to adduce at 
the trial, or any evidence to be given by a witness whom the 
prosecutor intends to call at the trial and the grounds for the objection. 
It seems to me that what you need to identify for [Prosecutor], and 
then ultimately maybe for my adjudication, what it is that you’re 
objecting to.  What are the general heads of objection to the statement 
of Ms Kingdon?  I think really that’s what it comes down to, 
[Defence]. 
 
Defence:    Well, I understand what your Honour is saying.  But with respect, sir, 
in my submission, given the terms of section 31A, it’s for the 
prosecution - despite what the common law position is and was before 
section 31A - - - 
Judge:   Yes. 
Defence:  - - - and it hasn’t changed apart from, shall we say, the development 
of the common law as we all know it can move; somewhat slowly, 
generally speaking.  But 31A, I think it’s fair to say, revolutionised 
the law in this state in relation to both propensity and relationship 
evidence. 
And one only has to look at the textbooks and read the voluminous 
amount of consideration given to what - well, it’s only been a decade 
or so since it was introduced.  A little more perhaps now.  But it has 
                                                                                                                                                        
 





led to a vast amount of appellate consideration and it’s led to a 
considerable amount of disputation as to what it means and where the 
limits are and so forth.  And then of course there are other issues, that 
hopefully we won’t get involved in in this case, about warnings and 
the directions - - - 
Judge:   Except in this case - sorry to interrupt you, Mr Lovitt. 
Defence:    Yes. 
Judge:    But the State is not relying - - - 
Defence:    No. 
 
 
Judge:   - - - as I understand it, on 31A at all.  So they’re not saying that there 
should be this tendency direction or propensity direction.  As I 
understand it, what they’re saying is they are seeking to lead simply 
the  background, the context in which the five alleged offences 
occurred.  In which case it’s just simply the common law 
situation.  They’ve then directed not to follow propensity reasoning 
and matters of that nature. 
Defence:    Well - - - 
Judge:   So it’s simply a - as I’ve understood it, it’s the common law 
position.  That’s all they’re relying on.  They are not seeking to rely 
on 31A.  So therefore it comes down to a question of whether the 
probative value of these additional matters outweighs the prejudice. 





Defence:   Yes. 
Judge:    That’s my understanding of it. 
Defence:    Well, your Honour, there are a considerable number of allegations of 
assaults - - - 
Judge:    Yes. 
Defence:    - - - that do not form the subject matter of counts 1 to 5. 
Judge:    Yes. 
 
Defence:   Consequently the prejudice that may well be caused is, in my 
submission, rather profound.  And also it’s fairly obvious.  But if the 
prosecution is seriously saying that it can ruminate around the 
990-odd paragraphs of the lady’s statement, the 104 pages, in order to 
show that their relationship, without any adjudication from the court, 
as to probative value, well, obviously we’ve got an argument ahead of 
us because it’ll be my submission that the - nevertheless it’s not for 
the defence to spell out what parts the - - - 
Judge:    It seems though, Mr Lovitt, under our Criminal Procedure Act it is for 
the defence to do so. 
Defence:   Well - - - 
Judge:    As I said, under section 96(3)(d) - I can hand it down to you, a copy, 
unless you - Mr Brennan’s got a copy.  But it says you are required to 
give written objection. 





Perhaps, Mr Brennan, if you could just pass that to Mr Lovitt? 
And all you need there do perhaps is just give them the heads.  What 
are - what is it that you’re objecting to?  Are you objecting to the 
periods in custody?  Are you objecting to references to the outlaw 
motorcycle gang?  I mean - - - 
Defence:    I just - - - 
Judge:   The State are entitled to know what it is. 
 
Defence:    Pardon me a moment, your Honour. 
Judge Yes, certainly. 
Defence:    Well, your Honour, I see what’s written there and I can understand 
why it exists.  But with respect, it can’t possibly mean that the onus is 
thrown upon the defence in a trial where there is a 104-page - and I 
keep repeating the number of pages - but there is a very, very long 
narrative of events spacing some 16 years by the complainant.  It 
can’t possibly mean that the defence has to articulate which particular 
parts it objects to. 
The crown’s got the burden of proving the case against the 
accused.  There are quite identifiable sections of her statement that 
relate to the five counts on the presentment.  And I anticipate, and I 
may well concede, that there is some material that the crown ought to 
be entitled to lead to show the perspectives of certain behaviour and 
so on. 





In my submission, that particular provision doesn’t effectively put the 
onus on the defence whether the crown want to lead - what if the 
victim’s - sorry, what if the victim’s statement was 500 pages 
long?  Do we simply have to - regardless of the length and regardless 
of how much in it is remote from the charges, the defence has to 
articulate what it objects to.  It just seems to me that, particular 
bearing in mind that the relationship - and it really wants to lead it 
under the heading of relationship.  Section 31 - - - 
 
Judge:   I know you keep going back to 31A, Mr Lovitt, but 31A - - - 
Defence:    I know –  
Judge  - - actually has no application in this case unless one of the - unless 
the State makes an application.  They’re not seeking to lead it under 
31A.  It is simply the common law position 
Defence:   Well, then the common law position doesn’t give the prosecution 
carte blanche - - - 
Judge:    No. 
Defence: - - - to lead what it wants. 
Judge:    No.  And that’s why you need to - - - 
Defence:    (Inaudible) 
Judge:    That’s why - sorry. 
Defence:    Sorry. 





Judge:   But that’s why you need to let the State know what it is you’re 
objecting to so that I can then rule on that. 
Defence:    Well - - - 
Judge:    Would it be helpful if the two of you - if I adjourned and you spent 
some time together? 
  





Appendix two:  Voir Dire argument on admissibility of witness 
Fisher’s testimony  
 
Prosecution:    Your Honour, if I could refer you to Ms Kingdon’s statement at page 
56 of the brief.  If I can refer your Honour to paragraph 456, because 
what’s happening is there’s an assault that’s occurred inside the 
house.  She’s gone outside.  He’s brought her back inside.  She’s 
hobbled back to the garage at 463.  Inside, he started in on her again at 
464. 
Judge:     Yes. 
Prosecution:   He started belting her again at 466.  At 470: 
I was begging Troy to stop. 
Now, we can’t possibly say where the bodily harm occurred, whether it 
was before or in the garage.  This is to be viewed as one ongoing 
assault, if I can put it that way, as the Criminal Procedure Act schedule 
allows. 
Judge:   Yes.  There’s no reason why Ms Kingdon - she can give all of this. 
Prosecution:    Of course. 
Judge:  Yes. 
Prosecution:    But what we say is the jury is going to need to understand how 
Mr Mercanti appeared, and his attitude and demeanour.  Did he appear 
angry during the course of this offence? 
Judge:     She can say all of that. 





Prosecution:  But Mr Fisher being an independent eyewitness, your Honour. 
Judge:    Mr Fisher can describe everything up to, in my view, paragraph 11. 
Prosecution:     But is the jury not going to be perplexed if Mr Fisher is not asked, 
“Well, how did he appear?” 
Judge:    “How did he appear to you, Mr Fisher?” or “How did he appear to 
Ms Kingdon?”  They’re two separate issues. 
Prosecution:  But the issue - - - 
Judge:    His attitude to Ms - to Fisher is not what he’s on - it’s got nothing to 
do with the indictment. 
Prosecution:  No, it’s not, your Honour, but it does indicate his state of mind and 
demeanour - because the State says this is relevant.  He’s come out - 
because it may be ultimately that they say, “Yes, she was outside 
naked and he came outside because he was concerned about her”. 
Now, the State says if the jury hears that Mr Mercanti has come out of 
his house, hasn’t so much glanced at Ms Kingdon, and has abused 
Mr Fisher, that can rationally affect the jury’s assessment of the 
probability of a fact in issue.  That is to say, was he being solicitous for 
the welfare of his wife and concerned because she was out there for 
some unknown reason?  Or is it because he was in the process of 
assaulting her? 
If a jury is not provided with the information that he appeared to be 
angry, a jury is going to be completely baffled as to how they’re 
supposed to interpret this evidence.  Whether he was calm, whether 





he was smiling, whether he was being friendly, whether he was being 
angry, whether he was raising his voice.  A jury is going to wonder 
why no one’s asking him - - - 
Defence:    You gave me the wrong page number. 
Prosecution:    - - - about this thing.  We simply can’t lead this evidence in a 
meaningful way, with respect, if we - - - 
Judge:     Well, I mean, you go back to paragraph 3: 
Even over the noise of the bikes I could still hear the woman 
screaming, ‘Somebody, please help me’. 
Prosecution:    Mm. 
Judge: I mean seriously, Mr Whalley.  The jury can’t follow that and work 
out what was happening?  What is being objected to at paragraph 11 
is his attitude to Mr Fisher, “I’ll punch your head off, you fucking” - 
Punch your head off your shoulders, you fucking maggot. 
Well, what’s that - - - 
Prosecution: Well, because the State says - if he - if they accept that evidence then 
whatever words he used, what he’s saying is, “I want you to leave the 
scene”.  Now, here if it’s a situation where Ms Kingdon is in a 
situation where she’s a danger to herself or whether Mr Mercanti 
doesn’t know what’s going on and goodness knows why she’s out 
here naked, one would wonder why a helpful or potentially helpful 
passerby would be told in no uncertain terms to leave the scene.  Now, 
the State - - - 





Judge:      Because of what’s said at paragraph 10, Mr Whalley: 
He was shouting.  Then he turned his attention to me. 
What happened then, Mr Fisher?---I left. 
You don’t think the jury wouldn’t get the drift? 
Prosecution:  Well, he was shouting.  The jury are going to want to know, “Well, 
what was he shouting?”  Surely.  I mean, they’re just going to think 
that we aren’t doing our job properly by asking the appropriate 
question.  He was shouting.  Well, what was he shouting?  Was he 
shouting, “Come and help my wife, come and help my wife”? 
Defence:     Well, you can argue what you (indistinct) 
Prosecution:     “Will somebody please come and help me”? 
Defence: Your Honour, there’s got to be an end to this.  Your Honour made a 
ruling. 
Judge:    Yes, I have made a ruling. 
Defence:  I normally don’t cavil with rulings.  My friend got, I think, a 
reasonably - - - 
Judge:    He was - yes, but - Mr Whalley was trying to work out the parameters 
of what the evidence - 
It’s up to paragraph 11, Mr Whalley.  That is my ruling. 
Defence: Well, your Honour’s told him and he’s still arguing the point with 
your Honour. 






Judge:    Yes. 
Prosecution:     I’m obliged, your Honour. 
Judge:    Yes.  And with the - yes, all right.  We’ll leave it at that.  Are there 
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